Bakhtiar; 3- Negotiations Between the Leader of the National Front and the Shah and Khomeini

(In the previous two parts, we examined Bakhtiar's family background and political activities. We also saw that the Shah, in the most difficult period of his reign, was forced to turn to old enemies and choose a prime minister from among the prominent figures of the National Front. However, the National Front had to decide whether to cooperate or continue the struggle against the Shah.) From the day after August 28, 1953, this was the first time that Mohammad Reza Shah decided to allow members of the National Front to return to power. Prominent figures of the National Front had repeatedly asked the Shah to refrain from direct interference in the administration of the country and to hold free elections to transfer power to the parties that the people wanted. The Shah never accepted this demand. Instead, when in the autumn of 1978, more than a year of street protests linked to nationwide strikes and no change satisfied the opposition, he turned to the National Front of Iran. Gholamhossein Sadighi, an old member of the National Front, Karim Sanjabi, who had effectively taken the leadership position of the National Front, and Shapur Bakhtiar, an important leader of the National Front, were the main candidates for the premiership. Among these three options, Gholamhossein Sadighi seemed to be the most serious name for this position. Among the politicians remaining from the era of Mosaddegh's government, he was one of the most important and had risen to the position of the second person in Mosaddegh's government. Alongside this background, he was recognized as a reputable academic figure among various groups. Although Sadighi had withdrawn from political activity in the National Front for years, due to his past and significant political credibility, there was a belief that his premiership would also be supported by important figures of the National Front. However, regardless of Sadighi's relationship with the National Front, his negotiations with the Shah did not yield results. Abbas Milani believes that the main reason for the failure of these negotiations was the set of conditions that Sadighi proposed for accepting this position. The most important of these conditions was the Shah's departure from Tehran instead of leaving the country, which Sadighi believed could prevent potential sabotage by the royal army. For someone who had the experience of the Shah's flight on August 25, 1953, and the reaction of a group of military personnel to this issue, complete trust in the royal army in the absence of the Shah seemed difficult. However, Sadighi was simultaneously adamant that the constitutional law should be strictly implemented and that the Shah should refrain from interfering in the country's affairs. Thus, the Shah had to both remain in Iran and completely relinquish his power; a position that was unacceptable to him even in the most critical and fragile days of his power in 1978. Now the Shah had only two options left: either Sanjabi or Bakhtiar. Sanjabi, during this time, made an important visit to Nofole Chateau, where Ayatollah Khomeini had migrated to France in mid-October 1978. In November, Karim Sanjabi traveled to meet Khomeini. According to Shapur Bakhtiar, this meeting was actually Sanjabi's personal initiative, and he was supposed to travel to Vancouver, Canada, to participate in the 14th conference of the Socialist International, but ended up in Paris. In an interview with Radio Iran, which was one of his affiliated media during the post-revolution struggles, he stated in 1981 about this trip: 'In the executive board of the National Front, he [Sanjabi] raised the topic of the trip, and we agreed. He had written part of his speech himself, and I wrote and corrected the rest and gave it to him to take to Canada and read at the Socialist International, saying that we are deprived of rights and that our law is not implemented, and that our king does not respect constitutionalism. All of this was without pretense. But there was no talk of Khomeini, the republic, or Islam.' However, Sanjabi never read this speech in Canada. Instead, after his meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini in France, he published a very short statement with three points. First, that the current monarchy is illegitimate. Second, that what was called the 'Iranian Islamic National Movement' would not agree to any governmental composition, and finally, that the system of government in Iran should be determined based on the principles of Islam and democracy and with reference to the people's votes. It seems that the National Front's position in the face of the Shah's protests and proposals was clarified by this statement. Bakhtiar says about this statement: 'After three or four days that he was here [in France] and wanted to meet the Imam, he negotiated with Khomeini. Khomeini had not yet mounted his horse of desire. But Khomeini thought that by attracting Sanjabi, who, as the head of the executive board, was the first person of the National Front, I can control them. The interesting issue that the Iranian nation should know is that in this contract, it is stated that the future regime should be elected with reference to the people's votes, within the framework of the Islamic and national revolution. Islam was for the first time under the pen of a successor of Mosaddegh. In Mosaddegh's school, we never talked about Islam. Islam is our religion. Being a Muslim is my own matter. It has nothing to do with politics and running the country.' Bakhtiar emphasizes in the same interview that he considers himself 'secular' and believes in the separation of religion and politics in running the country. Nevertheless, he repeatedly calls himself a 'Muslim' and states that he is not without faith. Negotiations with the Shah Sanjabi, after issuing his newsworthy statement in France, returned to Iran among his supporters, including Dariush Forouhar, who had gone to Mehrabad Airport to welcome him. However, he was soon arrested on the verge of holding a press conference, along with Dariush Forouhar. Simultaneously with these developments, the Shah's negotiations to find a prime minister from the National Front continued. According to Shahbanu Farah Pahlavi, she personally met with Shapur Bakhtiar with the Shah's approval. According to the former queen of Iran, one of Bakhtiar's conditions for meeting with the Shah was the release of Karim Sanjabi. Sanjabi was released from prison, and as he himself stated in his book 'Hopes and Disappointments,' he met with the Shah through General Nasser Moghaddam, the head of SAVAK. Abbas Milani, the author of the book 'Shah,' states about this meeting: 'It seems that Sanjabi was more cowardly than the remaining options for the premiership and clearly told the Shah that he could not accept the premiership without Khomeini's approval. He told the Shah to either calm the situation with the establishment of martial law and then hand over power to the National Front, or that this should be done with Khomeini's consent.' Sanjabi himself, in an interview conducted in 1983 with the Oral History Foundation of Iran at Harvard University, discussed his meeting with the Shah and his conditions for accepting the premiership, stating that in this meeting he had to first explain the three-point statement he issued after meeting with Khomeini. After that, Sanjabi referred to the Shah's speech in which he said, 'I heard the voice of your revolution,' and mentioned that in a revolutionary situation, a revolutionary solution should also be chosen. According to Sanjabi's account, at this moment, Mohammad Reza Shah offered him the presidency of the government. The text of Sanjabi's 1983 interview is published in his book 'Hopes and Disappointments' as well as in the twelfth volume of the 'Iran Oral History Project' series. In tape number 25 of this series, he discusses the Shah's offer and his conditions for accepting the premiership, stating: 'At this moment, when I was faced with this matter and this duty to take over the government, I realized that managing Iran in the context of the revolution, a huge revolution that is taking place in the country and with various groups fighting and massive demonstrations and strikes happening every day, and with the power that the clergy, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, had gained, with people shouting his name in all the streets and chanting 'Allahu Akbar' at night, without finding a way to communicate and cooperate with this force, it was impossible and unfeasible. Furthermore, with the history we had with the Shah, I did not consider any action possible in his presence. Therefore, I told him that in my opinion, the first action that should be taken in this regard is for His Majesty to leave the country for a while... in the absence of His Majesty, a high council should be formed... I spoke in detail about this and said that in the absence of His Majesty, a council should be formed with the agreement and cooperation of the clergy and national figures who are accepted by the public, and then we should take fundamental actions, the principles of which are outlined in a letter that I sent to you some time ago. At that time, the Shah, for whatever reason, whether his mood allowed him or he was sufficiently strengthened from abroad, or the invitation he had extended to me was merely a formality to say that he was not ready to accept responsibility, told me no, none of your proposals are acceptable. I cannot and will not leave the country. If I leave Iran, the army will not calm down, and only I can keep the army calm, and it is absolutely not permissible for me to leave the country. And I do not need a council. I will take any necessary action and will consult with individuals who are worthy, either individually or in a committee for national issues. I said the choice is up to His Majesty, and in this case, I would be excused from accepting responsibility. This negotiation lasted half an hour or perhaps less, and after that, I fell silent. The Shah asked again if you have anything else to say? I told him that my statement was just what I said and I reiterate that the foundation of the monarchy and the country is in danger.' However, at the same time, Shapur Bakhtiar was also negotiating with the Shah to accept the position of prime minister. He also had his own conditions for such a responsibility. Contrary to what Sanjabi says, that the Shah was unwilling to leave Iran or form a royal council, the Shah accepted these conditions in his negotiations with Bakhtiar. Additionally, according to Abbas Milani, based on American documents, the U.S. government at this point, namely late December 1978, which coincides with early January 1357, had concluded that it would be better for the Shah to leave the country to calm the situation in Iran. And of course, this opinion of American statesmen had been communicated to the Shah in various ways. In this context, the difference in Bakhtiar's conditions for the premiership compared to Karim Sanjabi is in one key aspect: that Bakhtiar had no condition for the approval of his premiership by Ayatollah Khomeini, and merely the implementation of the constitutional law was sufficient for him.