Bakhtiar; 6- Dealing with the 'Imam'

In previous sections, we saw that after coming to power, Bakhtiar quickly attempted to control widespread discontent by releasing political prisoners, dissolving the SAVAK, and ensuring freedom of expression. However, it seemed that all these freedoms were not enough to end the protests. During the winter of 1979 and the period of Shapur Bakhtiar's power, public dissatisfaction was rampant among the people. Bakhtiar himself had been one of these dissatisfied individuals for 25 years. Yet, now that he was in power, no one paid attention to his actions. It was as if Bakhtiar had dramatically provided the groundwork for many freedoms. On the contrary! Instead of being a balm for the pain of 25 years of repression, these freedoms had become an opportunity to expand discontent. While Bakhtiar appeared to be in 'power,' his actual ability to enact change was very limited. This was not because he lacked sufficient authority, but due to the chaos prevailing in the country, widespread strikes, and systematic sabotage by opponents. Manouchehr Razmara, the Minister of Health in Bakhtiar's cabinet, believes that at this time, real power was 'in the streets.' He stated: 'Even some ministers were not allowed into their ministries. The only minister who was present in his office until the 22nd of Bahman was me. On the third or fourth day after I became minister, 50-60 doctors came to my office and said, 'Sir, we do not accept you.' But I had a certain respect as a doctor and university professor. I told them to cooperate so that the situation of treatment and medicine in the country would not be disrupted.' As Razmara mentioned, during the first 37 days of Shapur Bakhtiar's premiership, the cabinet met only five times, and in these critical days, power was in the hands of groups such as 'the Clergy, the National Front, the Freedom Movement, and the Tudeh Party.' Whatever the case, Bakhtiar quickly realized that his government was not progressing as he had imagined, and there was no sign of the end of protests or the return of striking employees and workers to their jobs. The country remained paralyzed, and the protesters looked to Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris. In such circumstances, Bakhtiar resorted to another initiative; the Prime Minister's trip to France and meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini, who practically held the leadership of the protests and insisted that the protests and strikes must continue. He, who was adamant in his disagreements with his allies in the National Front about preventing clerics from interfering in politics, had now concluded that to resolve the crisis, it was better to approach Khomeini as a revolutionary cleric and align him with his government. This was, in fact, similar to the plan that Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front, insisted on implementing, believing that the potential success of this group in guiding the government was impossible without Khomeini's cooperation. In 1981, Bakhtiar explained the reasons for this decision, which seemed contradictory to his fundamental stance on the separation of religion and politics, in a promotional interview with his own radio: 'This was a correct political act that I undertook, and the reason is that I say. A man [Ayatollah Khomeini] unjustly rode on a group of politically unaware, oppressed, and deprived people. A large number of people had come to believe in Khomeini. I think about 50 years from now, when people read history, they should not say, 'What was wrong with this man not meeting with Khomeini to discuss problems?' Wasn't this selfishness? Wasn't this man very self-satisfied? I was thinking that I made this decision myself.' To prepare for this meeting, which could have had a fateful impact on the course of political developments and changes in Iran's political system, Bakhtiar contacted Mehdi Bazargan and shared the idea of this meeting with him. He also prepared a text as a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini to be delivered to him. As Bakhtiar states, it seemed that there was no problem for this trip and meeting with Khomeini, and for this reason, he was fully prepared to travel to France with several of Khomeini's supporters, such as Mehdi Bazargan. However, ultimately, a condition set by Khomeini caused this idea to also fail. Manouchehr Razmara, who was supposed to accompany the Prime Minister on this trip, said that when the letter was delivered to Ayatollah Khomeini through intermediaries, he stated that the condition for the meeting was that Bakhtiar resign from the premiership; a condition that Bakhtiar was unwilling to accept, believing that he had legally obtained this position according to the usual procedures of the monarchy during Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. Bakhtiar's insistence on holding the premiership, which he had obtained by the Shah's decree, indicated that he did not believe in questioning the legitimacy of his position, and although he was ready for a serious deal with Ayatollah Khomeini, he was unwilling to bargain over his position. Thus, the idea of a meeting in Nofel-Loucha and any potential deal with the 'Imam' was stillborn. After the failed attempt to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini, the next important issue that the Prime Minister faced was the return of Khomeini to Iran. Khomeini, who was now referred to as 'Imam,' was adamant about returning to Iran as soon as possible. However, Bakhtiar was trying to delay this trip. For this reason, he closed Mehrabad Airport to prevent Khomeini's plane from entering Iran. Bakhtiar believed that this delay would benefit his government and hoped that during this delay, the street presence of people who had held two rallies in support of the constitution would gain broader dimensions. Ultimately, however, Bakhtiar had to surrender to the increasing pressure of public opinion and the expansion of protests and ordered the airport to be opened for Ayatollah Khomeini's return. Khomeini's capitalist supporters also took advantage of the opportunity and quickly negotiated with Air France to rent a plane from this European company to facilitate his return to Iran. Meanwhile, during this period, newspapers enjoyed maximum freedom to publish their content, and news regarding Ayatollah Khomeini's return was published in detail. In this exciting atmosphere that emerged shortly after Mohammad Reza Shah's departure, a group of striking employees of radio and television also announced that they were willing to return to work to cover the news regarding Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival. Although Bakhtiar did not believe in freedom of expression for national radio and television, he initially agreed to this as well. He even insisted that he would strive to ensure Khomeini's security. As General Abbas Qarebaghi, the Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote in his memoirs titled 'Facts about the Crisis in Iran,' Bakhtiar also told military and security officials at the National Security Council meeting that ensuring Ayatollah Khomeini's security was very important. According to Qarebaghi, Bakhtiar also asked the army to hold a show of force in the streets of the capital before Khomeini's arrival. As General Qarebaghi wrote, these contradictory ideas greatly benefited the revolutionaries because ultimately, soldiers faced a crowd of happy supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini in the streets on the morning of Bahman 12, who approached the army's tanks with bouquets of flowers and placed flowers in the barrels of the soldiers' guns. Ultimately, about a week later, striking reporters from radio and television, some of whom were considered Khomeini's supporters and all of whom supported the revolution, published images of this event showing smiling soldiers alongside happy revolutionaries. Qarebaghi wrote that these images fueled the speculation among military personnel in other parts of Iran that in Tehran, the military celebrated Khomeini's arrival alongside the revolutionaries. Opening the airports for Ayatollah Khomeini's return became one of the main criticisms Bakhtiar faced after the fall of his cabinet and his escape from Iran. In 1981, he responded to this criticism by saying: 'Before my premiership, I had said that if he wanted to come to Iran, there was no obstacle. I believe that no Iranian can be prevented from coming to Iran. This situation where you oppose me, so you should not come, or I will not renew your passport because the Imam has said you are a hypocrite, and these statements that have been commonly used to undermine national authenticity and respect for Iranians, I am completely against all of this. Khomeini, as a citizen of Iran, has the right to come to Iran whenever he wants and leave whenever he wants. If he has committed a crime, he should be tried in court, and if necessary, he should go to prison. When he entered the atmosphere of Iran, I specifically ordered that no harm should come to him. Why? Killing Khomeini would have been very easy. To this Mr. Rabiei [the last commander of the Imperial Air Force], if I had said, [his plane] would have been shot down. He would not have done it; there were other means by which his plane could have been shot down. But then we would have mourned for this absolute Imam for 300 years instead of three years and 30 years. If Khomeini had been killed, then you would have seen that the people of Iran would have cried for several years for a criminal.' 'The Imam has come.' Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini entered Iran on Bahman 12, 1979, amidst a very enthusiastic welcome from his supporters and went to the large cemetery of the capital, Behesht Zahra. The front page of the most important national newspapers in Iran at that time, after Khomeini's arrival, reported: In his first speech in Tehran after becoming the leader of a widespread revolution, he first questioned Mohammad Reza Shah's legitimacy to rule based on fundamental democratic principles, stating that even if the people of Iran had elected Reza Shah to the throne with their vote, after 50 years, they should vote again to ask what kind of government they want. He also harshly criticized the cultural and artistic developments in Iran, the lifestyle of Iranians, and the social freedoms during Mohammad Reza Shah's rule. Ayatollah Khomeini described Iran's economic situation as deplorable and characterized Mohammad Reza Shah's initiative for land reforms and the end of the feudal system and distribution of land among Iranian farmers as a conspiracy by foreigners, especially the United States and Israel. He then launched a fierce attack on Bakhtiar's government, stating that due to the support he received from the people, he would determine the government instead of Mohammad Reza Shah. At this moment, the audience present at the speech applauded him for the first time, and then, in a disorganized manner, some even changed the applause to chants of 'Allahu Akbar.' Khomeini then, without mentioning Shapur Bakhtiar's name even once, spoke about the Prime Minister, saying: 'This man who does not even accept himself, his friends do not accept him, the nation does not accept him, the army does not accept him, only America supports him and has instructed the army to support him. England has also supported him and said that they must support him. A person whom neither the nation accepts nor any of the classes of the nation accept from anywhere you take him. Yes, there are a few thugs who are from themselves and bring them into the streets; these thugs shout and say such things. However, the nation is this. This is the nation.' At this moment, Khomeini pointed to the people surrounding him who had gathered clearly to hear his speech. However, Khomeini's threats at Behesht Zahra and even his statement that 'I will hit this government in the mouth' did not lead the government to confront Ayatollah Khomeini. And Khomeini quickly fulfilled his promise, appointing Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister three days later in an unprecedented and historic decree. While Bakhtiar and his ministers were still officially considered the government of Iran, Bazargan was tasked with forming a revolutionary cabinet and selecting new ministers appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini.