Bakhtiar; 7 - A Country with Two Prime Ministers

(In previous sections of the series on 'Bakhtiar', we reached the point where the Prime Minister ultimately agreed to the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, and following Khomeini's inspiring entry, the circle of protests expanded, and revolutionaries continued their active struggle against the constitutional monarchy with renewed spirit. Also, three days after his arrival, on February 4, 1979, in an exceptional move, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister.) From February 4, 1979, Iran had two Prime Ministers who, despite their dramatic confrontation, maintained a good relationship during their political activities, and based on many scenarios, there was a possibility that they could ultimately collaborate. However, developments unfolded in such a way that Shapur Bakhtiar and Mehdi Bazargan found themselves at odds, with the success of one determining the failure of the other. Ultimately, despite their long-standing friendship and mutual respect, Bakhtiar decided to respond more seriously to this revolutionary government. As Bakhtiar stated in a 1981 interview with his own radio, he was determined that if this revolutionary government took steps to control the ministries, he would have them all arrested: 'When I was informed that Mr. Bazargan had been appointed Prime Minister by Mr. Khomeini, I showed the clearest and most decisive reaction. In a press conference attended by 150 domestic and foreign journalists, I asked if this matter was a joke? Well, if so, we accept it as a joke. But if any of these gentlemen entered a ministry, I ordered that they be detained right there. And I believe none of them went. Neither Mr. Bazargan nor anyone else. And they wouldn't go, God is my witness.' However, Bakhtiar's critics, including Army General Abbas Gharabaghi, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, raised the question of why Bakhtiar did not issue an arrest order for Mehdi Bazargan at that time. The critics argue that if Ayatollah Khomeini's speech in Behesht Zahra on February 1 did not require legal prosecution within the framework of freedom of expression, then the actions of this opposing cleric in appointing a Prime Minister, as well as Bazargan's acceptance of this premiership, were criminal acts against the constitution of the country, and from that time, Bakhtiar should have issued orders for their arrest. The events surrounding the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, his fiery speech against the Shah and the government, and the appointment of Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister during a time when the press enjoyed complete freedom and the spirit of revolution and regime change had engulfed a large segment of Iranians, practically caused public protests to take on very different dimensions. During these days, Bakhtiar's most significant challenge was the sporadic attacks by revolution supporters on military barracks and law enforcement forces. At the same time, underground paramilitary organizations such as the Fadaiyan Khalq guerrillas or the Mojahedin Khalq were more active than ever and showed no hesitation in resorting to full-scale armed conflict. However, in contrast, security and law enforcement forces were practically in the worst state of morale and planning. The bill to dissolve SAVAK had been approved. Among the military personnel stationed in the streets, there was always the question of how to control a large demonstration of several thousand people. Amid all these security disarray, Bakhtiar and Bazargan spoke publicly against each other, each calling the other an illegitimate and illegal Prime Minister. Bakhtiar claimed that he was Prime Minister by law and with the vote of the National Consultative Assembly, while Bazargan believed that the monarchy no longer had legitimacy and by the decree of the leader of a popular revolution, he was the Prime Minister. The situation escalated to the point where Bazargan, in a passionate speech at Tehran University on February 7, called on Bakhtiar to resign to prevent further bloodshed. On February 8, a large demonstration was held in Tehran and other major cities at the invitation of Ayatollah Khomeini, which was described as a million-strong demonstration by newspapers such as Kayhan. In fact, the government's failure to confront the street presence of opponents led to a significant response to Ayatollah Khomeini's call for participation in the demonstrations. However, the most important news of that day was not the widespread demonstrations but a meeting between a group of air force personnel and Ayatollah Khomeini. At that time, Khomeini had settled in the Alavi School; an old non-profit school established by religious figures in the 1950s, located between Baharestan Square and Shemiran Gate, near the air force base. 'Homafarans' were a group in the Imperial Iranian Air Force responsible for technical matters. According to the website of the Islamic Republic Air Force, this group consisted of individuals who were hired with a high school diploma and were generally trained in specialized courses in the United States. However, according to their hiring regulations, they could never attain officer rank, which fueled dissatisfaction among them. What seriously shook Bakhtiar's power base on February 8 was not only the presence of this group before Khomeini but also a unique photo from this meeting. In this image, a large group, apparently in military uniform and seen from behind, salutes Ayatollah Khomeini. The famous photo shows the homafarans 'pledging allegiance' to Ayatollah Khomeini. That evening, Kayhan newspaper published this photo on its front page. Regardless of whether all the individuals present in this photo were indeed homafarans or not, and what role and significance this group had in the structure of the Iranian army, the image of an organized group of military personnel saluting and standing at attention before Ayatollah Khomeini held extraordinary symbolic value for the revolutionaries who were more concerned about the possible reaction of the Imperial Iranian Army than Bakhtiar at that time. Bakhtiar's government claimed that this photo was staged. According to Cyrus Amouzgar, who was then responsible for overseeing the media as the head of the Ministry of Information, the only instance in which he personally warned a newspaper in Bakhtiar's government was regarding the publication of this photo. He stated that it had been reported two weeks earlier in security reports that a group of tailors in Khurasan Square were preparing homafaran uniforms, and on the day the photo of the homafarans was published, he had no doubt that the incident was staged. For this reason, he called Rahman Hatefi, the editor-in-chief of Kayhan, and told him that the publication of this photo was beneath the dignity of the newspaper. Amouzgar stated that Hatefi also confirmed this opinion and promised that such a 'lapse' would not happen again. The front page of Kayhan newspaper on the evening of February 8, 1979. Bakhtiar's last shot One day after the publication of the homafarans' image in Kayhan, television announced that it would broadcast the film of Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival. This time, all of Iran had the opportunity to witness the numerous supporters welcoming Khomeini. These images were broadcast on February 20 and, like oil on the fire of a revolution whose flames had risen to the sky, gave renewed energy to the countless opponents. At the end of this film, in the dormitory of the Air Force Training Center in Dushan Tappeh, excited students began a rebellion with cries of 'Allahu Akbar', which quickly spread the news in the capital and caused ordinary people to head towards the Air Force barracks. As Bakhtiar's associates stated at that time, it was during these critical days that Bakhtiar began to consider implementing a second plan; ending the tolerance towards the revolutionaries and resorting to legal confrontation. Manouchehr Razmara, the Minister of Health in Bakhtiar's government and a close friend of his, describes this last idea proposed in Bakhtiar's government for resisting Ayatollah Khomeini as follows: 'Only a few people were aware of this plan, which was to have a list from General Oveisi's time of about a thousand people to be arrested. When Bakhtiar saw that there was no way to come to terms with Khomeini, he decided to arrest them on Saturday night at the Alavi School and send them to Qeshm or Kish Island, and the late General Changiz Vashmgir [Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces] was sent there to prepare for their arrival. This was a decision made by the government.' The Saturday that Manouchehr Razmara refers to is February 10. On this day, it was planned to first announce martial law to prevent street demonstrations and protests, and then, in the late hours of the day, the arrests would begin. At 2 PM, the start of martial law was announced on the radio. Meanwhile, the atmosphere in the streets was extremely tense, and more importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini also announced that he did not recognize martial law and urged his supporters to remain in the streets. With rising rumors about a possible army coup, more revolutionaries sought to obtain weapons, and as a result, clashes between protesters around police stations increased. However, more importantly than the police stations was the attack of protesters on the arms factory in eastern Tehran. If the protesters succeeded in taking control of the arms factory, a significant amount of weapons would fall into the hands of the revolutionaries. With the failure of martial law, Bakhtiar found himself in an exceptional position, issuing his final command: the bombing of the arms factory. Regarding this order, Bakhtiar stated in an interview with Radio Iran (affiliated with him) in 1981: 'In this area, homafarans and a number of clerics and riffraff had gathered, and the number of these people was increasing hour by hour. When I saw this danger, I asked Rabiei [Commander of the Air Force] if it was possible to gather them from there or not? He replied yes, but you have to give the order. So I ordered that to prevent weapons – especially light weapons – from falling into the hands of the people, this area must be bombed. To hell with losing 10 million dollars, but the country is separate from these things. And this was officially recorded in the minutes, and a colonel was preparing the minutes. Then in the National Security Council, I ordered Mr. Badrei [Commander of the Ground Forces] to send some tanks and personnel around this area. One hour was also given to the individuals, including homafarans and others, via loudspeakers to leave the area. Anyone who did not leave, they should shoot.' Thus, according to Bakhtiar's account, on the evening of February 10, he issued clear orders for suppressing the protesters, widespread arrests, and even bombing the arms factory, and then returned to his office. From here, the Prime Minister waited to see the result of this new strategy. However, this strategy not only did not keep him in power, but the events of the following hours unfolded in such a way that Bakhtiar was forced to flee from the Prime Minister's office within less than 24 hours after issuing his last orders.