Bakhtiar; Day 8 - The Last Day

(In the previous section, we reached the point where Shapur Bakhtiar issued orders for a widespread crackdown on protesters, the arrest of all leaders, and even the bombing of the arms factory on the night of February 21.) As Shapur Bakhtiar repeatedly stated after the revolution, on the night of February 21, after issuing key orders in the National Security Council to deal with the protesters, he returned home and to his office and waited to see the results of his orders. However, those who were supposed to receive these orders claim that Bakhtiar is lying about the events of that day and the orders he gave. General Abbas Qarehbaghi, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who was considered the highest military authority in Iran in the absence of the Shah, wrote in his book that the National Security Council meeting on February 21 was held before the armed clashes around the arms factory, and for this reason, Bakhtiar never issued an order to bomb the arms factory. According to Qarehbaghi, what Bakhtiar stated in the National Security Council meeting on Saturday, February 21, was an insistence on fully implementing martial law and cleansing the streets of protesters; an order that, according to Qarehbaghi's account, was practically impossible to execute. Bakhtiar claims that after the order to bomb the arms factory, he returned home and until five in the morning, he received no news from the army regarding the execution of his orders. Qarehbaghi rejected this claim as well, stating that due to the critical conditions that night, he and many other army commanders were in their offices until the morning of February 22 and were reporting to the Prime Minister throughout the night. General Qarehbaghi wrote in his book that he spoke with Bakhtiar by phone at least ten times until morning. General Abbas Qarehbaghi, who held the key position of Chief of Staff during the critical days of Bahman 57, recounts what happened to the government and the army of the monarchy on the morning of February 22 as a series of contradictory stories, with Bakhtiar and his supporters on one side and the army commanders on the other. According to Bakhtiar, he spoke by phone with General Qarehbaghi at five in the morning on February 22 and asked him to come to the Prime Minister's office at eight in the morning. He says he wanted to be informed about the situation in the capital and the latest news of the clashes in a meeting that included Qarehbaghi, as well as Major General Mehdi Rahimi, the military governor of Tehran, and Major General Abdolali Badrei, the commander of the army's ground forces. At eight in the morning on February 22, Shapur Bakhtiar was present in the Prime Minister's office. He narrates the rest of the story as follows: 'Until eight-thirty, I carried out normal tasks and was waiting for Mr. Qarehbaghi to arrive. When nine-twenty passed, I called [the army headquarters] and was told that he was in a meeting and would come. I thought he was giving some urgent orders and would come to the Prime Minister's office. It was ten o'clock, and he still hadn't come. I called again, and the operator said he was in a meeting. Then I called General Rahimi; he wasn't there. I called General Badrei; he wasn't there. The deputy military governor told me that the generals were in the army headquarters for a consultation. I became suspicious about the purpose of this meeting. When eleven o'clock came and he still hadn't arrived, I called and told the operator to tell him to come to the phone. Qarehbaghi came and said that all the generals were there and we were preparing a statement that we would inform you about.' However, General Qarehbaghi's account of what transpired describes a very chaotic and crisis-filled situation among commanders who were somewhat in deep confusion. He wrote that from the National Security Council meeting on the evening of February 21, he was receiving increasingly bad news, and by midnight, he was sure that a large amount of weaponry was in the hands of the opposition, and in addition to the clashes that occurred in the last hours of the day in front of the arms factory, he was receiving various reports about riots in military schools. Simultaneously, some commanders, including Qarehbaghi himself, concluded that the intelligence system within the army had lost its functionality due to revolutionary infiltration, and the possibility of seamless communication among them had vanished. During these hours, Qarehbaghi relied more on his personal observations with military helicopters and wrote that in one of the last flights, the helicopter carrying him was also targeted by opposition fire, which resulted in no casualties. Qarehbaghi confirmed in his book that he was summoned by Bakhtiar for a meeting at the Prime Minister's office. However, he wrote that in this conversation, he told Bakhtiar that he had asked the army commanders to gather at the army headquarters on the morning of February 22. According to Qarehbaghi, he asked Bakhtiar to wait a little so he could discuss the problems with the commanders and then come to the Prime Minister's office, and Bakhtiar agreed. On the morning of February 22, the commanders entered the headquarters one by one, and from the very beginning, the impracticality of the plan for suppression and widespread arrests was raised. Qarehbaghi quoted Major General Nasser Moghadam, the commander of SAVAK, as saying that even the Prime Minister was aware of the impracticality of his orders. Meanwhile, before the official start of the commanders' meeting, Kazem Jafaroudi, a veteran senator, contacted Qarehbaghi and told him that at four in the afternoon, Shapur Bakhtiar and Mehdi Bazargan were scheduled to meet at his house and that Bakhtiar would present his resignation at this meeting. Jafaroudi asked Qarehbaghi to attend this meeting and said that Bakhtiar would soon inform him about this meeting. Qarehbaghi claims that Bakhtiar called shortly after and confirmed this meeting. This arrangement at Kazem Jafaroudi's house is also noted in the writings of some revolutionaries, such as Abbas Amirentajam. Ultimately, the famous meeting of army commanders began at ten-thirty in the morning on February 22. In Qarehbaghi's report of this meeting, each commander expressed the significant problems they faced. Most of the commanders' statements were about the revolutionary attacks and losing control of parts of the buildings under their supervision. Until Major General Houshang Hatami, the deputy commander of the staff, described the situation and the issue of the Shah's departure from the country, stating that according to the Prime Minister's remarks, the Shah would not return to Iran. He added that Ayatollah Khomeini wanted an Islamic Republic and that the people supported him. In contrast, Bakhtiar wanted to declare a republic but lacked popular support. Major General Hatami then referred to the experience of the Turkish army in political disputes and said that it would be better for the Iranian army to declare that it would not intervene in political disputes and would remain neutral. Qarehbaghi wrote that after much discussion, the majority of the commanders agreed with this proposal, as they believed Bakhtiar wanted to declare a republic and therefore no longer needed to follow the Shah's order to support him. Thus, the army's neutrality statement was approved by a majority vote of 27 army commanders, and with the widespread announcement of this matter, the constitutional monarchy regime collapsed within hours, leading to days of chaotic turmoil; a turmoil that ultimately resulted in the formation of revolutionary committees and, after executions and bloody purges, eventually led to the emergence of a new regime called the 'Islamic Republic of Iran' from the events of 1357. The role of General Hoizer as the last nail in the coffin of the constitutional monarchy is therefore of key importance for supporters of the Shah and Bakhtiar when examining the events leading to the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Even after nearly four decades, there are still many who believe that if the army had not declared neutrality, the constitutional monarchy regime in Iran might not have collapsed, and the religious government of the 'Islamic Republic' would not have emerged with the extensive religious restrictions it imposed on Iranians. In the course of this neutrality, the name of an American general is mysteriously repeated; Robert Hoizer. General Hoizer was the envoy of the U.S. President in the historic winter of 57 to a country that was considered one of America's most important allies in the region. Bakhtiar himself was among those who believed that the army's neutrality was Hoizer's initiative to end the reign of the Shah's regime in Iran. In an interview with Radio Iran in 1360, he said: 'Now, after three years [since the revolution], I can tell you with certainty and undeniable evidence that has now emerged that Mr. Hoizer had given this order to Qarehbaghi and Fardoust before leaving [Iran]. Fardoust, who was nowhere to be seen and was hidden like a spider in a corner, was the main orchestrator of that meeting. Qarehbaghi came the next time [on February 22] and said that the army leaders had decided to be neutral. I told him, General! Neutrality between whom and whom? Our neutrality between the government and the rabble? You have helped this country so much that it has not helped any class, and then on the day when the country needs you, you act like this? And by whose permission did you do such a thing? Was it by the order of the Royal Council? I am a member of the council myself. The Prime Minister, who is responsible for the country, did not tell me such a thing last night. What kind of order is this? And from where is it?' Who is General Hoizer, who Bakhtiar identifies as the main architect of the army's neutrality? According to Abbas Milani, a Stanford University professor and historian who has conducted extensive studies on the events of that era, Robert Hoizer was the deputy commander of NATO who was tasked by the U.S. President to travel to Tehran to meet with the commanders of the Shah's army and inform them about the developments in Iran. This professor believes that to understand the mission of this American military officer, one must examine the broader context of the U.S. government's policy regarding the protests in Iran at the time. He states: 'Now, many documents have been published, and we are no longer relying on speculation in this regard. Based on the documents, it can be said with more certainty that there was a severe disagreement among U.S. officials regarding the situation in Iran. In this disagreement, there were two factions. One faction was the White House and Brzezinski [National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter], and the other was the State Department led by [Cyrus] Vance. Brzezinski believed that the Shah could stay and should stay, while Vance believed that the Shah was going and pressure should be increased on him. Mr. [William] Sullivan [the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran], due to his false pride and narcissism, was pursuing an independent foreign policy. As a result, a severe disagreement arose between the White House and Sullivan, leading to the point where Carter wanted to dismiss Sullivan. Ultimately, Vance convinced Carter not to dismiss Sullivan, but instead, Carter decided to send someone himself to Tehran for two missions: one to report on the state of the army and the other to prevent a possible coup by the army.' Thus, this American military officer arrived in Tehran in mid-January 57 and began meetings with the leaders of the Shah's army. As Abbas Milani states, with the escalation of protests in Iran, Hoizer, along with William Sullivan, attempted to establish communication between the army leaders and the revolutionaries to prevent a possible coup by the army. Qarehbaghi and Fardoust, alongside Hoizer, who entered the power equations in Iran as a lever of pressure from the U.S. government in favor of the revolutionaries and Ayatollah Khomeini, Bakhtiar in the years following the revolution repeatedly identified Abbas Qarehbaghi and Hossein Fardoust as the main agents of his downfall, and even some of his close associates accused them of treason and collusion with Ayatollah Khomeini. Abbas Qarehbaghi was a trusted military figure of Mohammad Reza Shah, who rose to the rank of army general in 1354 and had long commanded the gendarmerie. During the protests in 57, he initially became the Minister of Interior in the cabinet of Jafar Sharif-Emami. Then, in the military cabinet of Azari, he was also given the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy alongside the Ministry of Interior. Finally, with Bakhtiar's rise to power, Mohammad Reza Shah appointed him as the Chief of Staff of the Great Army to lead this important military force during the most critical days in the history of the Shah's army. Qarehbaghi announced that the army would support the Prime Minister as soon as the Shah left Iran. Alongside him, Hossein Fardoust was a very complex and influential figure who, as a childhood friend of Mohammad Reza Shah, held exceptional positions such as the head of the Shah's inspection organization and was considered one of the closest military figures to the Shah. In 57, he was the head of the General Inspection Organization with the rank of army general. Abbas Milani states that both of these individuals played a very important role in the final events of Bahman 57. He says: 'Not based on conspiracy theories but based on documents, we can say that Qarehbaghi was negotiating with the Americans at this time and was also negotiating with representatives of Ayatollah Khomeini through the Americans. All these negotiations were aimed at facilitating the transition to a new government led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Fardoust's role is shrouded in ambiguity and myth. I have heard from several sources that Fardoust spoke against excessive force in the army commanders' meeting and said that the army should not resort to violence, and in fact, he laid the groundwork for declaring neutrality. In any case, Qarehbaghi was also Fardoust's protégé and emerged from Fardoust's office.' This historian believes that alongside these two, Major General Nasser Moghadam also played an important role in these developments and was present in negotiations with the revolutionaries. He states that Moghadam's level of cooperation was such that he never thought he would be executed after the revolution. Bakhtiar and his supporters claim that he was popular in the army and that only a few commanders turned against him due to their connections with Ayatollah Khomeini and the opposition. He stated in an interview in 1360 that...