Calm Before the Storm Against the JCPOA

Despite the silence of the new U.S. president regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran during the initial days of his administration, peripheral movements indicate the possibility of a storm that could severely impact the JCPOA and U.S.-Iran relations in the coming weeks. The unprecedented and calculated message from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to the people of Iran, followed by the news of his phone conversation with Mr. Trump the next day covering Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian issue, as well as the official invitation for the Israeli Prime Minister to visit Washington for further negotiations, indicates the activation of political dimensions of Middle Eastern issues in a different atmosphere compared to the previous U.S. administration's approach over the past eight years. The second significant event in the first week of Trump's administration was the publication of a report on January 23 by the analytical news site 'Washington Free Beacon' regarding multiple meetings of two well-known Iranian figures close to the nuclear negotiations from the White House. It appears that the Persian re-broadcast of the American site's report by the Fars News Agency indicates the readiness of domestic opponents of the JCPOA to seize opportunities arising from future changes in regional policy and the efforts of the right-wing faction to play a role in transforming the structure and composition of the future Islamic Republic government. Despite the support of some retired military personnel and security officials in Israel for the nuclear agreement with Iran, Netanyahu's government has repeatedly labeled the Islamic Republic as a threat to Israel's existence and has emphasized its opposition to the terms of the nuclear agreement at every opportunity, including sessions of the UN General Assembly. In the year following the implementation of the JCPOA, and in continuation of the very cold relations between Tel Aviv and the Obama administration, Israel replaced its criticism of the nuclear agreement with a policy of silence and waiting, which cannot be interpreted as acquiescence. In the national security calculations of any responsible government, immediate and short-term dangers, medium-term threats, and preparations for long-term national defense are taken into account, with separate and complementary plans prepared for each. For example, the shift of America's political center from the Middle East to the South China Sea and Japan requires medium- and long-term preparations, or Britain is pursuing a 25-year program to equip its nuclear submarines and use Trident missiles. The Islamic Republic ruling Iran has been introduced as a more serious threat than its disputes with Arab countries in all three layers of Israel's immediate, medium, and long-term national security considerations. According to the JCPOA, a large portion of the Islamic Republic's nuclear restrictions will be lifted over the next nine years, and missile restrictions will be lifted over the next four years. Israel's two main concerns regarding the Islamic Republic are the establishment of Quds Force troops near the Golan Heights and the continued supply of military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the development of the religious government's nuclear and missile capabilities. Regarding Syria and the role of the Islamic Republic, Israel hopes, in addition to its military and political preparations based on domestic capabilities, for cooperation with Russia and the Kremlin's understanding of its security concerns. In the field of missile defense development, in recent months, new systems known as 'David's Sling' have been tested in Israel alongside the 'Arrow 1, 2, and 3' missiles, which provide the Iron Dome missile defense system with new capabilities, especially for countering missiles with ranges of 100 to 200 kilometers, drones, and low-flying cruise missiles. Israel's government intends to connect its new missile defense capabilities (David's Sling missiles and Arrow 1, 2, and 3) with the advanced U.S. missile system known as 'Aegis' and 'Patriot' missiles, which have been installed in the Gulf region, Turkey, and Israel for years. The White House has announced the establishment of an advanced U.S. missile defense system to counter missile threats from Iran and North Korea. Part of the new ballistic missile defense system, which relies on ultra-advanced radars, will be installed in neighboring countries or waters close to the two countries. The new U.S. missile defense system 'Aegis,' produced by Lockheed Martin with Boeing's assistance, will be installed in the Gulf waters, Arab countries, and Israel to counter potential threats from the Islamic Republic and North Korea in Japan and South Korea. The system mentioned by Mr. Trump is an enhanced capacity of existing systems, particularly 'Aegis,' which Israel intends to finalize an agreement with the new government in Washington to integrate with its missile system. In addition to the reference to Iran in the early days of Trump's presidency, the disclosure of frequent meetings between Trita Parsi, 'President of the Iran-U.S. Cooperation Council,' and Hossein Mousavian, former ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Germany, from the White House during the nuclear negotiations, by the 'Washington Free Beacon' site just one day after Trump's official start, and possibly learning about the subject of the meetings, is a sign of preparations for a media war against the nuclear agreement using tools that were managed by Ben Rhodes, a member of Obama's national security advisory group, to promote the agreement in the media and sell it to Congress members (a subject that Ben Rhodes has admitted to). The announcement of the creation of Trump's 'Star Wars' system, the possibility of integrating U.S. and Israeli missile defense systems, Netanyahu's media onslaught by sending a direct message to the people of Iran, and simultaneously, the revelations of the 'Washington Free Beacon' in America and inside Iran, shortly after the change of government in the White House, are developments that cannot be considered coincidental. Thus, it is conceivable that external pressures, and consequently internal pressures against the JCPOA will increase in the coming weeks. The increase in external pressures against the Islamic Republic, along with a change in the political approach of the current Tehran government (the controversial objection of Zarif to U.S. participation in the Astana ceasefire negotiations) could increase the chances of conservatives in the months leading up to the presidential elections of the Islamic Republic, arguing about the failure of the JCPOA and the necessity of a government capable of confronting the 'hostile policies of the new U.S. administration,' a development that makes maintaining the JCPOA in its current form more difficult than before.