Can the Results of Polls in Iran Be Trusted?

Iranian media has published part of a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) during the street protests of January on a sample population of 4,500 people. The poll asked people about the reasons for the protests, the problems and future of the country, the relationship between the people and the government, and the treatment of protesters. According to Mohammad Aghasi, the head of this center, the distribution of age and gender in this poll has been fully respected, and the percentage of individuals with university education and those without is completely proportional. According to ISNA, a meeting to review the results of these polls was held with the presence of sociologists, economists, and researchers at the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency. Saeed Peyvandi, a sociologist and university professor in France, answered questions from Radio Farda regarding this poll and its handling at the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency: First of all, can we trust the results of such polls in the political atmosphere of Iran? Polling is a snapshot of public opinion at a specific moment, and its validity depends on the nature of the sample population, the polling method, the proposed options in the questions, and most importantly, the political atmosphere and the trust that people have in polling centers and their freedom to express their opinions. What Mr. Aghasi, the head of the Iranian Students Polling Agency, has stated indicates that conventional criteria have been observed in the construction of the sample population, and the sample size is appropriate and sufficient. However, at the same time, the three other conditions for the validity of a poll—public trust, the type of proposed options, and the existence of freedom of expression and the ability to express opinions without fear—are not clear. For example, the question arises: when thousands of people are arrested for participating in these protests and imprisoned, or when some officials openly relate the protests to foreign countries and threats are made against protesters during Friday prayers, how can anyone feel free and unafraid to express their opinions about the protesters, their demands, or sympathy for them? On the other hand, in the Islamic Republic, there are prominent red lines that no one dares to cross openly, and as a result, polling does not address these issues, nor does it raise questions about these forbidden areas. In a meeting held at the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency, Mahdi Rafiei, the research deputy of the Iranian Students Polling Agency, raised interesting points about the conduct of this poll. For instance, he mentioned that the announcement of the poll results was delayed due to difficulties, including the arrest of researchers in some cities. Mr. Rafiei also pointed out the invalidation of many questionnaires. In my opinion, these remarks indicate that polling in the political conditions of Iran is not an easy task, and the results should be approached with caution. Thus, to what extent do the results of this poll reflect the reality of public opinion in Iran regarding the January protests? There is no possibility of verifying the poll results with published data. Only by accessing raw tables and understanding why many questionnaires were discarded can one make a judgment about the polling. We must also know whether there was specific pressure to adjust the questionnaire, omit certain results, or manipulate the statistics. For example, all domestic media censor slogans against Mr. Khamenei or the Islamic Republic. Was there also censorship during the polling? In an optimistic judgment, one might say that this poll reflects some main and general trends in public opinion. For example, those who oppose the protesters or support a hardline approach towards them constitute a minority group of 10 to 20 percent. However, judging their exact weight, considering the issues mentioned, is a difficult task. Another example can be given regarding the impact of censorship or self-censorship and fear of expressing opinions. In the poll, 40 percent of participants identified the executive branch as the main audience of the people's slogans, while 34.7 percent identified the entire system and 9.2 percent identified the clergy. While everyone knows that many slogans were against the Islamic Republic, the clergy, or Mr. Khamenei himself. The same narrative applies to the reasons for the protests. According to the discussed poll, 69 percent cited improvement of the economic situation, 30 percent protested against financial corruption, 20.6 percent against injustice, 13.5 percent against the cessation of support for certain countries like Syria and Palestine, 9.7 percent for freedom of expression, and 2.3 percent for lifting house arrest as the demands of participants in the protests. It seems that the small figure related to political demands and the issue of freedoms does not align well with reality, as everyone knows that a significant part of the slogans were political, and the economic crisis is a result of political inefficiency. However, there are points in the poll that do not seem to have been caught by the censorship blade; for example, three-quarters of the participants expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions in Iran. The main issue is not the technical and methodological flaws of ISPA's polling. Unlike some centers that tend to fabricate opinions, ISPA usually conducts polling professionally. The fundamental problem regarding this poll and other similar polls is the doubts surrounding forced manipulation of some results or the impact of censorship or self-censorship on public opinion and the types of questions asked. These are the issues that complicate polling in Iran. In democratic countries, people do not fear expressing their political opinions openly, and no one is punished for opposing the government. Polling in these countries is a normal practice, conducted by recognized centers, with no red lines or indirect statements in the questions, and there is a sense of trust among people regarding the transparency of the results. In Iran, these conditions do not exist in an ideal manner. Regarding the 75 percent who expressed dissatisfaction with the country's situation in the poll, there is no particular sensitivity among conservatives. They also believe that Rouhani's government is ineffective and that the current crisis is a result of this government's mismanagement and policies. The impact of fear and self-censorship can be illustrated by the fact that about half of those expressing dissatisfaction with the situation are not willing to participate in protests at all, and 41 percent condition their participation on the protests being peaceful. The existence of all these reactions is largely real, but the question is what impact fear or censorship has had on these responses. For example, if there were no fear of possible pursuit and punishment, would half of the dissatisfied deny participating in protests? Everyone knows that in Iran, there is no possibility of granting permission for protests to opponents, and protests are necessarily "illegal." This problem also exists regarding the question of why people do not participate in protests. 31 percent consider protests useless because their voices are not heard, 26 percent fear chaos and insecurity, 24 percent are concerned about foreign exploitation, 10 percent have issues with questioning the legitimacy of the regime, and 10 percent believe that these protests do not help the growth and progress of the country. Reading the reasons presented raises the question of how in a country where thousands are arrested within days for participating in protests or even to prevent the spread of protests, and where there are reports of dozens of deaths, many do not mention the absence of freedom or fear and repression, while simultaneously, foreign exploitation becomes a concern for a quarter of those who participated in the poll? Is this silence merely due to the way questions are posed, the proposed options, and the censorship of certain issues, or is there manipulation in the results? Why were some of those involved in this poll arrested, and what impact did this arrest have on the results? As you can see, there are many questions and ambiguities, and the lack of transparency alongside doubts about the complete freedom of polling centers does not allow for full trust in the results of such polls, although some of the data may be close to reality or reflect parts of it. Concurrently with the announcement of the poll results, a meeting was held with the participation of sociologists, economists, and researchers at the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency. In my opinion, some participants speak more candidly about the results of the poll, the state of society, and the level of dissatisfaction and existing crises. Overall, the outlook of experts and researchers is very pessimistic, and contrary to those involved who point fingers at virtual networks and foreign countries in public speeches, the experts at this meeting clearly discuss the political and economic problems and deadlocks, discrimination, corruption, and poverty as reasons for public dissatisfaction and protests. Even the head of the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency refers to the protests as a warning to the government that, if not taken seriously, will lead to catastrophe. At the same time, there were different approaches to the current situation and public protests in the meeting. For example, while former MP Tavakoli spoke about the gathering of protests, university professor Mohammad Mahdi Mojahidi pointed out that the closures, which seem to be in that state currently, should not be considered the end of the matter. Although it is unclear how much of the discussions from this meeting have been reflected in the media, most participants are concerned about the situation and the way officials are dealing with protest groups and the radicalization of protest movements. Despite the clear presentation of many issues in the meeting, it does not cross the conventional red lines; no one speaks directly and transparently about the unchecked power of Mr. Khamenei, the judiciary, the IRGC, or the Guardian Council. Revisiting the words of Mr. Ashna, the head of the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency at this meeting, reinforces the conjecture that the main goal is more political pressure on the political rival and a warning to this faction rather than a real analysis of the conditions in Iran. However, this governmental meeting may be unique in its kind in recent weeks, but it remains to be seen what real impact these meetings have on policies and whether there is a real listening ear in the establishment, as there is no sign of an effort to understand the protest movements in the statements and actions of a significant part of the establishment, including Mr. Khamenei himself and the judiciary, and the threats, humiliation, and disregard for dissatisfied people continue from them. At the same time, Mr. Rouhani and his government, who organized this meeting, do not go beyond words and generalities and do not take any steps to listen to the protests. They talk about hearing the voices of protesters and the right to legal protest, but they neither allow anyone to protest nor can they prevent the arrest of thousands and their harassment.