Carter, the Shah, and Khomeini as Narrated by American Documents

More than four decades after the Iranian Revolution, ambiguities, accusations, and conflicting narratives about this historical shock continue, including what the policy of Jimmy Carter's administration, the then President of the United States, was and what actions were taken behind the scenes regarding the Shah and Khomeini. While conservatives in America accuse Carter of naivety towards Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, turning his back on Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and 'losing Iran', supporters of the monarchy - and perhaps many Iranians - have gone a step further, viewing the Shah as a victim of a 'conspiracy' by oil companies and 'secret deals' of great powers. The prevailing and so-called 'official' belief in the West, however, is that Carter's administration was paralyzed due to internal conflicts between a moderate Secretary of State and a conservative National Security Advisor, and that Jimmy Carter was 'confused' in facing the crisis and had little capability. According to this narrative, despite all challenges, Carter remained supportive of the monarchy until the last moment, but had a 'rebellious' and 'self-willed' ambassador named William Sullivan in Tehran who was seeking to engage with Khomeini's representatives and form an Islamic Republic. Sullivan took actions behind the scenes that were not at all approved by Carter. The authors of this version of history emphasize that ultimately no one could stop Khomeini's 'uncompromising' wave, as the 'weak-willed' Shah fled and his 'paper tiger' army quickly collapsed. This story of the revolution - which is largely rooted in the views of leftist academic figures and the memoirs of former Carter administration officials - has been largely written after the occupation of the United States embassy on November 4, 1979; a time when the White House realized that secret efforts before and after the revolution to come to terms with Khomeini had backfired and that the U.S. was facing a full-blown crisis, to the extent that congressional investigations into Carter's performance regarding both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes might soon follow. According to existing documents, shortly after the embassy occupation, Carter ordered a comprehensive study of his administration's actions during the revolution in accordance with the classified documents of that time. The goal was to prepare for defense against media attacks from critics and upcoming congressional investigations to exonerate the White House from the accusation of 'losing Iran'. Initially, Carter sought to draft a document known as the 'White Paper on Iran'; a comprehensive document that would include details of internal government discussions and its actions regarding events in Iran, but his National Security Advisor opposed this. Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that similar investigations regarding China and the Vietnam War in the past had leaked to the media and embarrassed former presidents. The 'informal' National Security Council meeting, the most important meetings of Carter's government that were favored by the president, usually took place on Fridays at 7:30 AM during breakfast at the White House. In the meeting on November 13, 1978, besides Carter, his vice president, National Security Advisor, and the then Secretary of State were present. Ultimately, Carter settled for a less sensitive 'non-white' document titled 'History of U.S.-Iran Relations'. This document, at Brzezinski's insistence, began with events from 1941 when the Allies invaded Iran and overthrew Reza Shah to place Carter's policy on Iran in a 'proper perspective'; so that, according to him, supporters of the Shah or Khomeini could not solely focus on the events of 1979. Brzezinski directly oversaw the entire process of drafting the 'History of U.S.-Iran Relations', especially regarding the extent and manner of using what he called 'sexy materials' to prevent potential leaks of sensitive matters. Some of those documents, prepared using 'sexy materials', have recently been declassified and provide a different picture of Carter's administration's actions behind the scenes during the revolution and the actual performance of the Carter team during that crisis: William Sullivan, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, from early November 1978 onwards sought the establishment of an Islamic Republic and actively acted against the Shah and then against Shapur Bakhtiar. Sullivan's contacts with clerics such as Mohammad Beheshti were conducted with full knowledge and permission of the White House. General Robert Huyser, Carter's military envoy to Tehran, prevented a military coup at two critical junctures - once during the Shah's exit from Iran and again during Ayatollah Khomeini's return to the country. Just two days after the Shah's departure from Iran, the White House messaged Khomeini that the U.S. fundamentally had no objection to a regime change in Iran and that the Shah's army commanders were flexible about their political future. Only two weeks before the U.S. embassy was seized in Tehran, the White House provided fresh information regarding Iraq's military intentions against Iran to the Bazargan government in a briefing, hoping to establish better relations with the Islamic Republic. Based on documents, Carter had neither a particular animosity towards the Shah nor a fondness for Ayatollah Khomeini. He lost hope in the Shah later than all his aides and was slower than them to engage in 'direct' secret contact with Khomeini. In fact, during the height of the crisis, Carter was only after one thing: preserving America's vital interests in Iran. Carter's objectives were specifically: preventing civil war and chaos in Iran so that the safety of about 40,000 American residents would not be jeopardized, continuing 'normal' diplomatic relations with future rulers in Tehran, especially to prevent the disruption of oil flow to the West and the potential turn of Iran towards the Soviet Union. Thus, from late December 1978, Carter adopted a complete and specific program regarding this crisis that was implemented in several phases: ensuring the peaceful exit of the Shah from Iran and making sure that the Shah would not give orders to suppress from abroad; quietly contacting Khomeini in France and ensuring that the process of the future leader's return to the country would occur without conflict and bloodshed; gaining the consent of army leaders with the Shah's departure and Khomeini's arrival so that the army - or as the U.S. ambassador described it, the 'wounded beast' - would not resort to a coup or suppression; and finally encouraging army leaders and SAVAK to sit at the negotiating table with Khomeini's team to form the next government. Documents indicate that following the worsening situation in Iran, Carter and his aides - despite all initial disagreements - reached a consensus on two issues: the most important and oldest U.S. ally in the region would soon be leaving, and the U.S. must think about securing its future interests in Iran; maintaining interests necessitated that the U.S. set aside nearly two decades of policy of avoiding secret contact with critics and enemies of the Shah and directly engage in dialogue with Khomeini, who had just moved from Iraq to France, to reach an understanding. This consensus gradually emerged among the main players of the Carter administration; first Henry Precht, head of the Iran desk at the State Department in early September 1978; after him, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran in early November of that year; then National Security Advisor Brzezinski in mid-December; and finally, Carter himself in late December 1978 came to the conclusion that there was no hope left for the Shah and that it would be better for U.S. interests if he left as soon as possible. The question, however, was whether Jimmy Carter should address this issue directly with the Shah or not? Carter hesitated for a long time to do this until his ambassador reported from Tehran that some army leaders were fed up with the Shah's weakness and intended to stage a coup by January 12. The day after receiving the report, on January 2, 1979, Carter summoned the highest-ranking officials of his government to his most important government meeting, the 'Informal National Security Council Meeting', where major decisions were made. Carter initially asked the participants whether he should directly tell the Shah to step down? Only the National Security Advisor opposed this. Brzezinski's argument was that the Shah's counterpart in Saudi Arabia might react negatively to Carter's action. However, Brzezinski had no allies. Stansfield Turner, the CIA director, bluntly stated: 'The Shah must go.' Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, expressed the same sentiment in a softer and more diplomatic tone: 'The U.S. government supports the actions the Shah has taken so far, including his decision to leave the country.' Walter Mondale, the Vice President, suggested this approach: 'We should encourage the Shah to leave the country in a way that doesn’t appear to be [us] saying so.' Carter's opinion was the same. He said: 'We can pretend that the Shah's departure will be his own decision.'