Carter's Efforts to Engage with Khomeini Amid Revolutionary Executions and 'Discontent with Hijab'

Many believe that in the early months of the Islamic Republic, the United States primarily hoped to engage with the 'moderate' faction of the government, centered around the 'Freedom Movement' which had a long-standing friendship with the U.S.; figures like Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who was sidelined due to accusations of collusion with 'global imperialism' following the radicals' attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran. However, documents declassified in recent years show that the administration of Jimmy Carter, the then-President, not only had no animosity towards the Islamic Republic but was also seeking direct engagement with its founder amidst street unrest and revolutionary executions. According to these documents, in the summer of 1979, discussions at the highest levels of the Carter administration revolved around how to officially announce the transition from the Shah to Khomeini by extending an olive branch to the Ayatollah. A Pentagon policy document titled 'What to Do About Iran' explicitly emphasizes that it is time for the U.S. to abandon its 'case-by-case approach' to normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic and to engage openly with the 'real power' in Iran. The document states: 'The U.S. government must position itself to assist in the establishment of Khomeini's government.' Another document dated July 28, 1979, adds: 'The Islamic content of Khomeini's government, despite American hopes regarding women's rights and discontent in Iran over the hijab, should not hinder our policy; these are internal issues of Iran.' The report raises the question of why Khomeini still sees the U.S. as an adversary. The author self-critically responds: 'We paid more attention to Khomeini's victims than to his government and never sent an official representative to meet with Khomeini.' From the Pentagon's perspective, a shift in Washington's policy should begin with sending a special envoy to Qom to meet with Khomeini and then delivering a major speech in the U.S. in support of the revolution. The document notes that even if Khomeini reacts negatively to Carter's envoy, it is not a problem; the Soviet ambassador had visited Khomeini several times and continued to seek meetings despite being rebuffed and insulted. One example of a 'case-by-case approach' that did not meet Washington's expectations was the quiet dispatch of Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney General and supporter of the Iranian revolution, to Tehran to lobby for the reopening of a CIA base near the Soviet border. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had allowed the U.S. to establish facilities in Khabakan, Khorasan, and Behshahr, Mazandaran, to intercept Soviet military signals, but a few days after the revolution's victory, the U.S. evacuated those centers. Ramsey Clark traveled to Tehran in the spring of 1979 at the request of the White House on a 'personal' trip to negotiate with Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister of the provisional government, about the reactivation of the Khabakan center, but Clark's mission ultimately proved fruitless as Bazargan had no real power and told Clark that Washington's request would only be considered if a joint request from the U.S. and the Soviet Union was presented. Another 'case-by-case' action by the Carter administration was sending a direct confidential message to Ayatollah Khomeini; a message that was sent from Washington to Qom through Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi in the summer of 1979. Mehdi Haeri, the son of Ayatollah Abdul Karim Haeri Yazdi, the founder of Qom seminary and a close relative of Khomeini, was appointed as 'representative of the Imam' at the Iranian embassy in Washington after the revolution. Mr. Haeri's connections with American officials date back to the early 1960s when Khomeini had just emerged as an opposition figure against the Shah. According to a diplomatic report declassified in 2014, the Carter administration assured Khomeini in its message: 'The government and people of the United States empathize with the difficulties faced by the people of Iran over the past year and support the goals of the Iranian revolution.' This message was sent at a time when the Iranian government had just executed Habib Elghanian, a famous Jewish businessman and founder of the Plasco building, and despite the Carter administration's consultations, the U.S. Congress had passed the first human rights resolution against the Islamic Republic. After returning to Washington, Mehdi Haeri reported to the U.S. State Department that Khomeini listened carefully to the message and said nothing, but seemed pleased to have received it. Ayatollah Haeri also stated that he currently had no intention of returning to Iran, as he strongly opposed Khomeini's policies, especially his theory of Velayat-e Faqih. Nevertheless, American officials remained hopeful that tangible actions could lead to an agreement with Khomeini. On October 15, 1979, about two weeks before the attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the CIA provided military intelligence regarding Iraq's potential plans to attack Iran to the Bazargan government; information that a CIA officer later stated was not taken seriously. The next day, Gary Sick, a senior White House official on Iran, proposed a trip to Tehran. His counterpart at the State Department, Henry Precht, traveled to Tehran a few days later to meet with various Iranian officials. Precht told Ibrahim Yazdi, the then Iranian Foreign Minister, on October 21: 'Let me be clear, we see no other sustainable option than Khomeini's government and have no desire other than to assist it.' According to documents, the State Department envoy conveyed the same message in separate meetings with Hossein Ali Montazeri and Mohammad Beheshti, asking them to assure Khomeini that the U.S. has 'goodwill' towards Iran. However, it seems that Khomeini, who had made many secret promises to the Americans during the revolution, now needed more public hostility towards the 'Great Satan.' Initially, it was thought that the occupation of the embassy on November 4, 1979, by a group known as 'Muslim Students Following the Line of Imam,' would end quickly, similar to the occupation of the embassy by radical leftists four days after the revolution's victory, but this time Khomeini seized the opportunity to initiate what he called the 'second revolution' and used a 444-day crisis to consolidate his power and that of the clergy.