Carter's Silence; From Guadeloupe and Hostage Crisis in Tehran to Acceptance Outside the White House

The dizziness resulting from the Iranian Revolution and Jimmy Carter's agreement in Guadeloupe for the transfer of power in Tehran was just the beginning of his hardships, especially if we ignore his domestic problems such as the declining value of the dollar and failure to control inflation in America. Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1976 after a tough competition within his own party and in the presidential elections. The defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal had made American voters eager for someone somewhat distanced from the political atmosphere of Washington and who would also pay attention to restoring ethics in politics. However, upon entering the White House and in the wake of tensions in the oil market, he called on people to save and avoid wastefulness, a slogan that was unpleasant for a highly consumerist society at that time in America and sparked the first disappointments. Rising inflation and unemployment also negatively impacted his popularity. Shortly after entering the White House, he hosted the Shah of Iran and was perhaps the only U.S. president to witness protests outside the White House while welcoming a foreign leader (the Shah of Iran), and he himself was not spared from the effects of tear gas used by police against the Shah's opponents. In 1978, when the first sparks of the Iranian Revolution were ignited, few in Washington imagined that a year later, the U.S. would lose one of its powerful allies. The Carter administration's flawed perception in Washington of the negative consequences of the reckless economic policies stemming from rising oil prices in Iran, coupled with the Shah's reluctance to open up the political space in a timely manner and the weakness of the culture of compromise within the opposition, all quickly unraveled the Shah's regime faster than expected. Newly released documents confirm the confusion within the Carter administration and its internal disagreements regarding the approach to the developments in Iran and what actions the Shah could take to contain the crisis, which also contributed to the speed of the Shah's downfall. Carter, the Shah, and Khomeini as narrated by American documents. The Carter administration and the Iranian Revolution. The Shah had, as much as he could, provided significant assistance to Richard Ford's election campaign, Carter's Republican rival, in 1976. He had once again seen the pressure from Democrats for reforms during the Kennedy era and now saw in Carter someone who would enter the White House with a human rights agenda and a focus on urging allies to respect it. There was concern in Tehran that Washington might underestimate the risk of political imbalance in Iran and the region and would not provide the necessary support for Tehran's actions, even if they were harsh, in times of danger. Two or three decades later, Dariush Homayoun, a senior official during the Shah's time, expressed in a note his regret and sorrow over Ford's defeat and the role that this defeat played in the collapse of the monarchy in Iran: 'Ford's government was essentially the same as Nixon's government, with the same spirit — men like Kissinger and Schlesinger, with deep strategic insight and close familiarity with the workings of power, and a strong will to prevent any disruption of balance, especially in the most sensitive regions of the world, including the Persian Gulf. It should not be forgotten that Nixon, with all his flaws, was one of the greatest U.S. presidents in foreign policy, and only the exceptional duo of Truman and Acheson surpassed the formidable combination of him and Kissinger. With Ford's defeat, that experienced group was replaced by novices from the presidency down, people lacking self-confidence and with vague and immature ideas, who had the least qualifications to manage a crisis; and here is where the connection between that election and that revolution becomes clear...' The inevitable transfer of power in Iran, while an ambiguous transformation, was not particularly disappointing for U.S. interests in the region compared to worse options, especially since the anti-communist tendencies of the new leaders were seen as a reliable point that made the rise of the left in Iran and the potential shift of this country towards the Soviet Union unlikely. However, the day that 'students following the line of Imam' took American embassy staff hostage in Tehran and imprisoned them in that embassy, it seemed as though Carter's own imprisonment in the White House had begun, a period of paralysis and facing an unprecedented crisis in American history. The failure of the military operation (Operation Eagle Claw) to free the hostages further exacerbated the situation. The 444 days were not only torturous for the hostages but also inflicted significant psychological and prestige damage on Carter. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although described by Brzezinski as a 'beneficial development' that would bog down the rival, did not ultimately enhance his image and credibility in the face of other crises. Particularly the day when the newly empowered regime in Iran ended the hostage crisis to Reagan's benefit and prevented Carter from remaining for another term in the presidency perhaps marked one of the hardest days of his life: Carter's efforts to engage with Khomeini amid executions and 'discontent with the veil.' Greater acceptance outside the White House. The signing of the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union for mutual arms reduction may be considered the most successful aspect of Carter's presidency. Notable success in steering Israel and Egypt towards signing the Camp David Accords can also be evaluated in this context, although during those years he faced accusations and insults from the new rulers in Tehran: 'Death to the three corrupt ones, Carter, Sadat, and Begin!' However, a closer look at the Camp David Accords reveals that the problem was more related to Israel's failure to implement particularly the second part regarding Palestinian rights than to the agreement itself. Regardless, upon leaving the White House, he stepped into a realm where his credibility and reputation became renowned worldwide. The foundation he established to support human rights and democracy, his fair and less biased activities in these areas, or the help he provided in combating epidemics in Africa, and the monitoring of elections worldwide to ensure their integrity and transparency were noteworthy and somewhat accepted and respected. In the 44 years since leaving the White House, he has broken many taboos and significantly enhanced his moral standing and respect. In other words, his success in the post-presidency era began. Emphasizing negotiation and diplomacy, Carter had successes in engaging with the stubborn leadership of North Korea, negotiated with Fidel Castro and called for lifting sanctions against Cuba, and mediated fairly and successfully in Eritrea, Sudan, Bosnia, Haiti, and more, and he continued to advocate for a just resolution to the Palestinian issue until the end. The revelations by Edward Snowden in recent years also provided an opportunity for Carter to break another taboo. He stated that in light of Snowden's revelations, if he wanted to contact a senior political figure from another country, he would write a letter and personally deliver it to the post office, knowing that he was under surveillance in other ways. He also stated that Snowden should not be on trial and that if he were still in the White House, he would have exonerated him. Even if Carter had not received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 for his services to peace and resolving international conflicts, he would still have been known as a symbol of ethics and peace in the world, especially as he remained active in these areas even in this autumn of his life. The passing of Jimmy Carter; from the loser of the hostage crisis in Iran to a global peace activist. Turning 100 and the overlooked aspects. Carter will turn 100 in October 2024. No other U.S. president has lived to this age. He is the last surviving member of the famous Guadeloupe summit, composed of the leaders of four major Western countries to manage the Iranian Revolution crisis in January 1979, a summit that found itself in a situation with little initiative in the face of rapid developments in Iran and only decided to support the government of Shahpour Bakhtiar and prevent Khomeini's monopolistic power, a decision that buried the course of those developments and resulted in what happened and what you know. With his advanced age, Carter was able to see the unintended and undesirable developments that occurred during his time due to hesitations, confusions, the lack of democratic culture and structures, and adherence to unrealistic slogans and promises in Iran, and what unimaginable dimensions and consequences they have created and what repercussions they have had for the region and the people of Iran. He also saw how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which the Camp David Accords were supposed to remedy, has evolved and how the spirit and hope embedded in that agreement have now turned to dust. In November 2019, at a religious ceremony in his hometown of Plains, Georgia, Carter explicitly stated that he views death with peace. He said, 'I have not asked God to keep me alive, but I have asked Him to give me a proper perspective on death. And now I can say that I am completely at peace with death.'