Ceasefire in Gaza; From Uncertainties to 'Decline and Bankruptcy' in Tehran

The story of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, if implemented from Sunday, January 30, contains clear points. The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is a significant advancement, one that both the current U.S. administration (Biden's government) and the incoming administration (Trump's government) claim to have played a central role in achieving. The reality may lie somewhere in between these two claims. The main preparatory work and negotiations for the agreement were carried out throughout the past year by the Biden administration along with its regional allies, namely Qatar and Egypt. The integration of Trump's team into these negotiations, along with the pressures and promises made by the U.S. president-elect to both sides of the conflict, also played a significant role in this matter. The agreement was reached against the backdrop of the weakness of the 'Resistance Axis.' The insistence of both sides on their maximalist demands was one of the main factors behind the failure of the first ceasefire and the lack of a new agreement. The fact that a new agreement has finally been reached is significantly related to the severe blows to Hamas's military capabilities and, beyond that, to its main supporter, the 'Resistance Axis' led and supported by the Islamic Republic. On a broader scale, the blows inflicted on Hezbollah for creating a new front in favor of Hamas and against Israel not only severely weakened its military capabilities but also ended its prominent role in Lebanon's political life, such that Lebanon now has a new president and prime minister who are not aligned with Hezbollah and Tehran, and the entire political structure of this country has tilted towards the West and rival Arab countries of the Islamic Republic. The military and political blows to Hezbollah, alongside the blows to the military and advisory maneuverability of the Islamic Republic in Syria, have also contributed to the conditions for the downfall of Bashar al-Assad. Thus, the Islamic Republic's 'Resistance Axis,' which was supposed to be a 'helper' to Hamas in confronting Israel, has itself faced unprecedented decline due to developments in Lebanon and Syria. Pressures in Iraq for the dissolution of the Popular Mobilization Forces and attacks that Israel and its allies have carried out against the Houthis in Yemen have further exacerbated this weakness and decline, to the extent that Israel finds itself in an unprecedented favorable security situation, without the main and chronic threat to this security, namely the conflict with the Palestinians, being resolved. It is likely that the Gaza war will deepen this wound. The staggering costs of Israel's wars and the future ahead are significant factors that led Netanyahu's cabinet to accept the agreement. Regardless, this favorable security situation, albeit temporary, has somewhat taken the wind out of the sails of the hardline forces opposing the agreement in the Gaza war. Before the U.S. presidential elections last November, there was a strong suspicion that Netanyahu had two significant motivations for his reluctance to agree to a ceasefire; one was the fear of hardline forces leaving his cabinet and the collapse of this cabinet, which would likely coincide with the revival of corruption cases against Netanyahu, and the other was that any ceasefire agreement could become a trump card for the Biden administration in its electoral campaign, especially given the differences between Netanyahu and the Democrats in the U.S. and particularly considering the experience of Trump's first term and the unprecedented actions taken in favor of Israel. With Trump's victory, it seems that Netanyahu and the Israeli right have achieved their ideal. Now he and all the hardliners in his cabinet can be assured that Trump, unlike Biden and the Democrats, has no inclination towards the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state and pressuring Israel in this regard, and will exert more effort and pressure towards the continuation of the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations between Israel and other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, than the Biden administration. Regarding pressure on Iran, the experience of Trump's first term has been more effective for Netanyahu (from exiting the JCPOA to killing Qassem Soleimani) than to be ignored. These reassurances, along with the pressure that Trump's team exerted on Netanyahu to show flexibility in reaching an agreement, ultimately played a major role in gradually steering him and his cabinet towards an agreement, although the intensification of discontent within the military, the effects of the war on the country's economy, the pressures from the families of hostages, and the agitation and anger of global public opinion regarding the situation in Gaza also played a significant role in Netanyahu's cabinet's concession. Now, just days before the start of Trump's presidency next week, an agreement has been reached. If the current tensions and ambiguities in Israel's position are resolved, from Sunday, the first phase of the ceasefire will be established for six weeks, and 33 hostages will be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners. However, a ceasefire does not necessarily mean the end of the war, and until then, there is still a long and difficult road ahead in the Middle East, and it is unclear whether it can even be traversed. This agreement also implies that Netanyahu has not achieved two strategic objectives of the war. Although Hamas has been militarily weakened, it has not been destroyed; indeed, it now has a better position among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and any political decision regarding these areas may not be possible without circumventing it. The fact that the freedom of hostages is now possible not through war but through an agreement with Hamas also contradicts the strategic objective of the war. Yielding to a concession such as the release of a relatively high number of Palestinian prisoners in this agreement has also not been easy for Netanyahu's government. Nevertheless, if the hostages are still alive, they no longer need to fear the inhumane conditions of their captivity or being shot by Hamas members or bombed by the Israeli army. After nearly 500 painful and anxiety-filled days, they will return home. This release, however, will initially only include one-third of nearly a hundred hostages in the first 42 days. The extent to which more detailed negotiations regarding the second and third phases of the ceasefire will progress successfully within these 42 days remains a significant question mark. The people of Gaza may also find it hard to believe that the war has ended for a time. But how can survival continue in a devastated environment where no life is fundamentally possible? The grief of losing a multitude of relatives and acquaintances only leads to hatred and vengeful thoughts that Hamas will also incite. What awaits the Palestinians after the ceasefire? The Gaza agreement and the moral decline and political bankruptcy in Tehran. The administration of various sections of Gaza and the immediate relief to its different areas, while Hamas is not expected to return to this mission and Israel is not pleased with the activities of UN agencies, remains uncertain as to what mechanism it will follow and may itself become a factor for disruption in the ceasefire. Moreover, the overall fate of Gaza after the war and how it will be managed is also shrouded in ambiguity. On a larger scale, the animosity and hatred that has developed between the Palestinian and Israeli communities will likely extend the realization of the idea of an independent Palestinian state, which the Israeli right has been the main opponent of, to broader sections of this community, especially given that among some Palestinians, contrary to Netanyahu's government's expectations, Hamas is now at least politically and in terms of presence and influence, more powerful than before. Meanwhile, despite the devastation of Gaza and the deaths of 40,000 Palestinians and nearly a thousand Israelis and a large number of Lebanese, the hard core of power in Iran, from the media of the 'Leadership House' to the IRGC and other institutions of the Islamic Republic, has instilled a sense of false joy and pride, describing the Gaza agreement as a 'great blow to the Zionist enemy and a great victory for the resistance.' This propaganda and positions can only be seen as moral decline, a cover-up of the failures of the Islamic Republic's regional strategies, and a means of deceiving its own forces and evading accountability regarding a policy that is among the main factors of Iran's isolation and regression in all areas.