Chabahar, Gwadar, and the Signs of the 'Great Game' Between India and China at Sea

The ports of Chabahar and Gwadar on the Makran coast are the latest chess pieces that could determine the fate of the great game initiated by the emerging powers of India and China in the northwestern Indian Ocean. China's decision to deploy several of its warships and submarines at Gwadar port in Pakistan is one of the latest moves by Beijing in this game, which has sounded alarm bells in New Delhi. India was likely aware of this decision before it became public and has recently attempted to send an Indian submarine into Pakistani waters for reconnaissance purposes, which was forced to retreat by the Pakistani Navy. The economic and military significance of Gwadar lies at the southern terminus of the 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,' a 2,442-kilometer corridor constructed at a cost of $52 billion, connecting to the city of Kashgar in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of northwestern China. This project, expected to be operational by 2017, is economically significant as it provides a cost-effective transit route for China and facilitates greater exports of Chinese goods to Middle Eastern and African countries through the Indian Ocean. More importantly, this corridor could alleviate what is termed the 'Malacca dilemma,' meaning that China's imported oil, whether from Gulf countries or from Africa or Latin America, must pass through the Malacca Strait, which can be disrupted due to political reasons, oil spills, terrorist attacks, and piracy, potentially inflating global oil prices and adding thousands of miles to the maritime route for oil delivery to China. From a military and strategic perspective, China has gained a foothold in the Oman Sea and the Indian Ocean, which is crucial for its maritime strategy to become a major naval power. In contrast, India perceives the deployment of Chinese naval units at Gwadar as a threat to its security, aimed at counterbalancing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean by its two hostile neighbors. Some Indian defense experts believe that Gwadar port not only enhances Pakistan's military capability but also facilitates Chinese naval access to the Arabian Sea and countries along the northwestern Indian Ocean. China's presence in Gwadar directly links it to the commercial shipping routes of the Persian Gulf, the Oman Sea, and the Arabian Sea, altering the geopolitical map of the region by providing strategic depth to the navies of Pakistan and China. According to former Indian Navy Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta, Pakistan could control the 'lifeline of global energy' using Gwadar. Under a $5 billion contract, Pakistan is set to receive eight S-20 class submarines (designed for hunting and destroying enemy submarines) with air-independent propulsion systems from China. Beyond military concerns from India, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, fully funded by Chinese investment, has called into question India's plans to access Central Asia. Gwadar and the geopolitical developments stemming from it will have negative impacts on India's security and its position in the region. Furthermore, the economic corridor project is likely to bring Beijing and Islamabad closer together, which is another source of concern for India. Some Indian analysts believe that the mentioned project is far more than a commercial relationship and that the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the utilization of Gwadar as a commercial and military port could strengthen the positions of both countries against India and even affect American influence in Asia. In light of these developments and the rising tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, the Indian Navy has increased its patrols and is closely monitoring the movements of Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean. In this context, Admiral Sunil Lanba, the Chief of the Indian Navy, recently stated: 'We are closely monitoring the movements of Chinese ships and submarines, including nuclear submarines, and continuously tracking their traffic in the Indian Ocean.' The Chabahar project, a trilateral agreement, has seen India ramp up its efforts to realize the Chabahar project, located 72 kilometers west of Gwadar. According to the newspaper 'New Indian Express,' India has invested $2 billion in Chabahar, which holds economic and strategic importance. Chabahar allows India to establish trade relations with Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan, exporting its goods through Afghanistan to landlocked Central Asian countries, and increasing its exports to Iran. The development of this port will also expedite the implementation of the 'North-South Corridor,' which connects Northern European countries and Russia through the Caspian Sea and Iran to the countries of the Indian Ocean, the southern Persian Gulf, and South Asia. India's participation in the Chabahar project began thirteen years ago, in 2003, but its investment was delayed in some respects due to international sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear program. However, with the successful conclusion of nuclear talks and a relative easing of sanctions, India's activities at this port have been revived. Additionally, in June of this year, during the visit of the Afghan President and the Indian Prime Minister to Iran, the three countries signed a trilateral economic agreement to expedite the development of Chabahar port. Afghanistan sees this port as a better and cheaper route for imports and exports compared to Karachi and Bandar Abbas, to which it is currently more dependent for trade. Iran, by developing Chabahar, which will be the country's first deep-water port, can address some of the limitations and structural deficiencies of its ports in the Persian Gulf, accept ships over 100,000 tons, reduce its dependence on the port facilities of the UAE, and simultaneously lower transportation costs. Despite all this, Gwadar and Chabahar, besides their commercial importance, can disrupt the strategic balance in the region due to their geopolitical significance. Gwadar allows China to monitor the movements and activities of American and Indian ships in the Oman Sea and its surrounding waters. China has full control over Gwadar port, while Chabahar, as Iranian officials have emphasized, will be managed by Iran. This port is not considered a military port for India, but Iran's logistical support for India at this port will enable Indian ships to increase their reconnaissance operations in the Oman Sea and the Arabian Sea and monitor Chinese naval movements. Pakistan views the development of Chabahar as a threat to its security and a project to compete with Gwadar, although following the trilateral agreement between Iran, India, and Afghanistan, Pakistani political officials have not shown significant opposition to it. Rubina Ather, Pakistan's Deputy Minister of Commerce, stated that her country has minimal concerns about the trilateral agreement, saying: 'Chabahar port is not located in deep waters and will never be a competitor to Gwadar.' In this context, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Pakistan's Defense Minister, emphasized that Islamabad has no objections regarding the trilateral agreement, stating: 'At the same time, it is better for Iran to consider the implications of relations between India and Pakistan.' Conversely, Pakistani generals, including Asif Yasin Malik, a former Defense Minister, have deemed the mentioned agreement a security threat to Pakistan, stating: 'Opening this trade route will lead Pakistan to isolation.' Similarly, General Nadeem Lodhi, a retired defense general, described the development of Chabahar as a significant obstacle in Pakistan's neighborhood that could be a 'bad omen' for the country. The complexities of the Rouhani government's dual approach indicate that a new great game has begun with the political and military rivalries of India and China. It is expected that the China-Pakistan axis will exert its utmost efforts to establish its dominance in the region. In contrast, India will attempt to reduce the influence of China and Pakistan in the region by utilizing the Chabahar port, which forms part of its geostrategic calculations, and pave the way for its access to the Middle East and Central Asia. Some defense experts and media in China and India have their own analyses and predictions regarding the direction of the competition initiated in this great game. Chinese state media, pointing to the instability of countries' geopolitical priorities, suggest that the current strategic convergence between Iran and India may become fragmented in the future, and India's utilization of Chabahar may lose its benefits. Meanwhile, Indian defense circles regard Chabahar as a strategic port for India, deeming its use vital for achieving some of the country’s security objectives and facilitating trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. These circles argue that China's strategic focus on Gwadar and the economic corridor may also diminish due to insecurity and instability in Pakistan's Balochistan and Pakistan's own political instability. Despite these predictions, the competition between China and India will continue due to the mutual distrust between the two countries on one hand and the enmity between India and Pakistan on the other. However, it seems unlikely that Iran would wish to exacerbate this enmity. On the contrary, Iranian officials' statements indicate encouragement for the involved countries to pursue some form of cooperation. Hassan Rouhani, after signing the trilateral agreement in Tehran, stated: 'This trilateral agreement and the development of Chabahar is not against any country, but rather in line with the economic development of the region... This is a vital message from Tehran, New Delhi, and Kabul... that the path to progress for the countries of the region lies through joint cooperation and the utilization of regional opportunities.' Additionally, Iran has very close relations with China, and following Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Tehran in February 2016, the two countries signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement and emphasized close military and intelligence cooperation. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang considers the Chabahar project and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as complementary to each other, and reports suggest that Hassan Rouhani informed Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, of Iran's willingness to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor during the UN General Assembly in September 2016. The realization of this request, which currently seems unlikely, would geopolitically complicate the alignments of regional actors and could negatively impact the Chabahar project and India's access to Central Asia.