Challenges of Drone Production and Iran's Real Position, Final Section

In previous sections (first, second), the exaggeration of drone capabilities, questionable achievements, armed drone capabilities, stealth technology, and communication challenges were discussed. In this section, we will follow the ways to render unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) ineffective, the increasing number of countries possessing drones, the necessary requirements for producing armed drones, and finally, the level of progress and the real position of the Islamic Republic in the field of drones. Anti-drone technology has advanced alongside significant global technological advancements for the production of various drones and their capabilities. Drones, in addition to their strengths, also have weaknesses, and various methods have been devised to render them ineffective. For example, using directed-energy weapons such as lasers can blind the cameras and other devices of an armed drone, effectively blinding the operator's sensors. One of the advantages of drones, which can be controlled from very long distances, is also considered one of their weaknesses. Satellite communications, which is one way to control drones, are vulnerable and can be hacked. In some cases, drones may go out of satellite range, disrupting their control. In this regard, the Islamic Republic claims that its acquisition of the American 'RQ-170' drone was due to its use of anti-drone technology, in other words, it captured it with its 'electronic trap.' Meanwhile, the U.S. attributes the drone's crash in Iran to a technical failure. Regardless of how this American UAV came into the possession of the Islamic Republic, infiltrating the communication and control systems of drones (whether through the Global Positioning System known as GPS or radio) is possible, and for this reason, some drone-producing countries have encrypted the signals sent to these aircraft to prevent hacking. Aside from infiltrating drone communication systems, which is essentially a form of electronic and cyber warfare, military or private organizations have also taken effective steps to develop anti-drone technology. In this context, the American company Boeing, in a test with a 10-kilowatt laser cannon, was able to destroy various drones and rockets. Recently, the U.S. installed a 30-kilowatt laser cannon on the USS Ponce, which is essentially the U.S. floating forward base in the Persian Gulf. This weapon is intended to counter Iranian drones in this water area and speedboats of the IRGC. The mentioned company is set to produce laser weapons with 50 or 60 kilowatts for the U.S. military. Another innovation in anti-drone technology is the development of electronic systems for locating and identifying drones, which is being pursued in the U.S. Currently, this system can determine the location of small drones with low flight ceilings, but the ultimate goal is a system that can disable the cameras and sensors of enemy drones. The increase in countries possessing drones continues as most armies around the world strive to understand the role and position of drones as weapons of war and integrate them with other weapons. The cost of airstrikes using drones is significantly lower than conducting such operations with manned bombers. The U.S. has so far used armed drones for airstrikes in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. American drones like 'Predator' or 'Hunter' and 'Reaper' can loiter over target areas for up to fourteen hours without refueling, attacking at the right moment. From this perspective, unmanned aerial vehicles have a clear superiority over conventional bombers that do not possess such capabilities. Currently, three countries, the U.S., Israel, and the UK, have armed drones and have actively used them. In contrast, the number of countries with unarmed drones is on the rise. Ten years ago, in 2004, only 41 countries had unmanned aerial vehicles, but this number increased to 76 countries by 2011, according to a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Iran and China have also claimed to have equipped themselves with armed drones. India is also trying to equip some of its drones with smart weapons, and Pakistan, not wanting to fall behind its rival, has announced that it will produce armed unmanned aerial vehicles either independently or with China's help. Currently, Turkey has 24 drones and is striving to equip itself with armed drones. In the meantime, Australia, Japan, and Singapore have also succeeded in building reconnaissance drones, which may lead to the development of armed drones in the future. The prerequisites for producing advanced armed drones are more complex than they appear. Qualitatively, the technology required to build an unarmed UAV like the 'Predator,' which was used in the mid-90s in the Balkan War, differs significantly from the technology needed to produce drones equipped with smart weapons. Advanced armed drones of the type used in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the U.S. military require not only experienced operators at control stations but also reliable information, a very advanced communication system, access to satellite communications, and engineering of complex systems, which currently only a few countries possess. In other words, countries that have complex military technology such as nuclear weapons and satellite communications have been able to build advanced armed drones. However, some countries with this technology have not made significant progress in this area for various reasons. For example, Russia has not made tangible progress in producing armed drones due to budget cuts in its aerospace industries. France and Italy have also been unable to advance their production programs for such drones and have settled for unarmed 'Reaper' drones. France uses these drones for reconnaissance missions. In the 1980s and 1990s, with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the dangers posed by their potential use, global powers made extensive efforts to prevent the transfer of missile technology and further development of these weapons through export regulations. Currently, armed drones, like the ballistic missiles of the aforementioned decades, are not considered factors of instability, but the dangers of these drones will increase with the spread of their technology to other countries and the increase in the number of countries possessing this weapon. The real position of the Islamic Republic: The excessive interest of IRGC commanders and defense ministry officials in exaggerating stealth technology or claiming baseless ranks in drone technology, despite their obvious limitations, seems futile and unnecessary. The lack of proportionality and symmetry between claims and realities, and the display of capabilities, has led the countries addressed by the Islamic Republic not to give credibility to the exaggerations of its commanders and officials, as what they have heard has not been seen in practice. Nevertheless, IRGC and defense ministry officials continue to exaggerate drone capabilities and, in general, the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic, which undoubtedly has domestic consumption as well. The Islamic Republic, by controlling domestic media and severely countering any media challenges from abroad, has blocked the way for free access to information for the people and has bombarded them with its propaganda, sending them misleading signals. Furthermore, IRGC and defense ministry officials, instead of giving credibility to Iran's military and deterrent capabilities and displaying their claims in such a way that other countries would accept them and take them into account in their calculations, distort the facts and consider countries they deem enemies as insignificant and miserable, unable to withstand the Islamic Republic. Overall, the effectiveness of Iran's drones is not at the level and standard that IRGC commanders or defense ministry and military industry officials advertise. The drones of the Islamic Republic cannot be considered on par with the highly advanced drones that the U.S. military possesses. However, if exaggerations are set aside, despite the limitations imposed by international sanctions, the Islamic Republic has produced drones that possess relative capabilities. According to eyewitness reports in Syria, Iranian drones, such as the Mohajer and Ababil drones, have been very effective in providing information about the positions of Assad's opposition groups, guiding precise rockets and artillery fire from government forces to these positions. However, no evidence of armed Iranian drones has been observed in Syria. During the largest recent military exercise of the Iranian army in the southeast of the country and the Sea of Oman, known as the Mohammad Rasulullah exercise, the army's ground forces relied on the use of suicide drones, and there was no mention of armed drones. Whether we like it or not, Iran is considered a drone power in the Middle East, but contrary to the claims of the Islamic Republic, it does not hold the first rank in design and production. A brief look at the level of drone technology and the effectiveness of various drones produced in Israel and the export of some of them even to European countries such as the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain shows that this country holds the highest rank. Israel is the largest exporter of drones in the world. According to a report by a consulting firm in the U.S., Israeli drone and drone system exports between 2005 and 2012 reached $4.6 billion, while U.S. exports during the same period were between $2 to $3 billion. The use of drones can somewhat compensate for the shortcomings of Iran's air force, which faces serious challenges in maintaining and repairing old aircraft remaining from the Shah's era due to sanctions. Apart from the sanctions against the Islamic Republic, the disarray and turmoil in the country's military industries have also diminished Iran's progress in drone programs. A look at aerospace projects shows that the main challenge is more in the managerial domain than in the technical one. According to some Western experts, the defense projects of the Islamic Republic, like most of its industrial projects, often fail to progress due to the lack of coordination among sectors, their separation from each other, and the narrow-mindedness of responsible managers. The extent of the negative effects of these factors on the subunits of the Aerospace Industries Organization or the research centers of the IRGC is not fully known. However, managerial incompetence in the industrial sector, coupled with widespread corruption in the country, can be a hindrance even with the necessary technical skills and technology. Despite these constraints and problems, the Islamic Republic will continue its efforts to enhance its drone capacity and power.