Challenges of the Additional Protocol

About twenty years ago, in the 1990s, some countries in the international community concluded that the treaty known as the "NPT" was insufficient for comprehensive inspections of countries' nuclear activities. Consequently, one of the most important amendments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that we know today is the Additional Protocol. This protocol allows inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit declared and undeclared sites related to a country's nuclear program under conditions outlined in a multi-page document, ensuring the nature of the countries' nuclear programs. Since 1997, many countries have signed and ratified this protocol, and today about twenty countries, although they have signed it, have not implemented it. Iran is among these countries; during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and the nuclear negotiations at that time, this protocol was accepted and voluntarily implemented by Iran for a short period. Following the failure of negotiations, its implementation was halted, and the seventh parliament passed a law making its implementation conditional on parliamentary approval. Now, with about a month left for Iran and the P5+1 group to finalize a comprehensive agreement, the hottest and most contentious issues surrounding the nuclear negotiations in Iran can be summarized in a few words: acceptance of the Additional Protocol, access to military facilities, and nuclear scientists. The debate has escalated to the point where the presence of Iran's nuclear team in a closed session on Sunday led to a confrontation between the foreign minister and some parliament members, with some calling Mohammad Javad Zarif a "traitor." The voluntary acceptance of the Additional Protocol has been on paper since the initial Geneva agreement in 2013 and has been a point of understanding. This issue was also referenced in a recent agreement reached in Lausanne, but what has made the topic sensitive, according to Mark Fitzpatrick in London, is that the two main issues in the ongoing negotiations are inspections and sanctions, where Iran has limited maneuverability regarding sanctions but can influence decisions on inspections. The Director of Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies said to Radio Farda: "It is understandable that the issue of access and inspections is sensitive, and Iranian commanders do not want foreigners to have unlimited access to their military sites, but it should be said that this access will not be unlimited." Mr. Fitzpatrick, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's statements that Iran will not allow inspections of military sites and interviews with nuclear scientists, told Radio Farda: "One interpretation of the Iranian leader's remarks could be that the agency will not be allowed access to any military facilities, and since this statement was made, it has given critics of the agreement in Iran the opportunity to talk about restricting this access. In my opinion, the leader's remarks were very general and likely have been misinterpreted, as it is inconceivable that the agency would have no access to any military sites, especially considering that Iran has previously allowed the agency to visit military facilities at least 12 times. If Iran's position is to deny complete access to the agency, achieving a comprehensive nuclear agreement will not be possible." Alongside numerous comments made before and after the Iranian leader's statements by many critics, especially conservative parliament members, and aside from the impact such approaches may have on the potential for reaching a final agreement, some proposals and statements are also legally infeasible. Among them is the statement by Aladdin Boroujerdi, the head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, who said on Sunday, "Even if we accept the Additional Protocol, we will exclude the issues of inspections and interviews with scientists." This statement was made by an Iranian legislator while Saeed Mahmoudi, a professor of international relations in Sweden, says that making such an exception is not feasible. Mr. Mahmoudi told Radio Farda: "From an international law perspective, it is generally possible to make exceptions and conditions for a contract and then accept the rest of the contract. But this is not common and is usually anticipated within the contract itself. In the case of the Additional Protocol and the NPT, such a provision has not been anticipated. The basis and understanding of member countries has been and remains that no exceptions can be made to this treaty and the related contracts." Members of the Iranian negotiating team have repeatedly emphasized in various forms, both officially and unofficially, on Facebook or Instagram, that if the agency requests clarification, access to certain locations will be managed. The conditions for visits and inspections in the Additional Protocol state that this action will include observations, environmental sampling, and measurements. Analysts have repeatedly emphasized that there are innovative ways for this action. Among them is Robert Einhorn, a former advisor to the Clinton and Obama administrations on disarmament, who previously told Radio Farda: "I think the issue of denying access to military sites is incorrect. I participated in negotiations when the U.S. was negotiating with the former Soviet Union and then Russia on arms limitations. The U.S. and Russia managed to reach an agreement for verification that allowed us to enter military facilities without disclosing sensitive information unrelated to this agreement. For example, under this agreement, the U.S. and Russia could ask the other side to separate their missile warheads for counting. For this purpose, the solution was simply to cover the warheads with a cloth so that the other side could not accurately learn about the technology of these warheads. However, verification was still carried out." This initiative is proposed by Mr. Einhorn in Washington while adding that in the context of Iran, such intrusive actions are not necessarily required. Mark Fitzpatrick in London also agrees with him, adding that regarding access to nuclear scientists, Iran can use methods that both address the agency's concerns and protect the security of these Iranian scientists, especially after the assassination of some of them. However, as the Iranian foreign minister has stated, the issue of access to scientists, which critics of the negotiations and even the Iranian leader have recently discussed, is not related to the ongoing negotiations. The Additional Protocol also does not directly address this issue, and interviews with nuclear scientists are a matter that the agency must negotiate with the member state for verification of its previous actions.