In the first two sections of this article, foreign policy from the victory of the revolution in Bahman 57 (February 1979) to the fall of 1360 (1981) and the subsequent 16-year period of Ali Akbar Velayati's tenure as Foreign Minister is examined. The final section focuses on changes in the paradigm of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.
Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic; Part One: From the Revolution to Fall 1360
Until the end of Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency (1368 to 1376), he made scattered efforts to create a transformation in Iran's international relations by proposing that the "Imam" deemed relations with the U.S. permissible under certain conditions and did not prohibit it. However, Rafsanjani's efforts were a step forward and two steps back, ultimately leading nowhere. At the beginning of Mohammad Khatami's presidency (summer 1376), almost all European embassies in Tehran were semi-closed or operating at the lowest consular level. Khatami's actions were somewhat effective on two levels. On one hand, the idea of dialogue among civilizations and on the other hand, the very cautious actions of Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's former representative at the United Nations who had been appointed as Foreign Minister since August, led to the return of European ambassadors to Tehran. On the other hand, with the formation of non-governmental organizations, the model of the desirable UN governance was implemented domestically, and actions were taken to empower women, positively impacting Iran's external image.
At the beginning of Mohammad Khatami's presidency (summer 1376), almost all European embassies in Tehran were semi-closed or operating at the lowest consular level. Khatami's actions were somewhat effective on two levels. On one hand, the idea of dialogue among civilizations and on the other hand, the very cautious actions of Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's former representative at the United Nations who had been appointed as Foreign Minister since August, led to the return of European ambassadors to Tehran. On the other hand, with the formation of non-governmental organizations, the model of the desirable UN governance was implemented domestically, and actions were taken to empower women, positively impacting Iran's external image.
Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic; Velayati's 16-Year Period
It was also evident that despite the people's vote in electing Khatami, the clerics, led by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and alongside them the military, were not pleased with the implementation of the policy of de-escalation and dialogue among civilizations, fearing that the opening of the political space within Iran would raise the demands of the people or limit their actions in the international arena and profitable transactions conducted under the guise of supporting movements. Developments in both areas could have destructive effects on the regime's existence and could have taken control away from the clergy and the IRGC. Following that, with the changes in U.S. policy and the coming to power of George W. Bush (son) and the events of September 11 [despite strong pro-American sentiments among the general public in Iran], the stamp of the axis of evil placed Khatami's policies in confrontation with a new challenge. Khatami's second term was a complete retreat from actions that could have strengthened the idea of multilateralism in Iran. The beginning of the populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency (summer 1384) derailed and archived the actions taken during Khatami's time and the ministry of Kharrazi, handing over the orchestration of foreign policy to fundamentalists and advocates of Iran's nuclearization. The hide-and-seek game of Jalili as the main negotiator of the nuclear team and Ahmadinejad's statements that sanctions are worthless are among the achievements of this period that led Iran's foreign policy to a deadlock.
Following that, with the changes in U.S. policy and the coming to power of George W. Bush (son) and the events of September 11 [despite strong pro-American sentiments among the general public in Iran], the stamp of the axis of evil placed Khatami's policies in confrontation with a new challenge. Khatami's second term was a complete retreat from actions that could have strengthened the idea of multilateralism in Iran.
The beginning of the populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency (summer 1384) derailed and archived the actions taken during Khatami's time and the ministry of Kharrazi, handing over the orchestration of foreign policy to fundamentalists and advocates of Iran's nuclearization. The hide-and-seek game of Jalili as the main negotiator of the nuclear team and Ahmadinejad's statements that sanctions are worthless are among the achievements of this period that led Iran's foreign policy to a deadlock.
Ahmadinejad, by choosing Manouchehr Mottaki as Foreign Minister, effectively selected the weakest cadre for the most important mission in foreign policy. However, during his second presidential term, while the Foreign Minister was on a mission in Senegal (December 13, 2010), he insultingly dismissed him after five years and four months of service. Perhaps this is why Manouchehr Mottaki ran as a presidential candidate in the next election. Hassan Rouhani's presidency (summer 2013) promised changes that had been delayed for over thirty years. Mohammad Javad Zarif, a seasoned but overshadowed diplomat, was introduced as Foreign Minister and received a vote from the parliament. His mission was clear: - Reduce the pressure of sanctions and resolutions that had paralyzed the country, - Help realize the limited sovereignty of the moderate line through pursuing a multilateral foreign policy, and - Achieve a type of agreement that could turn the weakness stemming from incomplete nuclear capabilities into economic and international power. These goals represented a noticeable change in the paradigm of Iran's foreign policy. However, from the very first day, they faced challenges that, while not precluding the possibility of reaching an agreement, made the essence of Iran's foreign policy vulnerable. Three unchangeable areas were observed in this transformed and new paradigm: - The anti-American sentiment had not changed, - The anti-Israel sentiment continued with the same historical intensity, - Competition with the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, had not been abandoned. This factor contained a combination of political competition aimed at dominance over the region and religious competition through the claim of leadership of the Islamic world. In addition to all this, gradually, due to the continuation of the Syrian war, the phenomenon of rapprochement with Russia emerged, progressing to the extent of perceived strategic alliance. The small team of the Foreign Ministry under Zarif's management was able to gradually and carefully navigate through the deadlocks and achieve results. The pinnacle of this policy was the signing of the nuclear agreement known as the "JCPOA" with the 1+5 countries (the U.S., Russia, China, France, Germany, and the U.K.). In the "five plus one" formula, if we consider Iran as a contracting party with the others, we will have "seven countries" in one treaty. At the time of signing the agreement, the U.S., Russia, and China are countries that have disagreements on many strategic issues in the world, while the three countries Germany, the U.K., and France represent 19 members of the European Union. Iran had to somehow satisfy all parties. Therefore, it faced a very challenging operational environment, and moreover, countries and actors outside the agreement also sought to influence the results of the game to secure their interests or security goals. Saudi Arabia and Israel are among these actors who have special relations with the U.S. and pursue them.
Perhaps this is why Manouchehr Mottaki ran as a presidential candidate in the next election.
Hassan Rouhani's presidency (summer 2013) promised changes that had been delayed for over thirty years. Mohammad Javad Zarif, a seasoned but overshadowed diplomat, was introduced as Foreign Minister and received a vote from the parliament. His mission was clear: - Reduce the pressure of sanctions and resolutions that had paralyzed the country, - Help realize the limited sovereignty of the moderate line through pursuing a multilateral foreign policy, and - Achieve a type of agreement that could turn the weakness stemming from incomplete nuclear capabilities into economic and international power. These goals represented a noticeable change in the paradigm of Iran's foreign policy. However, from the very first day, they faced challenges that, while not precluding the possibility of reaching an agreement, made the essence of Iran's foreign policy vulnerable.
Three unchangeable areas were observed in this transformed and new paradigm: - The anti-American sentiment had not changed, - The anti-Israel sentiment continued with the same historical intensity, - Competition with the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, had not been abandoned. This factor contained a combination of political competition aimed at dominance over the region and religious competition through the claim of leadership of the Islamic world.
In addition to all this, gradually, due to the continuation of the Syrian war, the phenomenon of rapprochement with Russia emerged, progressing to the extent of perceived strategic alliance.
The small team of the Foreign Ministry under Zarif's management was able to gradually and carefully navigate through the deadlocks and achieve results. The pinnacle of this policy was the signing of the nuclear agreement known as the "JCPOA" with the 1+5 countries (the U.S., Russia, China, France, Germany, and the U.K.). In the "five plus one" formula, if we consider Iran as a contracting party with the others, we will have "seven countries" in one treaty. At the time of signing the agreement, the U.S., Russia, and China are countries that have disagreements on many strategic issues in the world, while the three countries Germany, the U.K., and France represent 19 members of the European Union. Iran had to somehow satisfy all parties. Therefore, it faced a very challenging operational environment, and moreover, countries and actors outside the agreement also sought to influence the results of the game to secure their interests or security goals. Saudi Arabia and Israel are among these actors who have special relations with the U.S. and pursue them.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, by choosing Manouchehr Mottaki as Foreign Minister, effectively selected the weakest cadre for the most important mission in foreign policy.
The two external actors mentioned above had unique destructive capabilities and political, economic, and strategic levers (and still do), while Rouhani's multilateralism was a young sapling that could not meet their demands and was therefore vulnerable to any pest. Among these pests were the destructive role of domestic fundamentalists and the power circle around the leadership on one side and the role of the IRGC commanders on the other, each of whom felt threatened by the limitation of their powers and the possibility of a decrease in their influence. Others also concealed their opposition behind the argument that Rouhani's multilateralism could lead to a Gorbachev syndrome in Iran and result in the overthrow of the religious government. This argument itself caused fear among the religious leadership of the Islamic Republic. Has Rouhani's multilateralism failed? Mohammad Javad Zarif, at the beginning of his tenure as Foreign Minister, outlined his foreign policy manifesto in an interview with Mohammad Mahdi Raji, in which he limited his mission to establishing relations with Europe and explicitly ruled out the possibility of establishing relations with the U.S. (Mr. Ambassador - Interview with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Nashr Ney, 1392). Therefore, Iran's goal was not to achieve flawless multilateralism, and from the very beginning, it sought to pursue and perhaps test a limited form of multilateralism. The nuclear agreement of Iran with the 1+5 (JCPOA) bore fruit at a time when only a short time remained of President Barack Obama's second term, and the U.S. was rapidly moving towards unprecedented and unpredictable changes. What could have saved the JCPOA was the establishment of at least a defined and limited diplomatic relationship between Iran and the U.S. Something that could have a very limited scope. For example, both countries agreeing to have a number of American and Iranian diplomats serve in each other's interest offices (the Swiss embassy in Tehran, and conversely, the Pakistani embassy in Washington) or that a small consulate with a limited number of consular staff could be present in the capitals of both countries to allow for minimal balance and adjustment. The existence of such accepted diplomatic structures could have saved general agreements with American companies, for example, with Boeing, and prevented actions that were later proposed by Donald Trump and ultimately led to the collapse of the JCPOA and the failure of Rouhani's incomplete multilateralism. In the author's view, Barack Obama created an opportunity in one case, namely direct phone contact with Rouhani and indirect (accidental) contact with Mohammad Javad Zarif in the hallways of the United Nations, but in both cases, no positive signals were exchanged due to the incomprehensible stubbornness of the Iranian side. It is possible that in the coming years, Zarif may be able to decode his direct conversations with his then-American counterpart, John Kerry, and say, for example, whether the minimum demands of the U.S. for the post-JCPOA period were raised during their walks in Switzerland, and if so, what they were and how the leadership in Iran reacted to them. It is worth noting that U.S.-Israel relations during Obama's presidency were fragile, and even many pro-Israel circles refer to Obama as the president who exerted excessive pressure on Israel to achieve the nuclear agreement. This situation did not repeat after Obama.