Changing the Structure of the Foreign Ministry: What are Zarif's Two 'Super Priorities'?

The Iranian Foreign Ministry is one of the smallest ministries in terms of size and personnel. However, it is undoubtedly one of the most important in terms of its influence on the country's fate, to the extent that the supreme leader expresses opinions on the appointment of the foreign minister in an unwritten law. This ministry, like other institutions, has undergone significant turmoil since the revolution, which is understandable given the revolutionary atmosphere. These upheavals severely affected the effectiveness of this important ministry in formulating and implementing a 'realistic foreign policy.' Moving away from idealism and training a new generation of seasoned diplomats required three decades, only to be hit by another storm that swept through the Foreign Ministry. Idealistic excesses resurfaced after 2005, leading to a massive exodus of experienced diplomats during the tenure of Manouchehr Mottaki, either being dismissed, resigning, or being sidelined. Mohammad Javad Zarif himself was a prime example of an ambassador who learned about the content of Ahmadinejad's speeches at the UN at the same time as others and was never consulted in his capacity as Iran's ambassador in New York. Like many others, he retreated to a corner until the green vote of the people in 2013 dressed him not in the garb of an ambassador but in that of a minister. In his ministerial role, he knew that during those eight years, seasoned diplomats were replaced by individuals with the 'revolutionary spirit' preferred by Ahmadinejad. It is enough to recall that during Ahmadinejad's second term, a plan to transfer 1,500 Basij forces to the Foreign Ministry was proposed (there is no data on how many of them actually entered the ministry). The state of the ministry that Zarif inherited was such that when he decided to dismiss Amir Abdollahian (the Arab and African deputy foreign minister) due to his ineffectiveness, voices like Kayhan protested. Before the dismissal order for Amir Abdollahian was even finalized, he was appointed as the director general of international affairs in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, serving as a sign of his connection to the power structures. Such individuals and their like are still numerous in the Foreign Ministry; those who are more obedient to external commands than to the foreign minister. Zarif and the two super priorities The results of the 2013 elections placed Hassan Rouhani in the presidency, while for various reasons, including the nuclear deadlock on one hand and the country's descent into the quagmire of the region, especially Syria, on the other, Iran's economy was becoming increasingly fragile. In the early months of the eleventh government, Hassan Rouhani, in an unexpected yet intelligent move, transferred the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry. This action had two significant advantages. First, Hassan Rouhani, as the head of the Supreme National Security Council, was well aware that the colorful composition of the council, including the presence of Saeed Jalili (the current representative of the leader in the council and former nuclear negotiator), would not allow progress in negotiations. Second, by focusing the nuclear file in the Foreign Ministry, the direct responsibility for negotiations was entrusted to someone who was only accountable to Rouhani and Khamenei. Shortly after the transfer of the nuclear file to the Foreign Ministry, the leader of the Islamic Republic issued the order for 'heroic flexibility' in the nuclear file during a public meeting with the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. It was clear that a significant shift in Iran's foreign policy regarding the nuclear file was about to occur. The JCPOA (good or bad) is the outcome of this shift, which was passed in the Assembly in just 20 minutes at the behest of the leader's office. (At that time, one representative sarcastically remarked that the Assembly debates for hours on issues like buying baby formula. How is it that such an important agreement was passed in just 20 minutes?) With the beginning of Hassan Rouhani's second term, it seems that 'another flexibility' from the leadership of the Islamic Republic is on the way; a flexibility that Zarif has named one of the 'two super priorities.' This super priority, as Zarif explicitly stated, is 'resolving regional problems.' Since the Syrian issue is the 'focal point' of regional problems, the second 'heroic flexibility' is logically aimed at untangling a problem that has damaged Iran's relations with the Sunni world and the Arab world. It is no secret (as it is not hidden from Khamenei) that if the JCPOA brought any financial relief to Iran, this slight financial relief is currently dissipating in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. From both the perspective of the leader of the Islamic Republic and the president, the key to resolving the issues lies in the hands of the one who previously untangled the nuclear file (with all its shortcomings). If transferring the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry was necessary to untangle it, this time, resolving regional problems requires a 'house cleaning' (or as Zarif puts it, 'streamlining') of the Foreign Ministry. To this end, he has decided to dissolve three regional deputy offices (including the Europe-America office, Asia-Pacific office, and Arab-African office) and merge them into a newly established office called the 'Political Deputy Office.' This action, while downsizing the Foreign Ministry and reducing unnecessary costs, pursues a larger but unspoken goal: cleansing the Foreign Ministry of elements like Amir Abdollahian, who, in his position as the Arab and African deputy foreign minister, was more aligned with the Revolutionary Guards than with his superior minister. At that time, Kayhan criticized the dismissal of Amir Abdollahian, stating: 'It is naive to think that the dismissal of a revolutionary diplomat is without reason.' According to the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, in the new structure of this ministry, conditions will be such that 'the general departments will be under the direct supervision of the foreign minister.' From this statement, it is evident that Zarif seeks to exert direct oversight over the structure of the Foreign Ministry and, naturally, prevent external entities from interfering in decision-making and implementation. The significance of Zarif's intentions becomes clear when we realize that over the years, many official personnel of the Revolutionary Guards have been assigned to serve in the Foreign Ministry. It is no surprise when we know that Iran's ambassador to Iraq is officially a senior member of the Revolutionary Guards. Given this, Zarif is not facing an easy task in implementing his intentions. The second super priority of Zarif The advanced Japan we know today, when defeated and humiliated from war, decided to rebuild itself, began its first decision by 'redefining the activities of its embassies.' Tokyo's directive to its foreign offices (embassies) was to focus all their efforts on economic activities. Japan, having been defeated, had nothing to offer in culture, industry, and politics, but had much to learn from the progress of other countries. Thus, the embassies of this country became the eyes and ears of Japan to propose economic-trade ideas, albeit in small sizes, to the capital, and eventually, that is what we see today. The situation of Iran, which has not recovered from the eight-year war and is mired in the nuclear file, the Syrian file, and human rights issues, receiving various sanctions for each, is not much different from Japan's situation after the war. Redefining economy-oriented diplomacy is something that has eluded Iran's foreign policy for nearly four decades. Redefining such diplomacy is immediately a 'super priority'; a super priority that can only be realized by distancing from slogans. In implementing this super priority, the 'Economic Diplomacy Deputy Office' is set to be added to the structure of the Foreign Ministry, and as Zarif himself stated, an 'economic strategy will be designed and implemented in the center and embassies, with the necessary motivation and training for managers, ambassadors, and experts'; something akin to what Japan had prepared for its revival. Innovations and shortcomings of Zarif A wise saying goes, 'With the mind that created a problem, one cannot eliminate that problem.' Immediately, a new idea and a new plan must be put forward to overcome the challenges. Four years ago, when Zarif took office as minister, Facebook and Twitter were labeled 'tools of the devil.' However, he broke this taboo to the extent that many of Iran's ambassadors now use social media. The irony of the situation is that people need a VPN to use the internet, but Zarif effectively broke this taboo, just as he appointed the first woman to the position of spokesperson and ambassador. Despite these innovations, when it comes to human rights, the ministry and the foreign minister himself struggle significantly. He claimed not to know Majid Tavakoli and Narges Mohammadi! And that no one is imprisoned in Iran for expressing opinions! While he harbors lofty ideas for specializing the Foreign Ministry, it remains unclear what his strategy is for overcoming human rights sanctions after the JCPOA and Syria. Is there a place in the new structure of the Foreign Ministry for advancing human rights in Iran?