Civil Society Activist or Government Supporter?

During the discussions between the Islamic Republic and the 5+1 countries, particularly after the significant initial agreement in Vienna, the civil society in Iran witnessed a meaningful event: a complete and exaggerated support from a range of activists for the content of the nuclear agreement, exaggerated praise for the agents of the agreement, and a celebration that went beyond mere satisfaction at the removal of the shadow of threat and insecurity from Iran, the lifting of sanctions, and Iran's entry into a new phase of international relations. This confrontation occurred while even Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged the 'data' presented against the 'gains.' Zarif emphasized after the agreement, during his presence in Parliament to explain the contents of the JCPOA, that 'in every negotiation, we have a data and a gain... We have never claimed and do not claim that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is entirely in favor of Iran. I emphasize that negotiation is a give-and-take.' The President of Iran, although repeatedly and understandably spoke of a 'victory' over the opponent (the West), nonetheless stated in a noteworthy remark that 'we were in a field where one side was Iran and the other side was diplomats from six global powers. In this competition, the referee was also aligned with the rival team, and if he wanted to blow the whistle, he would act in their favor. In such a match, the Iranian team won. Even in a football match, when we say we won or succeeded, it means we scored three goals and conceded two; now some may say that we could have used some opportunities to score more goals. We must see what team we played against; otherwise, if we sit beside the field and watch, we can make more demands.' In other words, both Rouhani and Zarif acknowledge the concessions that Iran made to reach the agreement and the costs imposed on the country and Iranians to achieve the compromise. A range of civil society activists, from a not-so-independent position unworthy of their citizenship and activism status in civil society, and rather in the role of government supporters, devoted themselves to mere celebration and support of the agreement's text. They ignored the possibility of empathetic criticism or critical support for the agreement, overlooked a facet of reality in the text of the compromise, and merely beat the drum of victory without distancing themselves from the power holders. However, as mentioned, a range of civil society activists, from a not-so-independent position unworthy of their citizenship and activism status in civil society, and rather in the role of government supporters, devoted themselves to mere celebration and support of the agreement's text. They ignored the possibility of empathetic criticism or critical support for the agreement, overlooked a facet of reality in the text of the compromise, and merely beat the drum of victory without distancing themselves from the power holders. They showed complete indifference to the costs and data that occurred and avoided presenting their independent critiques and questions. Considerations that could have been raised from an independent and national perspective, and at a specific and tangible distance from the criticisms of authoritarian peace-resisters and the attacks of domestic dialogue-averse alarmists or from a completely different angle with the warmongers of Israel and the West. This group of activists (whether journalistic, civil, or political) even ignored Zarif's 'weak cards' for 'playing' and negotiating with the West. Bad cards whose preparation was primarily the core of power in the Islamic Republic over the past years. In other words, in a normal situation, the main players in power (especially the leadership of the regime) should be held accountable for the situation imposed on the country and questioned; however, surprisingly, even the top figure of the regime was not subject to criticism and was praised by this group of activists; and there was no sense of necessity to question Ayatollah Khamenei and critique his costly policies for the country. The requirements of activism in civil society are described as an area of society and social relations that, free from direct government intervention, includes the activities of independent social groups, NGOs, and volunteers, and social forces and movements striving to realize the fundamental rights of citizens and limit political power. From this perspective, civil society activists are concerned about their professional and civil rights and issues such as democracy and development. This concern is mainly pursued and manifested in the form of group activities and actions of various associations independent of the government, and it serves as a barrier to the formation of society as a shapeless mass. Civil society is described as an area of society and social relations that, free from direct government intervention, includes the activities of independent social groups, NGOs, and volunteers, and social forces and movements striving to realize the fundamental rights of citizens and limit political power. Jurgen Habermas, a contemporary political theorist, refers to aspects and features of civil society in explaining the concept of the public sphere and in describing how public opinion is organized. He emphasizes the importance of collective and public dialogues free from domination and under coercion and threat and insecurity on important and agreed-upon topics. A platform for civil institutions and especially the press to influence decision-making and actions of the government and control the political power structure within the framework of the majority citizens' tendencies. From Habermas's perspective, the public sphere is an important realm of social life that has a close relationship with civil society; a domain that has a non-governmental and even anti-governmental function. 'Questioning the government,' 'criticizing the established order,' and 'demand-centeredness' are important characteristics of civil society. Citizens in civil society are considered active actors who continuously seek their fundamental rights in the struggle with the government. A citizen in civil society is not a submissive, obedient, silent, and compliant element. Just as civil society is significantly distanced from the shapeless and jelly-like mass society. It is in the text of the public sphere and in civil society that the government is criticized and compelled to respond and be accountable for its actions, and also forced to grant the fundamental rights of citizens. The demands raised by responsible and active citizens in civil society and demanding activists in the public sphere are discussed and pursued through civil institutions and social networks. Critique of the 'existing situation' and the effort to improve and reform the established order in the context of the responsible demand-centeredness of citizens is not only a necessity for activism in civil society but also an important component for achieving human and sustainable development. Activism under the shadow of restrictions and threats The current limitations and insecurities against Iran's civil society and its activists, and the problems and threats against the formation and movement of the public sphere in Iran, are well-known. Independent of the authoritarian approach dominating the political power structure in the Islamic Republic, the government's reliance on two components of rent (oil and gas revenues, etc.) and ideology is a serious and specific cause for threatening and limiting civil society and suppressing the public sphere. In such a context, the strategic and realistic reception of activists towards the gradual revival of civil society in various ways is not only unsurprising but also understandable. The choice among candidates that are more aligned in non-free and unhealthy but semi-competitive elections becomes tangible within this framework. On another level, as a new witness, the welcome of the nuclear agreement and reconciliation with the West, and the expression of satisfaction by the majority of society and civil society activists from the beginning of a new era of international relations is also understandable. This is independent of the importance of distancing from the threat and insecurity and the line of war against the country following the nuclear agreement. Opening the doors of the country to foreign investors and starting a new phase of economic and commercial interaction can have unavoidable consequences on social-political structures. Increased production and the possibility of employment and the vitality of industry can not only be a reason for the revival of the urban middle class but also reduce pressure from economically disadvantaged social layers under the burden of inflation and unemployment. All of this (regardless of the importance of stopping the previous costly and damaging trend) is worthy of welcome by civil society activists. Because it provides an opportunity and space for strengthening civil institutions, social participation, and pursuing fundamental demands. However, there is a significant distance between this and the independent activism of civil actors in the context of the prevailing social-political and economic transformations in the country, with their becoming passive actors or supporters and promoters of power. Where, for example, some activists or newspapers referred to the Foreign Minister—who was the executor of the core power strategy—as 'Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh' or described him as 'Arash the Archer'; they overlooked the critique of the agreement's contents; abandoned the evaluation of the 'playing cards' in the hands of the diplomatic group; avoided examining the reasons for the prolonged negotiations and the costly and adventurous nuclear programs for over a decade; refrained from judging the weight of 'data' and 'gains'; exaggerated the dimensions and content of the agreement; and praised the 'victory' without mentioning the number of 'goals' conceded—as Rouhani put it. All of this signifies indifference to the effective and real role of activism in civil society and standing in the position of an actor as a supporter or promoter of the government—or at least part of it, namely the executive branch. Demand-centered activism in civil society, despite all the limitations, obstacles, and threats it faces in Iran, is ongoing. The number of real and legal actors who pursue their rights independently of the political power structure and in the context of current realities (the rentier-ideological and authoritarian rule) is not small. Actors who strive to strengthen the foundations of civil society and, in pursuit of their civil and fundamental rights, bring the central power to the negotiating and reconciling table within Iran.