Conditions for Reducing Tensions Between Tehran and Riyadh

Last week, Hossein Jaberi Ansari, the spokesperson for Iran's Foreign Ministry, accused Saudi Arabia of instrumentalizing terrorism and stated that Riyadh supports terrorist and Takfiri groups. However, his most striking comment was describing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as part of the Saudi Foreign Ministry, despite the fact that this large organization has 57 member countries. He added that Iran's complaint regarding the Hajj last year, in which over 400 Iranian pilgrims were killed, has been fruitless in the mentioned organization. He further stated that there has been no official dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh on this matter. Relations between Tehran and Riyadh were severed following the execution of Nimr al-Nimr, the leader of Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia, and the attack on Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad last year. However, even before that, disagreements over the conflicts between governments and opposition in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq had intensified tensions in the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Some political observers believe that, in addition to the consequences of the military attack on Iraq, the results of the Arab Spring and the effects of King Salman’s ascension after King Abdullah's death are factors that have led to increased tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But under what conditions will the level of tension between Tehran and Riyadh decrease? Do both sides even desire to reduce tensions in their bilateral relations? What are the prerequisites for reducing tensions between the two countries? I raised these questions with two guests on this week's program, Hossein Alizadeh, a former diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Helsinki, and Alireza Namvar Haghighi, a Middle Eastern studies lecturer at the University of Toronto. Let's first address the factors that have contributed to the increase in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Alizadeh, should the roots of this increased tension be sought in the consequences of the 13-year-old attack on Iraq, or the outcomes of the anti-government movement over 5 years ago in the Middle East known as the Arab Spring? Hossein Alizadeh: Tehran and Riyadh are rival countries. Since the formation of Saudi Arabia as an oil-rich country, they have been in competition, but until the Islamic Revolution, this was limited to oil competition. However, with the Islamic Revolution, we know that their perspectives changed, and the issue of Shia hegemony development became significantly pronounced in the Arab view, especially among the Saudis, who play a central role in leading the Arab world. Yet, after the revolution, we also witnessed a flourishing of relations between the two countries, such as during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami, to the extent that during Khatami's presidency, Tehran and Riyadh signed a security cooperation agreement between their interior ministries. Why has this level of tension increased so much? They have a negative view of the attack on Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, which empowered the Shia, and they are suspicious of this issue. However, we did not witness an increase in tensions until the Arab Spring emerged, when Tehran sought to intervene in Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia forcefully stabilized the issue, keeping the Bahraini government in power. As the situation reversed and the Syrian story emerged, it became exactly the opposite, with Saudi Arabia wanting to remove Bashar al-Assad while Tehran sought to maintain him. This situation led to a 5-year civil war in Syria, with Saudi Arabia supporting the opposing forces while Tehran staunchly supported the Assad government. This fire spread to Lebanon, reached Iraq and Yemen, and then culminated in events like the killing of last year's pilgrims, during which the Saudis believed that Tehran wanted to use the potential of the Shia to disrupt the situation within Saudi Arabia. This escalated to the point where Saudi Arabia executed a very significant figure in the eyes of the Islamic Republic, Nimr al-Nimr, and we also witnessed Tehran's reaction. However, what I find incomprehensible and cannot rationally explain is that a person can compete and oppose, but the very grave mistake recorded in the history of Iran is the attack on the Saudi embassy, which was instigated by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia also took Tehran's condemnation to the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting and received condemnation from the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. I predict that this issue of condemning Iran for the attack on the Saudi embassy will also be brought to the United Nations. The result has been that the level of tension has risen so high that I currently do not see anything clear on the horizon. Mr. Haghighi, what is your response to the same question? The roots of increased tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Alireza Namvar Haghighi: After the improvement of relations during Khatami and Rafsanjani's presidencies, several factors changed these dynamics, mostly related to the balance of power in the region. The events of September 11 and the U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan removed a neighboring Arab country that was a balance against Saudi Arabia and Iran militarily, as well as the Taliban government. You know that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan were the last countries to have dealings with the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia had ideological and strategic influence in the Taliban government. With the removal of these two balances of power, the balance shifted in favor of Iran. The key issue was that Saudi Arabia wanted Iran to recognize its leadership over the Arab world. This was achieved during Khatami's presidency, but the current situation has changed all balances, and it is natural that Saudi Arabia would seek to tilt this balance in its favor. Additionally, with the change of government from Khatami to Ahmadinejad, who pursued an aggressive policy, these factors combined to lead the Saudi government to exploit the West's fear of Ahmadinejad's government and the new situation that had arisen for its benefit. The nuclear issue also became a new factor in the balance of power, and thus, this security and regional balance caused Saudi Arabia to see the West as closer to itself, and in some ways, Israel also supported these positions. All of this led to Saudi Arabia's policy of encouraging and provoking the West to confront Iran. However, they did this secretly, as indicated in WikiLeaks documents. They tried not to make relations too critical, partly because King Abdullah pursued more mature policies and did not want to turn the limits of competition and even hostility into an unintended war. However, two factors exacerbated this issue: one was the Arab Spring and the related events that Mr. Alizadeh mentioned. Of course, it wasn't just Bahrain; Saudi Arabia's policy was aggressive in Egypt as well, because democratic changes in these countries and changes in power structures could ideologically impact Saudi Arabia. For the first time, Saudi Arabia ideologically shifted; according to Wahhabi theory, Muslims must obey the ruler even if the ruler is corrupt. For the first time, Saudi Arabia supported uprisings against rulers, even in Libya. In such a situation where the Arab Spring could change the balance against Saudi Arabia, it caused Saudi Arabia to adopt a more hostile policy before King Abdullah's death. The new rulers also aimed to mobilize forces because they faced a succession crisis, and King Salman's son has a longer-term theory for his succession, emphasizing Iran's Shia identity to mobilize forces and draw public attention to that point, which was also compounded by the Yemen issue. Mr. Alizadeh, you mentioned that there are no signs of improved relations on the horizon. Are there any indications that at least Iran and Saudi Arabia desire to reduce the level of tension? Hossein Alizadeh: The current scene of this opposition is such that the Islamic Republic is seeking to reduce the level of tension. This is completely clear and has been stated by Iran's Foreign Minister that we are seeking to reduce the level of tension. However, I do not see any signs today indicating that the Saudis are seeking to reduce the level of tension with Tehran. None. I suspect that they are looking to increase pressure on Tehran. There is a reason for this. When they consider the Nimr Baqir issue as their internal matter, like the executions happening in Iran, or suppose Saudi Arabia comes to defend why you have Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi under house arrest. This is just an example. What interpretation arises in Iran that what does it have to do with you that we want to solve an internal issue in this way? The Baqir Nimr issue, which Tehran claimed was a cleric, was not, and I do not know that he was a Shia leader. Let me put it this way; this individual was considered the Saudi Hassan Nasrallah. When they executed the Saudi Hassan Nasrallah and awaited Tehran's reaction, it is evident that under such conditions, they have no reason to back down; on the contrary, they are increasing the costs. Countries like Djibouti, Comoros, and recently Maldives have severed relations with Iran, and Saudi Arabia has been behind these actions. I expect such instances to be repeated. Let me also say that given this situation, when the two countries essentially have two strategies in the region that do not align, there is no reason to expect Saudi Arabia to back down, especially if we also examine the cards in the hands of both countries. I regret to say that Saudi Arabia has many effective cards, while Tehran has few and not very effective ones. A simple example is that Saudi Arabia has maneuvering power in the Islamic world that Iran does not have. I refer to the 13th summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; it is enough to read these clauses. I have read all 204 clauses. It seems as if the Saudi Foreign Ministry prepared a text that 50 countries approved. I am not saying this lightly. Mr. Jaberi Ansari, the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, has stated that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation seems to be an extension of the Saudi Foreign Ministry. Consider this tool. They have multiple tools that are not appropriate to mention here. Saudi Arabia has a lot of maneuvering power. Even now, it has the votes of countries that have been within Iran's cultural sphere, such as Afghanistan or Tajikistan, alongside it. We have no country that supports Iran. When I say no country at all... we have no country that supports Iran. Except for Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah. Mr. Haghighi, considering Mr. Alizadeh's previous statement that the attack on Saudi diplomatic offices in Iran has complicated the situation, and that it is said that the Islamic Republic of Iran's macro policies are under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, do you see any signs on the Iranian side that indicate a desire to reduce the level of tension? At the level of macro policymaking under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. Alireza Namvar Haghighi: In any case, both countries know that they cannot enter into war, and war is not a solution to the issue. However, reducing the level of tension does not mean strategically backing down in certain areas; I doubt it. The Saudi issue in Iran is now the issue of Iraq. That Iran should have no presence in Arab countries. The Syrian issue also arose because of the Iraq issue. Saudi Arabia's presence in Syria is to remove the Iraq card from Iran's hands. This is a red line for Saudi Arabia, and Iran, for its part, considers Iraq as its backyard from a security perspective, making it a key issue. If Saudi Arabia can reconcile with Iran regarding Iraq, Iran might also be able to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia regarding Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen and Bahrain. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, unlike during King Abdullah's era, is inclined to highlight its threats. It has taken an aggressive stance due to the succession crisis and the character it wants to mobilize against Iran using the Shia issue from the Islamic world and Arab world. In the meantime, Iran's policy could generally be better. Some factions within Iran's power bloc want to undermine Mr. Rouhani's government, and some of those factions are not very keen on Mr. Rouhani succeeding in his promise to de-escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia. They are pleased with the government's failures, particularly the unfulfilled electoral promises regarding improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab world. This is also a point that could have an impact. All of this has created a situation where the main desire of Iran's power bloc is to control and manage this crisis and tension. However, on the Saudi side, it seems to be moving towards increasing this tension, and the reason is that it can bring parts of the international community and international powers behind it. The hardline factions in the U.S., Israel, and arms companies that support this tension can be said to benefit the most from this tension in the 21st century. Mr. Alizadeh, what are the conditions for reducing the level of tension between Tehran and Riyadh? Hossein Alizadeh: I mentioned that Saudi Arabia has many effective cards, while Tehran has few cards that may not be very effective. Despite this unbalanced situation, when you look at the history of wars, it is possible for a powerful army to be defeated by a smaller army. I want to say that despite the current situation, even the few cards in Iran's hands, if played well, can change the equation. What are those cards? Hossein Alizadeh: Yes, this is what I want to say. For example, despite nearly forty years of conflict between Iran and the U.S., when you study the strategic thinkers' thoughts in the U.S., from the theory of the Islamic Revolution...