Confrontation Between Sadegh Larijani and Rouhani and the Beginning of the 96 Election Competition

The verbal and political confrontation between the heads of the judiciary and executive branches has heated up the winter season of Iranian politics to some extent, with unprecedented attacks and harsh tones from both sides capturing public attention and overshadowing political equations. However, the death of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the tragic fire and bloody collapse of the Plasco building have pushed this confrontation to the sidelines. It seems that after passing these events, this confrontation may become active again. At the same time, it is unlikely that this confrontation will reach a clear conclusion or lead to specific political events beyond controlled boundaries, but its impacts on the twelfth presidential election are undeniable. In fact, this time, the political confrontation between two clerics occupying the positions of head of the judiciary and president of the Islamic Republic has shaped the gateway to electoral competition. The main reason for this dispute, which has a previous history, goes beyond disagreements over how to handle the Babak Zanjani case and related issues. While the escalation of tensions in this matter cannot be definitively attributed to electoral motivations, its consequences will inevitably affect the ballot boxes in May 96. The framing against Hossein Fereydoun and his financial connections with recently detained economic corruption suspects by the IRGC's intelligence has independently expanded the confrontation's scope. It seems that behind the scenes, the documents published by the regime's hardliners show the role of Sadegh Larijani. The framing against Hossein Fereydoun and his financial connections with recently detained economic corruption suspects by the IRGC's intelligence has independently expanded the confrontation's scope. Behind the scenes, the documents published by the regime's hardliners show the role of Sadegh Larijani. Of course, the dimensions of this confrontation do not limit themselves to the electoral aspect. In the long-term perspective, the most significant consequence of this affair is the representation of the intensification of corruption and its increasing entanglement within the power structure, where two senior officials of the government accuse each other of corruption or weakness against corruption. This incident, alongside the alarming expansion of economic corruption in the country and its organization, which encompasses astronomical salaries to legendary embezzlements, indicates that the Islamic Republic has lost its deterrent capability against corruption and the establishment of financial integrity and economic transparency, to the extent that corruption has become systemic within the government and an unavoidable issue in the outputs of governing institutions. The statistics from Transparency International, which has leniently assessed corruption in Iran, also confirm this grim situation with Iran's rank dropping to 131 out of 176 countries, which is fundamentally one of the main factors behind the structural crisis of the economy in the country and its disordered status in international trade and attracting foreign investment. Although there is no reliable information about the behind-the-scenes dimensions of this dispute, evaluating the signs and clues clarifies that Sadegh Larijani views the protests surrounding the off-the-books accounts of the head of the judiciary through the lens of Hassan Rouhani, or at least expected the moderate government to defend the judiciary in this matter. Now, the threat to investigate the alleged financial contributions of Zanjani to Rouhani's election campaign has shifted towards preparing the ground for confronting Hassan Rouhani, and it seems that the focus of political forces aligned with Sadegh Larijani is on pressuring Rouhani not to support his brother in the legal pursuit. But what is the impact of this confrontation on the elections? Hassan Rouhani has no tools to influence the judiciary other than continuing political confrontations, cyber statements, and speeches. Utilizing this issue to warm up the elections and activate the social base is a clear advantage for Rouhani and his supporters within the system, so that these framings replace accountability regarding unmet promises and stalled demands and prevent the expected vote erosion. The legal powers and approach of Rouhani do not have the capacity to lead to changes in the senior officials of the judiciary or alter their management and activities. It is also unlikely that his criticisms could change the course of the Babak Zanjani case. The case, in which four ministers from the ninth and tenth governments and the former central bank governor are among the accused and informed parties, and according to the judiciary spokesman, more than 20 managers from various agencies and 12 individuals have been arrested in connection with it, is now going through its final stages. Almost all legal and formal steps for executing Babak Zanjani's death sentence have been completed. The insistence and hasty actions of the judiciary for executing Zanjani, which continues the government's pattern in such cases, indicate a will that, by sacrificing secondary actors and players on the stage, does not allow for addressing the main accused and root causes. However, the judiciary, which has failed in its inherent functions of establishing justice and protecting the rights of the people since the establishment of the Islamic Republic and has structurally become dependent on the dominant power sector, has a stronger position to influence the executive branch. The preparations for advancing the legal pursuit of Hossein Fereydoun, the president's brother, and his potential arrest during the election season could create a crisis for Rouhani and his continuation of the presidency. The execution of Sadegh Larijani's threat to pursue Zanjani's claims regarding financial assistance to Rouhani's election campaign in 92 would force Rouhani to shift from an offensive to a defensive position. Of course, the re-publication of the Leader's recommendation to officials on 94/8/12 in the KHAMENEI.IR Telegram channel and the invitation to them to 'shout less at each other and target the main enemy' makes the possibility of the confrontation between the heads of the two branches reaching a boiling point unlikely. As expected, Khamenei, during a meeting with a group of people from Qom on the anniversary of the events of 19 Dey 1356, supported the judiciary and implicitly criticized Hassan Rouhani for neglecting the enemy and lack of insight. However, he emphasized that, contrary to the exaggeration of the enemy, this matter will soon come to an end. Yet, despite Khamenei's strong recommendation to focus on confronting what he calls the enemy, monitoring the behavioral patterns of hardline conservatives and loyalist forces shows that they, for various reasons, most importantly 'the theory of the leader's constraints from publicly expressing intentions,' have ignored these recommendations and will continue to attack the government and Rouhani's associates under the guise of fighting economic corruption. This issue even has the potential to provide a pretext for the Guardian Council to potentially disqualify Rouhani. Especially since the statements of the Guardian Council spokesman regarding 'the lack of guarantee for the approval of the incumbent president's qualification for a second term' have raised ambiguities in this regard. However, the likelihood of such an event is weak and mostly reflects the inclination of the regime's hardliners, and ultimately, it seems unlikely that the top of the power hierarchy and the balance of power would place a 'no entry' sign in front of Rouhani for entering the official stage of electoral competition. However, in the politically murky atmosphere of Iran, such events cannot be entirely ruled out. Now, assuming Rouhani's qualification is approved, accusing him of economic corruption in a situation where the moderate government's media team has a weak performance and Rouhani's position in public opinion is not as strong as in 92 is a hopeful point for most conservatives in defeating him or weakening him in his second presidential term. This confrontation overshadows the gray areas of society, especially ordinary voters who are not familiar with the intricacies and complexities of politics in Iran. Rouhani was in an aggressive position in 92, and exposing the violations and the dark record of Ahmadinejad's government in the fight against corruption and the emergence of the largest economic corruptions in the so-called 'clean and kind-hearted' government made it easier for moderates and reformists to persuade society to vote for their preferred option. It can be predicted that this affair will continue until election day, and the dimensions of the dispute will intensify. The type of confrontation, the documents that both sides will present, the political campaign and psychological warfare, and ultimately the expediency of the Guardian Council will clarify the electoral outcome of this dispute. However, the overall outcome of this case is unlikely to reach a specific conclusion. Regardless of whether both sides of the confrontation genuinely aim to solve the problem of economic corruption or not, since they cannot clarify the underlying issues and main problematic factors, and their confrontation is more reflective of a factional dispute, the tangled web of systemic corruption in the Islamic Republic will only become more complicated.