Consequences of the IRGC Being Listed as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organization'

The decision by the Trump administration to include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the U.S. State Department's list of 'Foreign Terrorist Organizations' (FTO) will not only affect foreign companies and institutions' trade with Iran but will also deeply influence a wide range of security and political equations, as well as intelligence cooperation in the region. The U.S. had previously listed the Quds Force (the IRGC's overseas operations branch) under Executive Order 13224 in 2007, and in October 2017, the Trump administration's Treasury Department included the IRGC in this executive order due to its support for terrorism. However, the U.S. State Department had so far refrained from officially listing the entire IRGC as a terrorist organization. Given the extensive economic and commercial activities of the IRGC (in addition to its defensive role alongside the military), placing the 'IRGC as a whole' on the foreign terrorist organizations list could be considered the largest action Washington has taken against the Islamic Republic since the return of sanctions. In such a situation, it is the first time that the U.S. has placed the military forces of a foreign country on a terrorist list, and due to the specific importance and extensive impact of this move, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and IRGC Commander Rahim Safavi have urgently warned of the 'grave consequences' of such an action and threatened retaliation. The U.S. currently has several military bases and tens of thousands of troops in countries neighboring Iran, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and these bases and personnel are within the range of the Islamic Republic's missiles. A significant portion of the IRGC's expenses does not fall under ordinary government budget lines and is funded through economic activities conducted by IRGC-affiliated institutions such as the 'Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters.' The number of contracting, financial, foreign trade, production, and investment institutions affiliated with the IRGC exceeds one thousand, and many of these affiliated institutions have their own subsidiary companies. The profit-making organizations linked to the IRGC have purchased shares in state institutions, foundations, and private sector entities, and some of these institutions operate under the auspices of the IRGC, fulfilling the country's pharmaceutical and food needs. For example, the supply and production of chicken and eggs and the import of poultry and livestock feed are primarily conducted by institutions and cooperatives affiliated with or related to the armed forces. Some of the IRGC's economic and commercial units are intertwined with the army and law enforcement, and for this reason, cooperation with such institutions by foreign companies could be regarded as collaboration with a terrorist organization. Military forces from different countries, when in shared operational theaters, particularly to avoid unforeseen clashes, maintain communication and intelligence channels and are best prepared for cooperation. After the U.S. occupation of Iraq in March 2003, the IRGC's Quds Force became active in Iraq, and evidence shows that from 2005 to 2007 (the time the Quds Force was included under Executive Order 13224), U.S. forces cooperated and communicated with the Quds Force in that country. Numerous reports have also emerged regarding the cooperation of Iranian military forces with U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. With the IRGC's name now on the foreign terrorist organizations list, maintaining such relations would be considered collaboration with a terrorist organization and, due to legal repercussions, would practically become impossible. Henceforth, any potential encounters between U.S. forces and IRGC bases and personnel, both inside and outside Iran, will take on a different nature and will be viewed as confrontations with terrorist elements. Should the Islamic Republic retaliate against the U.S. military and label the American armed forces stationed in the region and neighboring countries as terrorists, the hostile relations between the two countries could easily escalate to a red alert and armed conflict. Although the IRGC has previously conducted two missile and artillery attacks against the Mujahedin-e Khalq bases in Iraq and has targeted ISIS forces in Syria, considering the U.S.'s firepower in the region, taking similar actions against U.S. forces would be tantamount to suicide for the IRGC. The recent decision by the Trump administration to label the IRGC as a terrorist organization, which came after a year of deliberation and as part of the 'maximum pressure' policy against the Islamic Republic and its armed wing, could significantly reduce the volume of foreign institutions' commercial and financial cooperation with Iran and lead to a rapid increase in political and military tensions between Tehran and Washington.