Controversial Hajj of 1986 and the Renewed Confrontation between Montazeri and Rafsanjani Supporters

The recounting of the incident involving the transfer of explosives in the luggage of some pilgrims to Saudi Arabia during the Hajj of 1986 in an interview with Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Montazeri on the program "Khesht-e Khām" led to a reaction from Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani. Ahmad Montazeri, in this program, referred to the memories of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri to reject the official claims of the Islamic Republic attributed to Seyyed Mahdi Hashemi regarding this subversive operation, stating that the act was carried out by six Revolutionary Guards who had collaborated with the former head of the Expediency Discernment Council. Following this program, Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is now the head of Tehran City Council, denied this claim in a letter to Ahmad Montazeri, asserting that his father had no role in it and that the act was carried out by a self-directed group. He also considered the involvement of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in this matter, in the absence of evidence, to be an "unethical" and "irrational" act. Ahmad Montazeri called for the establishment of a fact-finding committee. The confrontation between the children of Ayatollah Montazeri and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is not only related to the text of this event but also reveals a deeper conflict between truth and expediency. The political landscape of the 1980s and 1990s, which has placed the Montazeris, Khomeinis, and Rafsanjanis against the monopolistic and authoritarian tendencies of Khamenei, cannot remain stable. Delving into the events of the 1980s revives the duality of "reform and rectification of mistakes" as envisioned by Ayatollah Montazeri and the insistence of Khomeinis, Rafsanjani, Khamenei, and the leftist faction on "continuation of the status quo and deviations," and these discussions will continue until the truth is uncovered. The temporary political expediencies are incapable of mending this historical rift. The advancement of Iran and the observance of the rights of the people largely require uncovering the truth and decoding the events of the 1980s, as well as seeking justice for all periods of history after the revolution. Another significant aspect of this matter is the agitation of Rafsanjani's supporters and the questioning of Ahmad Montazeri's claims, which do not align with Rafsanjani's moderate approach. However, examining history invalidates the criteria of these individuals. Rafsanjani has had different approaches and positions throughout his various periods in power, and the claim that he has always been a moderate and centrist figure is nothing but a myth. In the early years of the revolution and until 1986, he was one of the main figures of extremism in the regime. Although he gradually moved towards moderation, this relative moderation was in contrast to the hardline elements of the government, and he never assumed the role of a statesman committed to rationality and bureaucracy. Additionally, the shadow of power struggles loomed over him until the end of his life, and his political expediencies did not allow for a principled critique of the problems of the power structure after the revolution. Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani's claim that his father always had a good relationship with Ayatollah Montazeri is also not accurate and reflects at most part of the reality. His relationship with Ayatollah Montazeri, like his political career, underwent transformations. Until 1986, their relationship was cordial, and even Rafsanjani, contrary to Ayatollah Khomeini's wishes regarding the appointment of a successor, played a significant role in the appointment of Ayatollah Montazeri as the Deputy Leader. However, after 1986, as the relations between Ahmad Khomeini and some leaders of the leftist faction soured with Ayatollah Montazeri, he also distanced himself. Seyyed Mahdi Hashemi, in two letters he wrote to Ayatollah Montazeri before his arrest, argued that he accepted the advice to speak with Ahmad Khomeini and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani but realized through the conversations that they not only had no intention of resolving the issue but were also seeking to create problems for Ayatollah Montazeri's household. Rafsanjani cooperated with the project to remove Ayatollah Montazeri from the Deputy Leadership, and his efforts to moderate Ayatollah Khomeini's views aimed to prevent a harsh confrontation that could lead to physical harm or imprisonment rather than preserving Ayatollah Montazeri's political position and dignity. In this regard, he did not show a favorable attitude towards the character assassination of Ayatollah Montazeri and, like other major political elimination projects within the revolutionary forces, sought not to have a prominent presence in the forefront. The narrative of good relations between Rafsanjani and the Al Saud family does not absolve Rafsanjani either. These good relations pertained to his presidency until the end of the 1980s. After the bloody Hajj tragedy, Rafsanjani made some of the harshest historical remarks by Islamic Republic officials against the Saudi government, including statements like: "We will drive the Al Saud rulers into the hell and certain death they have chosen..." A review of Rafsanjani's Friday prayer sermons before his presidency shows fiery speeches against the Saudi rulers. Someone who held such views in 1987 could also have been at the forefront of the project to transfer explosives and create a crisis for the Saudi government in 1986. However, the lack of rooted principled positions in Rafsanjani's political career and the high volume of fluctuating relations with the Al Saud family clearly indicate that within two to three years of sending them to hell, he shifted to de-escalation and establishing friendly relations! While there had been no change in the overarching policies of the Saudi government, a portion of Ayatollah Khomeini's will, which was supposed to be a guiding principle for officials, also included the statement: "If we overlook Saddam, we will not overlook Fahd!" Regarding the text of the dispute, it should be noted that Ahmad Montazeri has recounted and completed his father's written memories, in which neither Rafsanjani is definitively accused of being aware of the transfer of explosives to Mecca and participating in that security project, nor is he definitively exonerated. An informed Revolutionary Guard from the group of six who appeared before Ayatollah Montazeri testified that this group was composed of Rafsanjani's associates. Therefore, as Ahmad Montazeri rightly called for the establishment of a fact-finding committee, the issue, despite the passage of 25 years, is still in the preliminary investigation stage, and the volume of undisclosed and ambiguous cases is greater than what is known. Expecting documented proposals and evidence from Mohsen Hashemi is unreasonable, as the means for that are not available. Currently, there is a first-hand witness and a credible narrator like Ayatollah Montazeri, and this is sufficient to initiate investigations. Mohsen Rafsanjani has maneuvered on the moral aspect of the matter, while his father is vulnerable and deserving of condemnation in this regard. In a situation where his father, in his view, was aware that a self-directed group had carried out that adventure and action contrary to national interests, why did he remain silent in the face of the official system's accusations without referencing Mahdi Hashemi? This behavior is a clear example of immorality. In the confessions attributed to Mahdi Hashemi, whose credibility is questioned due to his detention conditions, he explicitly stated that the action was under the supervision of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Interestingly, despite this issue being raised in the past, neither Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani nor his family ever protested. To clarify the matter, the relevant section in the confessions attributed to Mahdi Hashemi is presented as follows: "One day my brother [...] came to see me and confessed that the team assigned to Mecca consisted of (he mentioned individuals whose names I only remember [...] and himself). He said that the issue was proposed from the very beginning by Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani to brother [...] and he discussed it with brother [...] responsible for intelligence [...] and assigned brother [...] and several others in the intelligence unit to follow up. Brother [...] added that we had two plans, one plan was the box of gaz, through which we transported some materials to Mecca and it passed safely, and the second plan was leaked and individuals were arrested... One of the things he told me was that brother [...] and [...] contacted several members of parliament and asked why you are not following up on this Mecca issue... After Ayatollah Montazeri became sure that the work was done by [...], he told Mr. Mousavi Ardabili that if you see Mr. Hashemi, tell him what kind of work was this you did. Rafsanjani replied that if the plan had succeeded, you wouldn't have come to criticize, but since it was leaked, you are criticizing." However, in light of the available information, there are credible conjectures and signs that point the finger at regime officials or influential factions within the power bloc. At the time of this thwarted operation, Mahdi Hashemi was under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence and could not have planned and organized such a movement, and this very fact would have been the basis for his arrest, which he was trying to escape from. Ahmad Khomeini years later explicitly states in a letter of suffering that although he does not agree with these methods, there is no other way to carry out revolutionary work! Engineer Mir Hossein Mousavi considers the transportation of explosives in the luggage of pilgrims without the government's knowledge as one of the reasons for his resignation, which had catastrophic effects on foreign policy. From these words, it is clear that the perpetrators and agents were not self-directed; otherwise, what reason would Engineer Mousavi have to object to the government's ignorance? In the first half of the 1980s, Hashemi Rafsanjani had a close relationship with operational forces abroad who were active in the IRGC or the Ministry of Intelligence at that time. One of the important files of the Islamic Republic is understanding the nature of subversive, terrorist, and aggressive actions against opposition forces and foreign targets in the 1980s and 1990s. Shifting the burden of problems onto those who are trapped or unable to defend themselves is a behavioral pattern in the Islamic Republic when caught in predicaments. For example, during the bombing at Imam Reza's shrine, some prisoners from the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization were brought on television, and they took responsibility for the explosion, later the regime officially announced that the claim was false. When the chain murders were discovered, unconfirmed news circulated that some officials, including Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, had suggested to Mohammad Khatami to bring some political prisoners on television to take responsibility for those crimes to preserve the regime's dignity and prevent negative repercussions, and then the Ministry of Intelligence would be surgically removed from within, which the reformist government head did not accept. However, the aforementioned cases are components of a hypothesis that has not yet been definitively proven and requires investigation and access to information and documents. The efforts of Ayatollah Montazeri's household to clarify the main issues of history after the revolution, especially the 1980s, is a very valuable endeavor that is significant for both recording historical truth and for learning lessons and preventing wrongful and catastrophic actions. The views expressed in this note do not reflect the perspective of Radio Farda.