Costs of IRGC Missiles Crossing Iran's Borders

The missile attack by the IRGC on Sunday night against ISIS positions in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, has dimensions, costs, and results that go beyond what IRGC officials describe as a "response to the terrorist attacks of June 17 by ISIS in Tehran." After the end of the eight-year war with Iraq and prior to the recent attack against the positions of Bashar al-Assad's opponents in Deir ez-Zor—located near the common border of Iraq and Syria and the Euphrates River—the IRGC had only once engaged in an offensive operation outside Iran's borders using its missile capabilities. On April 18, 2001, just a few weeks before the presidential elections in Iran, following an extraordinary session of the Security Council chaired by then-President Mohammad Khatami, the bases of the Mujahedin-e Khalq inside Iraq were targeted by missile and artillery attacks from the Islamic Republic. The Mujahedin-e Khalq, which maintained bases from the north to the south of the Iran-Iraq border after the cessation of the eight-year war, reported that a thousand missiles (and artillery shells) were fired at their bases after being targeted. Yahya Rahim Safavi, a former commander of the IRGC, first revealed details of this operation in 2008 on the anniversary of the assassination of General Sayad Shirazi. During the 2001 cross-border missile attacks by Iran, over 70 short-range Scud ballistic missiles were used, which represented a significant quantitative leap compared to the firing of only 14 missiles throughout the eight-year war with Iraq. Since 2001, the Islamic Republic has increased the destructive power and targeting accuracy of its missiles. The U.S. and Washington's regional allies label Iran's ballistic missile capabilities as a "threat to regional security." Iran's missile activities, along with allegations of support for terrorism and human rights violations, were among the three points cited in the approval of the sanctions bill passed by the U.S. Senate last Thursday. Security Council Resolution 2231, which replaced previous punitive resolutions against Iran after the approval of the JCPOA, prohibits all activities related to Iran's ballistic missiles for eight years in paragraph 3 of Annex B, let alone their use in cross-border operations, which are considered aggressive in any case. Another missile limitation for Iran relates to the comprehensive nuclear agreement, which in its fifth paragraph outlines arms restrictions for five years and missile restrictions for eight years. This paragraph requests that Iran refrain from any activities related to the design of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads for eight years from the date of the JCPOA's implementation and not to launch missiles using this capability. All ballistic missiles in Iran's possession, including Zulfiqar, would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead if a suitable one were fitted. To monitor the implementation of the "JCPOA," a commission composed of eight members is established, meeting four times a year in Vienna, generally addressing Iran's requests for more concessions or confirming actions taken, although other members can also raise violations of the JCPOA. The U.S., as the main party in nuclear negotiations with Iran, has officially declared its policy of "immediate reinstatement of sanctions" to the status prior to the lifting of sanctions in the event of Iran's violation of the JCPOA. The recent missile attack by the IRGC could be cited as a violation of the JCPOA during the three-month renewal of sanctions waivers by the White House and the Treasury Department. On February 1 of this year, Michael Flynn, then National Security Advisor at the White House, issued a formal warning to Iran following the Islamic Republic's missile test. After the recent missile attack against ISIS positions in Syria, the Israeli Prime Minister warned Iran against both verbal and practical threats from his country. The Times of Israel and its Channel 10 dedicated detailed reports to Iran's missile attack, typically presenting it as a serious threat to Israel's security. These sources warned that if the Zulfiqar missile were to fall into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel's security would be under "serious threat." The Zulfiqar ballistic missile is an advanced version of the Fateh 110, which, according to Iranian officials, operates with solid fuel and is reported to have better targeting accuracy than Scud missiles. Ballistic missiles, unlike cruise missiles like the Tomahawk, of which the U.S. used 59 in Syria last month, are first sent into the earth's atmosphere and then, after the booster engine shuts off, descend in an arc and fall to the ground like an iron weight. The Islamic Republic has announced that it has succeeded in building cluster bombs, and according to IRGC officials, two Zulfiqar missiles launched at Syria contained this type of bomb in their warheads. Despite Israel's three-layer missile defense system and the U.S. anti-missile defense coverage known as Patriot, which also provides defensive coverage for Arab countries in the southern Persian Gulf, none of the mentioned countries are completely safe from a potential missile attack from outside. These concerns also encompass U.S. military personnel in the region and its air and naval bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, which fall within the range of Zulfiqar missiles. Although the financial cost of launching each Zulfiqar missile is not more than three million dollars, considering the importance of lifting sanctions and its financial value in Iran's economy, the recent missile attack by the IRGC, the effectiveness of which in weakening ISIS in Deir ez-Zor is still unclear, could easily revert the government's economic plans to the pre-sanction lifting status and also expose Iran's national security to new risks.