Crisis Between Russia and Turkey and Tensions in Iraq: Result of Political Panic

The crisis between Russia and Turkey, along with ongoing tensions stemming from the emotional-psychological dominance in political actions between the two countries, indicates that their relations have entered a new phase. With the onset and implementation of trade-economic restrictions by Russia against Turkey, Mehmet Simsek stated in an emergency meeting on Monday, December 7, with financial-economic officials that Turkey is expected to incur losses exceeding $9 billion due to the imposed restrictions. As Russia intensifies its pressure through economic and political means against Turkey following the downing of a Russian Sukhoi 24 aircraft in Syrian territory, the sudden drop in global oil prices has also raised significant concerns within Russia's political base. Meanwhile, Turkey is preparing and arranging new energy markets, and in this context, Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently signed a pre-contract for the unlimited purchase of liquefied gas with Qatar. Russia is also seeking new export markets in the Mediterranean region to meet its domestic needs for materials previously imported from Turkey, which are now sanctioned. It is evident that both countries will not easily resolve the issues arising from this tension even if necessary economic measures are taken, leading to relative losses for both sides, as the export of fruits and citrus from Syria and Lebanon, recently mentioned by the Russian news agency Sputnik, will not be sufficient to meet Russia's demand. Similarly, Turkey, which imported over 60% of its energy needs from Russia, will not be able to meet its needs by replacing it with liquefied gas from Qatar, which must be transported by specialized ships. Currently, Turkey's liquefied gas storage capacity in Izmir and Mersin regions is over three to four billion cubic meters, which can only supply less than one-tenth of Turkey's domestic gas consumption. Therefore, the lack of necessary infrastructure for liquefied gas storage, in the face of Qatar's 11 billion cubic meters of exports to Turkey, requires essential infrastructure that, even if started now, will take less than three years to complete. On the other hand, the Turkish company Botas emphasizes that even if liquefied gas is supplied at current consumption levels, the Turkish government will not succeed in solving the crisis caused by Russian sanctions for two reasons: first, the consumption volume in the country increases by five percent each year; second, the estimated cost of exported gas from Qatar will be much higher than the price at which Russian gas is currently available to domestic consumers. Even with the implementation of the TANAP energy project between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and other consortium countries, only 20% of it belongs to Azerbaijan, which can sell to Turkey. Furthermore, the request for an increase in the production and export volume of natural gas from Iran to Turkey, raised by Turkish officials, was met with a negative response from Bijan Zangeneh, Iran's Minister of Oil. Although initially, conflicting statements were made in Turkish publications quoting some officials from the ruling party, interpreting this response as Iran's alignment with Russia, the Turkish Ministry of Energy issued a statement on Wednesday indicating that Iran is unable to meet our needs during winter seasons due to increased domestic consumption, which has also occurred in previous years. However, it is noteworthy that some observers believe Turkey's presence in Iraq, near Mosul, is actually a precursor to solving the energy issue of the Qatar-Turkey route. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, Turkey has sent messages to senior Iraqi government officials, requesting Baghdad's approval to construct the gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey in exchange for withdrawing its forces from northern Iraq and the Nineveh region. The Turkish publication Birgun and the Iranian newspaper Etemad have also reported that in the past 48 hours, following the arrival of Turkish forces in Mosul, numerous contacts have taken place at the level of negotiations between Baghdad and Ankara, mediated by Iraqi parties close to Turkey, regarding the construction of the gas pipeline from Qatar through Iraqi territory to Turkey. Although these reports have not been confirmed by official representatives of either country, the reactions from Iraqi popular forces and the confirmation of this news by Ehsan Al-Shammari, head of the Iraqi Political Thought Center, along with the high likelihood of consultations on this matter, indicate Turkey's panic following the crisis with Russia. It is believed that if such a topic exists, Turkey may also negotiate with Iraq regarding the Euphrates River's water output, as Iraq is currently facing a severe water crisis. Additionally, Erdogan's recourse to Ayatollah Sistani to reduce opposition to the presence of Turkish forces indicates the potential for Shiite front opposition in Iraq, which could also suggest Turkey's underlying motives. While Turkey is seeking to open chapters related to its membership in the European community, the insistence of the European Commission and Cyprus is that Turkey can only become a member when it withdraws its military forces from Northern Cyprus. In such a situation, Turkey will lose its important strategic base in the Mediterranean. Russia's presence in Syria has also disrupted Turkey's calculations in supporting Syrian Turkmen to establish a resistance front against the Kurdish buffer line in northern Syria, making it natural for Turkey to want to play another card by being present in Iraq. Despite the fact that the provisions of the agreement on the presence of Turkish forces in Iraq, signed on September 27, 2007, between Bashir Atalay, Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, and Jawad al-Bolani, Iraq's Minister of Interior, allowed Turkey to enter Iraq up to 30 kilometers deep, and this agreement was renewed during Nouri al-Maliki's rule, Turkey has now advanced into Iraq up to 100 kilometers with armored equipment, helicopters, and 1,200 troops along with numerous military vehicles. This action indicates the preparation of Turkish combat forces to take advantage of the opportunity to assert their military-political power balance in northern Iraq. Tanju Bilgic, the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, also explicitly stated in a press conference on December 8 that 'over five thousand military advisors from 20 countries are present in Iraq. Turkey is also compelled to be present in Iraq and will continue its presence in coordination with the Iraqi government.' This reaction among regional stakeholders is seen as Turkey's show of strength following the disruption of the existing conditions in the Middle East, especially with its neighbors. However, despite all this, the referral of Iraq's complaint against Turkey to the UN Security Council by Vitaly Churkin, Russia's permanent representative to the Security Council, and the support of neighboring countries for Iraq's approach towards Turkey, along with the statement from John Kirby, the spokesperson for the US State Department, indicating that Turkey's entry into Iraq was not coordinated with the United States, suggests a new phase in Turkey's foreign policy approach in regional relations. What is certain is that the current behavior of the Turkish government following the crisis with Russia aligns precisely with the third principle of political game theory in international relations, referred to as 'irrational behavior or emotional action,' indicating the panic of Ankara's statesmen in the face of repeated political conflicts with neighboring countries.