Crisis of Trust in the Islamic Republic

Trust is the essence of social capital. Social capital refers to "the connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Bowling Alone; p. 19). Trust in the political system and government is one form of social capital. Public trust in government is not very high even in existing democratic systems, let alone in dictatorial regimes. For example, Robert Putnam in his book Bowling Alone shows that social trust in the United States has been declining over the past few decades. He indicates that traditional forms of political activity and participation in America have decreased since the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 27). This is the situation in a free and democratic America, which Francis Fukuyama also noted in his latest article titled "The Erosion of America, the Roots of Political Inefficiency," stating: "There is a severe public distrust of America’s leading institutions." According to polls, only eight percent of those who voted in the midterm elections believe that Congress is doing an excellent or good job. (According to Al Jazeera, less than 30 percent participated in the elections. According to another calculation, less than 19 percent participated). Now consider Iran under the control of a non-democratic regime. Over the past few decades, social capital has been declining, and social trust has suffered greatly. Trust in the political regime/government has also significantly decreased. The judiciary, a violator of human rights and a repressive apparatus, lacks public trust. This is because: a- The judiciary is not independent, and the head and senior officials and the most important judges constantly declare that they follow the orders and wishes of Ayatollah Khamenei. b- Judges lack specialized qualifications, and their judgments are based on religious scholars' interpretations. c- Bribery and favoritism are very common in the judiciary. d- There is no fair trial procedure, and even the law is not practically enforced against the accused. e- The judiciary has tried to ensure that, as much as possible, individuals approved by the Islamic Republic are selected as lawyers. f- Instead of being a defender of people's rights against the state's overreaching power, the judiciary has turned into a repressive apparatus against opponents and critics. Executions of murderers are a global phenomenon and occur in all countries. According to official statistics from the Islamic Republic, the murder rate is about 3 per 100,000 people, which is lower than many countries (Honduras 90.4, Venezuela 53.7, Brazil 44.7, Colombia 30.8, and the USA 4.7). Murderers are punished in all countries. However, in Iran, even when a real murderer is convicted and executed, the judiciary cannot gain public trust that the accused was indeed a murderer. Moreover, in recent years, opponents of the death penalty have treated a murderer in such a way that he almost becomes a hero/innocent before execution. The executions of Mohsen Amir Aslani and Reyhaneh Jabbari caused a lot of noise. In the first case, the judiciary claimed that he was executed for the crime of rape after complaints from several women, but opponents insisted that he was executed for apostasy or blasphemy. In the second case, the judiciary claims that Reyhaneh Jabbari intentionally killed Dr. Morteza Sarbandi, but Reyhaneh claimed that she killed him in self-defense against his intent to commit rape. The judiciary's claims in these two cases did not gain anyone's trust. The high number of executions Ahmad Shaheed - the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran - stated in his sixth report for the UN General Assembly that at least 852 people were executed in Iran between July 2013 and June 2014. Mohammad Javad Larijani claimed in an interview with CNN that over 90 percent of executions are related to drug traffickers and that this benefits the Western world. However, opponents do not trust this claim. On the other hand, considering that a- Islam does not prescribe any punishment for drug offenses and that execution is a decree of the Islamic Republic, b- the death penalty has had no role in reducing drug trafficking and addiction, and the number of addicts in the Islamic Republic has sharply increased, why is the death penalty not abolished in this case so that the number of executions can suddenly decrease by more than 90 percent? This is another reason for distrust in the judiciary. Espionage is a crime in all countries, including the USA and Israel. However, in Iran, even if a real spy is tried and convicted, people do not believe that the accused was indeed a spy because they do not trust the judiciary - especially in political cases. Acid attacks are common worldwide. In the first six months of this year, 318 acid attacks occurred in Iran, not all of which were on individuals. From 1999 to 2009, over 3,000 acid attack victims were reported in Bangladesh, but the actual number of victims was much higher (UN report on acid attacks in Bangladesh, India, and Cambodia). In Colombia, between 2004 and 2014, 1,000 acid attacks were reported, with 80 percent of the victims being women (World Affairs/July and August 2014). However, the lack of trust in the Islamic Republic has led to a crisis in this area. Between September 6 and October 15, 2014, in Isfahan, according to official reports, acid was thrown on four women. Two of them were treated on an outpatient basis, and two others (Soheila Jorkesh on October 1, 2014, and Marzieh Hadaf on October 15, 2014) are still hospitalized due to the severity of their injuries. From the outset, opponents pointed fingers at the Islamic Republic (the government, clerics, and extremist religious forces supporting the regime) and plans such as promoting virtue and preventing vice and combating bad hijab. Protests were held in several cities, including Isfahan and Tehran, and security forces arrested some demonstrators. All officials of the Islamic Republic not only denied the role of the government, clerics, and religious forces in this crime but also claimed: a- The representative of the Supreme Leader in Lorestan province: The intelligence services of the USA and the UK are behind the acid attacks in Isfahan, b- Ahmadinejad's Minister of Intelligence: The British foreign intelligence service (MI6) is behind the acid attacks, c- Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi: Acid attacks are a plot by enemies to prevent the passage of the virtue and vice prevention law in Parliament, d- The Friday prayer leader of Isfahan: Acid attacks are the work of Israeli spies and ISIS, e- A member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission: The perpetrators of the acid attacks are certainly assisted by foreign and Zionist intelligence services, and all officials emphasized that the perpetrators of acid attacks should be punished and that the harshest penalties - for acting against national security - should be considered for them. They claimed that acid attacks had nothing to do with plans for promoting virtue and preventing vice and combating bad hijab. These claims were not only untrustworthy but also created more distrust. Why? First - as usual, they blamed foreign governments and their domestic mercenaries for the crime. Second - instead of hastening to find the acid throwers, they quickly arrested the protesters and reporters. Third - in many cases, the regime quickly claimed to have arrested the criminals. In this case, more than two months after the first acid attack, the perpetrators have still not been arrested. For example, a man threw acid on his wife in Delijan and fled. Shortly after, the Delijan prosecutor's office learned that the accused had supposedly gone to Mashhad. They informed the Mashhad prosecutor's office, and they quickly arrested the acid thrower in the second half of November. Of course, in this case, the accused was already known. Fourth - the Islamic Republic's history of serial murders, the assassination of Saeed Hajarian, the murder of Zahra Kazemi, the murders in Kerman, the murder of three defendants in Kahrizak, the murder of Sattar Beheshti, etc., places it in the position of the accused. Perhaps the most significant extrajudicial action was the murder of five individuals (Shahre Nikpour, Mohammad Reza Nejad Malayeri, Jamileh/Zahra Amir Esmaeili, Mosaib Afshari, and Mohsen Kamali) by six members (Mohammad Hamzeh Mostafavi, Ali Maleki, Soleiman Jahanshahi, Mohammad Yaabasi, Mohammad Soltani, Changiz Salari) of the Basij of one of the mosques in Kerman in 2002. After holding several closed trials and confirmation by the Supreme Court, which took 11 years, four of the murderers were sentenced to execution/retribution, and two for complicity in murder were sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison. Although the murderers killed the victims in the most horrific manner possible, except for one of them, the rest were free during this time. More than a year has passed since the finalization of the execution sentence, and none of the murderers have yet been executed. Fifth - some clerics have done nothing but promote violence. The justification of violence by this group has led individuals toward murder and crime. For example, Mohammad Hamzeh Mostafavi - one of the murderers of the Kerman serial murders - said in court that "Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi stated in Imam Hassan Mojtaba Mosque on the night of Ashura in 2001 (March 28, 2002) that the duty of individuals is to promote virtue and prevent vice; if the person does not accept, in the second instance, he should be introduced to the judicial authorities, and subsequently, if this individual continues his previous actions, the promoter of virtue has the right to kill him." The accused repeatedly mentioned Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi in court. However, the court only obtained a single inquiry from him, in which he wrote: "I have not issued a fatwa on this matter and have only conveyed the consensus of the clerics, while I have said that if the Supreme Leader conditions the proof of the subject on the court's ruling or issues any other governmental decree, the Supreme Leader's ruling is binding." Support for violent clerics like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi has further implicated the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khamenei has given many definitions of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. The violent Friday prayer leader of Isfahan is also appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei. He stated in one instance: "Now is the time to raise the stick to confront bad hijab." Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami also said on April 23, 2011: "It seems that cultural work can no longer prevent bad hijab in society, and I think to solve this issue, pure blood must be shed to eradicate this problem from our society." Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, said in the Eid al-Fitr prayer in 2012: "Each individual in society is responsible for the increasing disorder that is occurring in society. How can you pass by the indecent and filthy appearance of a bad hijab woman on the street and not protest? This indecent individual, with her disgusting appearance, mocks all the principles of religion and the values of the revolution and ridicules the entire lineage of martyrs. We should not pass by this scene indifferently. If people want to confront corruption, they can overthrow it." Sixth - extremist conservatives who are worried about the nuclear agreement and its consequences stand against Rouhani's government in the cultural sphere and have explicitly stated that people must be forced into paradise. They constantly create crises for the government. Perhaps this is one of their crisis creations. Conclusion: The Islamic Republic will remain one of the accused in the acid attacks until the main perpetrators are arrested, tried fairly in a public court, and society is convinced that they were the real perpetrators of the acid attacks. This approach is a product of the Islamic Republic's and clerics' history. According to the organization "Stop Street Harassment," 65 percent of American women have experienced street harassment at least once in their lives. A 10-hour walk in New York is a new witness to confirm this claim. In the Islamic Republic, this anomaly exists to a greater extent. The difference is that in America, no one holds the government and religion responsible for this act, but in Iran, the Islamic Republic and Islam are held responsible. Why? Because the political regime claims to be religious, and clerics justify and prescribe violence (refer to the article "Clerics' Promotion of Violence and the Discrediting of Opponents"). They issue apostasy rulings while condemning extremist groups (refer to the articles "The Paradox of Anti-Extremist Extremists" and "The Death Sentence of Soheil Arabi, One of the Branches of the Malicious Tree of Takfir"). Secularism - meaning the separation of religion from the state - is not only beneficial for the government and the people but also absolves Islam from the position of the accused. Trust is the product of a transparent process and a consistent discourse and behavior in negating violence and corruption.