Critique of Hassan Rouhani's Cabinet: Focus on Identity Politics or Transparency and Efficiency?

The criticisms of Hassan Rouhani's proposed cabinet for the twelfth government, both inside and outside the parliament, have largely been based on the gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and age of the proposed individuals. It seems that three female ministers, one Sunni minister, several ministers from Turk, Kurdish, and Baluch backgrounds, the singular Iranian nationality of the ministers, and a few young ministers will suddenly accelerate the government's ability to fulfill promises or perform duties. This notion, given the structure and function of the executive branch in the Islamic Republic, is nothing more than a dream. The executive branch is merely a logistical support for the religious bureaucracy, security and military forces, and the economic institutions of the financial empire of the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC. This branch has no choice but to obey the commands of the Supreme Leader. Therefore, the gender, nationality, religion, and age of cabinet members do not hold significant importance. What real outcome has or will this identity-centric policy yield? What will the government do if the proponents of this policy succeed? Why have reformists turned to this policy? Why identity-centric? The critiques of Rouhani's proposed cabinet are primarily based on gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and age, as if the presence of three female ministers, one Sunni minister, several ministers from various ethnic backgrounds, and a few young ministers will suddenly lead to the government fulfilling its promises or duties. This perception, considering the structure and function of the executive branch in the Islamic Republic, is merely a fantasy. The executive branch serves as a logistics provider for the religious bureaucracy, security and military forces, and the economic institutions of the financial empire of the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC. Let's start with the last question. Reformists and progressives have turned to identity politics in their critique of the government for five reasons: 1. Individual focus. Identity politics emphasizes the representation of officials rather than changing policies and rationalizing and clarifying the government. After the Green Movement, reformists realized that the existing government policies are not changeable or at least they do not want to move in that direction (the risk is too high), and thus they have resorted to a policy that attracts public attention but desires the status quo. Consequently, despite the promises made by the President during the election, no changes occur. 2. Apparently chic populism. Understanding and evaluating the current situation based on identity politics is very easy and trivial (count the number of women in the cabinet, look up their ages, and check their religion, ethnicity, and nationality), but understanding and explaining social and economic indicators (such as the Gini coefficient, recidivism rate, child mortality rate, unemployment rate, financial transparency of public institutions, conflict of interest, level of individual freedoms, the size and scope of the government in controlling national resources, and economic growth) is not as easy or attracts less attention. Despite criticizing the populist policies of Ahmadinejad's government, progressives have turned to identity politics, which is also populist. 3. Avoidance of fundamental critique. Counting the number of women, youth, Sunnis, and ethnic minorities in the cabinet and concluding that the Islamic Republic government is male-dominated and Shiite does not even tickle the rulers because they do not deny these issues and rather take pride in them. Khamenei has explicitly defended the home confinement of women. Shiism is the official religion of the government, and to be revolutionary, the government must rely on the revolutionaries of 1979 and the Basij forces under their command. These are not topics that the ruling clerics and IRGC members would shy away from mentioning. However, in the areas of human rights, democracy, transparency, efficiency, security, and justice, the government can be seriously challenged because officials claim to meet all these indicators at the top of global lists while Iran does not have a favorable status in these respects. Of course, criticizing their claims has costs. 4. Deadlock of demands. Reformists (developmentalists, moderates, and democrats) have turned to identity politics, which is trendy in Europe and America (among the left), after they were unable to advance their policies in the 1990s and 2000s in limiting the power of the Supreme Leader, diversifying the members of appointed institutions, abolishing the Guardian Council's oversight (which has rendered elections meaningless in Iran), and making the government more lawful and transparent. This policy shifts the focus from the process of development and democratization to superficial diversity. 5. Progressives are unable to demand the transfer of people's affairs to themselves and the closure of harmful and costly institutions (such as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, the IRGC, the Expediency Council, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, revolutionary courts, clergy, various Sharia implementation committees, and hundreds of institutions that use public budgets without any useful function) and have only resorted to requesting the decoration of the cabinet with various identities. An unproductive identity-centric policy and incessantly beating the drum of superficial diversity (without mentioning tolerance towards diversity and dissent, democracy, and individual freedoms) will yield no practical results in changing policies, and even if under public pressure women, members of other religions, ethnicities, and young individuals are included among the officials, there are enough of them among the authoritarian and totalitarian figures. Female, young, Sunni, and singularly nationalistic Basij members can replace all male, old, and tired officials. The problematic issue is the authoritarianism and totalitarianism and the corruption and inefficiency stemming from them, not the gender, ethnicity, age, or dual nationality of the officials. Ironically, the youngest proposed member of the twelfth cabinet (the Minister of Communications) is one of its most notorious members. The current problem of the government in Iran is the corruption, waste, and incompetence of all power institutions, including all cabinets, and not the lack of women, Sunnis, members of other religions, and youth in managerial positions. Such selections should be left to the people themselves. Annually, hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on corruption, tens of billions on smuggling, hundreds of billions on the privileges of clerics and IRGC members, and about ten billion on foreign interventions. If governors and members of provincial councils and chief prosecutors are elected by the people alongside the head of the executive branch and members of parliament, they will certainly consider the needs and demands of their constituents. However, due to the Guardian Council's oversight and the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, they are forced to consider the demands of clerics and IRGC members. In such circumstances, the gender, age, religion, ethnicity, and nationality of these officials no longer hold much importance because naturally, the people of Kurdistan, Tehran, and Zanjan will choose their officials from among those they have connections with and will change them whenever they wish. Four problems of Rouhani's cabinet Rouhani's cabinet lacks a social base and does not represent or reflect the demands and concerns of any specific class or stratum except for the ruling class. Those who pledged allegiance to him only did so to escape from Raisi. The head of the executive branch relies on military and religious institutions for his work and thus tries to give various power circles a share in the cabinet. In addition to the structural problems of the system and the constraints on the executive branch against appointed institutions, Rouhani's cabinet has four specific problems that hinder its efficiency and transparency: 1. Security framework. Half of the cabinet members have intelligence and security backgrounds. This means that Rouhani has turned to this sector to gain the approval of the Supreme Leader due to his security background, but on the other hand, the result is the continuation of a security atmosphere, while Rouhani has taken many pledges to criticize this atmosphere. 2. Irrelevance of members to electoral slogans and public demands. The list of ministers, especially the ministers of defense, culture, interior, justice, communications, and intelligence, shows that the losing side of the election and the Supreme Leader's office have a greater share than the winning side. 3. Lack of a program. In the first term, the government's program was to reduce inflation and advance the nuclear agreement. In the second term, there is no program that centers the government's activities. The text presented by the government to the parliament outlines a set of government goals but does not specify how to achieve them. Government officials do not explain how they intend to create one million new jobs annually, empower women, reform the labor market, reduce poverty, popularize the cultural sector, establish educational justice, promote citizen rights, combat corruption, reduce dependence on oil, and reform the financial and tax system. 4. Rouhani's cabinet lacks a social base and does not represent or reflect the demands and concerns of any specific class or stratum except for the ruling class. Those who pledged allegiance to him only did so to escape from Raisi. The head of the executive branch relies on military and religious institutions for his work and thus tries to give various power circles a share in the cabinet. In fact, the cabinet is the result of the power balance of intra-governmental factions based on hard power (economic resources, guns, and organizations) and soft power (intelligence, propaganda, and policymaking) of their own factions. This cabinet is neither a working cabinet nor a developmental cabinet. Such a cabinet cannot respond to public demands because it is not designed for that purpose.