Critique of Zarif's Remarks at the Second Tehran Security Conference

Amid ongoing protests and demonstrations in various cities across Iran and a tense security atmosphere, the second Tehran Security Conference on "Regional Security in West Asia: Challenges and Emerging Trends" was held. This one-day conference took place at the Summit Hall of Islamic Countries in Velenjak, Tehran. The timing of an international conference on the twelfth day of unrest that has resulted in the deaths of at least 22 people and the arrest of hundreds could indicate that the situation in the capital is "under control." It is worth noting that immediately after the protests began in Iranian cities, it was announced that the visit of Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister, to Tehran was postponed by Iran due to scheduling issues. He was supposed to prepare for the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Tehran. However, at the security conference on Monday, in addition to Iranian officials, a group of foreign participants, including "Yusuf bin Alawi, the Omani Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, the former British Foreign Secretary, the former Prime Minister of Italy, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, the advisor to the President of Lebanon, and the head of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq," also attended. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister, emphasized several key points in his extensive speech, which are significant both in terms of policymaking and the worldview of the Islamic Republic and understanding the practical approach of its future policies. The text of the speech included notable domestic speakers such as "Kamal Kharrazi, Hesameddin Ashna, Ali Larijani, Brigadier General Amir Hatami, the Minister of Defense, Hossein Dehghan, the former Minister of Defense, and Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister." Zarif's remarks highlighted the Islamic Republic's perspective on existing security threats, primarily focusing on surrounding threats: concerns about terrorism in neighboring regions and the expanding organization of the "Greater Khorasan" group, which is mainly composed of affiliates of the Islamic State and returning ISIS members from Afghanistan and Pakistan, currently causing concern in the region. This group has carried out bombings in Kabul and claims to pose broader threats. Iran, which has been present in Syria in recent years and has cooperated with the Iraqi government in reclaiming territories occupied by ISIS, is well aware of the spread of terrorism both in its neighborhood and at home. Zarif stated, "The terrorist organization ISIS and similar groups are still active," and their threat range is "regional and global." In his speech, Zarif emphasized the necessity and "indisputability" of maintaining national cohesion and territorial integrity of regional countries. He referred to "separatist tendencies" in "ethnic and sectarian movements" in Syria and Iraq, describing them as dangerous for "the region and the world," but beyond repression and the use of military tools, there is no exit strategy from this problem mentioned in Zarif's speech or in the actions of existing regional governments. Zarif does not provide a definitive solution but refers to the "complete suppression of the ideological roots and cutting off financial resources" of this terrorist movement without clarifying how such actions should be carried out or how the suppression of ideological roots in international terrorism is feasible. On the other hand, it is expected that similar threats from this radical religious movement, which Zarif confirms are "regional and global," should be addressed at a regional and global level. Zarif's speech does not define a role or place for the international community. The concern about fragmentation and the emergence of new political units is another issue mentioned in Zarif's remarks, or referred to through "respect for national borders and the nation-state system." He believes that national borders and the nation-state system have been targeted for destruction due to the emergence of "takfiri movements." He argues that the "continuation of the current situation" in the region could lead to "centrifugal tendencies within political units," resulting in "tension and instability." It is clear that Zarif, without mentioning a referendum or the declaration of independence for Kurdistan, is worried about efforts to create new political units in the region and believes that disrespecting existing national borders is "futile." Nevertheless, it remains unclear what plans regional countries have to strengthen solidarity through investment in the development of underdeveloped areas, improving the welfare of marginalized regions, and ensuring the political participation of the people in these areas to counter demands for autonomy and independence. Zarif emphasizes the necessity and "indisputability" of maintaining national cohesion and territorial integrity of regional countries. He refers to "separatist tendencies" in "ethnic and sectarian movements" in Syria and Iraq, describing them as dangerous for "the region and the world," but beyond repression and the use of military tools, there is no exit strategy from this problem mentioned in Zarif's speech or in the actions of existing regional governments. Does the end of the war mean the end of Iran's presence in the region? Zarif mentions the reconstruction of Iraq and Syria as a factor influencing "political stability" in the region and concludes that such efforts will lead to the "complete defeat of extremism." However, he does not directly refer to Iran's role in the reconstruction operations of these countries and considers it the responsibility of the "international community" to assist with "the aim of helping the people and stabilizing peace" and "not to advance group and political goals." If these remarks reflect what Zarif truly believes, it may be hoped that many of the West's concerns about Iran's long-term objectives will diminish. As the war ends and negotiations begin to achieve some form of political stability, for instance, in Syria, some countries in the region and beyond are worried about Iran's long-term goals in the Middle East, which some see as disrupting the balance of power (for example, with Saudi Arabia) and others (like Israel) perceive as a direct threat to their security and existence. Both mentioned countries believe that Iran intends to change the regional structure to its advantage through military and political reconstruction programs in the post-war period in Syria and to escalate its regional threats to higher levels by establishing military bases. Zarif does not clarify Iran's objectives at all. On the other hand, he considers the role of the United States in the region as "one of the fundamental challenges" and believes that the "continued military presence" of the US in Syria is "illegitimate." Zarif also regards the "continued occupation of Palestine" as the "most acute issue" in the region and the world, attributing all regional problems to it. This is while the US sees itself as the rightful main force of the military coalition against ISIS and considers its continued presence legitimate until a political solution is reached in Syria. Zarif's views on Yemen are somewhat ambiguous and should be scrutinized alongside other parts of his remarks about the region. However, even in that brief reference, he considers the Saudi-led coalition's attacks on Yemen as a "widespread war crime against civilians" and one of the "tension-inducing factors" in the region. He believes the Yemen crisis has "no military solution" and that "dialogue and national consensus" are the only solutions to this crisis. After these discussions, the Iranian Foreign Minister presents two theoretical topics under the titles of "a strong region" and "network security." In the first topic, he defends the "principle of securing collective interests in the Persian Gulf and extending the win-win rule" for regional countries. It is clear that this theoretical discussion contradicts Iran's practical policies in the region, which are in constant friction and conflict with many Gulf countries. Of course, he does not deny the existence of competition but dismisses it due to the "vicious cycle" it creates. He also considers the arms race as "an example of destructive competitions" and, referring to the figure of "116 billion dollars" in the military budgets of Gulf countries last year, argues that the allocation of these budgets has exacerbated the problems of the people and led to "the weakness of governments in responding to the demands of the people." Iran has not distanced itself from the language of threat in either its domestic or foreign policy. Although most political science researchers believe that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, if we do not want to pay attention to this belief, one unanswered question remains: In which of the Gulf regional disputes has Iran preferred the olive branch over the sword and succeeded? An important point raised in this context is the reality that "no country can produce security for itself at the expense of making its neighbors insecure." Although it seems that Zarif implicitly had a specific neighboring country in mind, it should be noted that another perspective could provide the same description regarding Iran. In his theoretical discussion about the interconnectedness of the world, the Iranian Foreign Minister states that in the past four decades, "bloc formation and alliances" have been ineffective and have led to "crisis and aggression." He points out the inevitable differences in the components of power, ignoring the eternal law of power application, which states that the continuous increase in one side's power raises the perception of threat in the opposite direction and fuels the drive for power increase. This principle compels the owner or owners of power to consider changing existing equations, especially in conditions where international relations are in a state of rigidity and the challenge for leadership of a region, a continent, or the entire world continues, making it inevitable and irrefutable. In such circumstances, only the formulation of rational and pragmatic strategies can establish balance, not belligerence and attempts for escalating confrontation and mutual provocation. Zarif, as a representative of a policy that led to a nuclear agreement, understands better than anyone that escalation in confrontation does not always yield the desired outcome because higher power provokes the use of force to resolve conflicts. Zarif's proposal for establishing "network security" can only be implemented and successful if it avoids the path of "escalation" and does not get caught up in miscalculations in power components, focusing on the optimal use of existing strategies and pursuing de-escalation and convergence with other members of the international community in "peaceful" actions without distinguishing between countries. Otherwise, one can easily get trapped in the conspiracy theory and fight against a hypothetical "enemy" forever. Another point that remains open for discussion in Zarif's speech is his reference to the "first step" towards creating a "new paradigm of network security." Network security is a formula he proposes for a "strong and stable region." In response to this proposal, one must ask what guarantees exist that this mechanism will actually materialize as a "win-win model" and not lead to the production of a superior power among smaller powers? Iran's role in the two regional wars (Iraq and Syria against ISIS) has been military. Is there any guarantee that a new coalition will form in the region where Iran is merely one of the equal members, even equal to the smallest member in the region? For "reducing tensions and strengthening peace and stability in the region," as Zarif desires, Iran needs to present an image of a player that has created symbols other than weapons and generals. Iran has not distanced itself from the language of threat in either its domestic or foreign policy. Although most political science researchers believe that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, if we do not want to pay attention to this belief, one unanswered question remains: In which of the Gulf regional disputes has Iran preferred the olive branch over the sword and succeeded?