Dalton: It Cannot Be Said with Certainty That Differences Have Decreased

Predicting what will happen on December 3rd, November 24th, regarding nuclear negotiations becomes more difficult as we approach that date. Negotiations for a comprehensive and final agreement began in December 2013, when Iran and the P5+1 achieved an unprecedented agreement on a Joint Action Plan. This document paved the way for a year of continuous and intensive negotiations for both sides to work towards a comprehensive and final agreement on Iran's nuclear program. Now, these negotiations are nearing their final station, and negotiating officials continue to say that the gap in opinions has not decreased. To examine the outlook of these discussions and analyze various scenarios, Radio Farda has spoken with Sir Richard Dalton, a senior analyst at the Middle East and North Africa Center at Chatham House. He was the British ambassador to Iran for four years and previously served in Libya. Mr. Dalton, before we delve into the prospects of reaching an agreement or the failure of negotiations, what is your assessment of how both sides have acted over the past year? Reducing the gap in approaches in these negotiations to reach a comprehensive and final agreement has been very difficult. Due to the confidentiality of the negotiations, no one is entirely sure what progress has been made on the negotiating table. However, analysts and some officials have provided explanations about the main challenges, which are somewhat reliable. One of these difficulties is the scope of Iran's enrichment and the practical needs of the country. The duration of the agreement is another issue. The third issue is how to lift and the reliability of this process for lifting international sanctions and unilateral sanctions from the U.S. or Europe. The fourth is a set of questions regarding specific facilities, including the Arak heavy water reactor, which can produce a high amount of plutonium. This amount could lead to weapon production. Also, the Fordow facility, where 20% enrichment can be carried out, is another concern. Another challenge is transparency and how the international community can be assured that the terms of the agreement are being properly implemented. The progress made in transparency seems to indicate that Iran wants to take steps in this area and allow extensive monitoring by the agency. There have also been advancements regarding Arak and Fordow. However, regarding the scope of enrichment and production at Natanz and other enrichment facilities, the timeframe of the agreement, and the process of lifting sanctions and removing barriers against Iran's economy, challenges still exist. As a result, it can be said that good progress has been made in some areas, limited progress in others, and in the remaining issues, it cannot be said with certainty that the gap in opinions has decreased. You were the British ambassador in Tehran during the European Troika negotiations in the early 2000s. Do you see any similarities between today's situation and that time? Or are the parties negotiating today with stronger will? The processes of these two negotiations are similar. In October 2003, Britain, France, and Germany reached an agreement with Tehran in Saadabad for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. As a result, this was part of the modus operandi that gave the international community confidence that negotiations for a final agreement regarding Iran's enrichment program and its research and development program were possible. This is similar to the agreement that was called the Joint Action Plan, reached in November last year. However, a significant difference between the two is that the Joint Action Plan has more content, and this is because Iran's nuclear program has made significant progress in the ten years since the Saadabad agreement. However, in both situations, it was necessary for all unresolved issues, whether from 2003 to 2005 or in the past year, to be on the negotiating table; issues such as the transparency of Iran's nuclear program and its research and development program and potentially military dimensions of this program. So that the international community, like its approach to all countries, can be assured that this program is purely peaceful. In 2005, the Europeans presented a proposal to Iran that Tehran was very dissatisfied with, but if further negotiations had taken place in that regard, there might have been a possibility of reaching a final agreement. The stark difference between today's negotiations and that time is that today China, Russia, and the U.S. have also joined these negotiations, which increases the weight and importance of the negotiations, and the issue of international sanctions that the Iranian economy suffers from, and Tehran wants these sanctions lifted. These motivations did not exist from 2003 to 2005. With such a background, do you think it is possible to reach a comprehensive agreement by December 3rd? Some analysts believe that there is not enough time to reach a comprehensive and final agreement. There are multiple possibilities. One is that the negotiations fail altogether, which I think is very unlikely. Because there has been progress, and there is a strong willingness from both Iran and the six countries to reach an agreement. The second scenario is an extension of the negotiations, that the Joint Action Plan continues to be implemented, giving negotiators more time to reach an agreement. The third scenario is that while the parties decide to extend the negotiations, they reach a new agreement on some aspects under negotiation. For example, regarding the Arak facility, where progress has been made, they could reach a final agreement, and on the other side, we could witness some actions regarding sanctions. This situation would give the negotiating parties confidence that they could reach a final agreement. The fourth scenario is that close to December 3rd, the parties announce areas where they have shown political flexibility and for which a final solution has not yet been reached, but they say that they need time and negotiations to achieve ways to implement these political flexibilities. I believe there is still time for this fourth scenario, and I am not yet pessimistic about reaching an agreement by December 3rd. I still want to return to the failure of negotiations scenario you mentioned. In recent weeks, some analysts have written that if the negotiations fail, the European Union is not very inclined to continue the hardline approach it has taken alongside the U.S. until now. Do you think that if negotiations fail, Europe will continue its recent approach, especially regarding sanctions? Yes, I believe that Europeans will not change their policy. However, it is clear that the details of the failure of negotiations can influence this issue. If the time for negotiations is extended, I think the Europeans will not change their position. If a failure is announced and the reason for this failure from the Europeans' perspective is that, for example, the U.S. insisted on unreasonable and excessive demands, some political groups may say that it is time to change the approach. This is my speculation, but I think in this case, not abruptly but over time, pressures regarding the EU's sanctions against Iran will increase. However, considering the optimistic scenario, if the parties reach a comprehensive agreement, in addition to resolving the nuclear dispute, what other impacts will such an agreement have on international politics? My response's premise is that international sanctions are lifted according to the program, Iran also fulfills its commitments in all aspects of the agreement, and the agency confirms the peacefulness of Iran's program. With this premise, I believe that these four areas will be affected by the agreement: The first area is trade between Iran and Western countries. Some companies will quickly go to invest in Iran, while others will act more cautiously due to the stability of the situation. Of course, to see a real and serious return of investment to Iran, time is needed, and expectations should not be raised too high. Government programs and plans in Iran can also be implemented with progress in oil and gas sales. The second area is Iran's relationship with Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. In this regard, I do not think anything significant will happen in the first months or perhaps the first years after the agreement, as the differences between the parties are very large. For example, the situation in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and Iran's presence in Iraq are contentious issues. However, I believe a nuclear agreement could pave the way for dialogue, especially regarding security between Iran and particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The third area is Iran's relationship with the U.S. In this case, one should not expect anything significant too soon. The level of distrust between the two sides is very high. There are statements from both sides regarding this. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei says that enmity with the U.S. is such that he is not willing to make any progress in this regard. What can be seen in the years immediately following the agreement is that Iran and the U.S. may engage in cooperation or discussions in areas where both sides have mutual interests; for instance, in combating ISIS. The two sides had a successful collaboration for a long time during the war in Afghanistan. The fourth area is the impact of this agreement on the balance of power within Iran. It is clear that such an agreement, which leads to the gradual lifting of sanctions and improvement of the economic situation, can affect the balance of power among political groups. Such an agreement will help moderates and the Iranian president, who will be democratically elected, and give opportunities to Rouhani's associates, including reformists acceptable to the government, to demonstrate that the groundwork they had laid for moderation, development, and relations with the world has yielded results, and these policies should continue while the radicalism of conservative groups should be curtailed. And as a final question, Mr. Dalton, considering the problems in Tehran-London relations, do you think a potential agreement would impact these relations? I think it could help improve relations. I believe that after the incident following the attackers' assault on the British embassy in Tehran, where diplomats had to leave Iran for their safety, both Iran and Britain have been somewhat slow in finding a way to improve relations. Certainly, such an agreement would assist those in both countries who wish to re-establish political, economic, and cultural relations. I had the honor of being the British ambassador in Tehran, and at that time there was a greater willingness to cooperate with Britain, and there were many obstacles in the way of political, economic, and cultural cooperation, which resulted from some animosities in Tehran towards Britain. As a result, any renewed British presence in Tehran will need time to develop, to show that it is in the spirit of goodwill, and that fears and concerns about cooperation with Britain are unfounded. However, without a nuclear agreement, I cannot imagine any progress in the currently cold relations.