Debate: Did the Iran Nuclear Deal Make Iran a Winner or a Loser?

It has been nearly 9 months since the agreement between Iran and the countries known as 1+5 regarding Iran's nuclear program, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Since the acceptance of the JCPOA, nearly six months have passed, and nearly three months have passed since its implementation and the announcement of the beginning of the process of lifting sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The passage of time has now created conditions to examine the results of the JCPOA and to ask whether it has strengthened or weakened Iran's national security, improved Iran's international regional relations, contributed to the development of Iran's economy, or led to political development in terms of the balance of internal power. A debate was held on this topic on Friday night in London. The two sides of this debate are now guests on this week's program "Perspectives": Farrokh Negahdar, a political activist and analyst residing in London, and Hoshang Amir-Ahmadi, president of the Iranian-American Council and professor of political economy at Rutgers University in the United States, this week in London. Let's start with national security. Mr. Negahdar, do you think the JCPOA has weakened or strengthened Iran's national security? Since it has been supported by the majority of the people and the majority of political activists and practitioners in the country, and since a broad coalition beyond the moderate-reformist coalition in the country supported the JCPOA, it has helped our national security. Farrokh Negahdar: In my opinion, strengthening national security depends on reducing or diminishing the gaps that exist between the government and the people, the gaps within the government, and the conflicts that may exist between Iran and the rest of the world, especially with major powers. The JCPOA has repaired Iran's relations with major powers, and since it has been supported by the majority of the people and the majority of political activists and practitioners in the country, and since a broad coalition beyond the moderate-reformist coalition in the country supported the JCPOA, it has helped our national security. What is your opinion, Mr. Amir-Ahmadi? Has the JCPOA strengthened or weakened Iran's national security? On the contrary, for example, the relationship between Iran and the United States, in my opinion, will not be better under the next U.S. administration, whoever it may be, than it was before the JCPOA. It will probably be worse. This is an issue because the JCPOA has, so to speak, agitated and strengthened a large part of Iran's opponents, making them more aggressive and anxious, such as the Democrats or Republicans. I believe that while a large part of the Iranian people support the JCPOA, it has created a gap within the government. Even if this gap is less visible now, it is because Mr. Khamenei is sometimes with the JCPOA and sometimes against it. Therefore, the hardliners have currently been restrained. I believe the JCPOA has significantly increased the gap within the government between hardliners and moderates. Let Mr. Negahdar respond to this point you made, and then let's move on to how the regional situation has changed following the JCPOA. Mr. Negahdar? In relations between Iran and regional powers, in addition to Iran's nuclear program, Iran's power and its return and resolution of the Iranian issue with major powers will have a very profound impact on their relations with Iran. It will change the balance of power. Farrokh Negahdar: In relations between Iran and regional powers, in addition to Iran's nuclear program, Iran's power and its return and resolution of the Iranian issue with major powers will have a very profound impact on their relations with Iran. It will change the balance of power. The JCPOA has established Iran's international position, especially in relation to major powers, which until that time had been monopolized by Iran's regional rivals, and this will lead to economic openings, provided that it remains committed to its obligations and that these sanctions are lifted. This prospect of Iran entering the oil market, especially, worries Iran's regional rivals, and this concern has nothing to do with whether we would have been better off if we had remained in the pre-JCPOA era. The JCPOA connects Iran's relations with the world and Iran's economy with the global economy, and this will increase the concern and intensify the opposition of Iran's regional rivals against Iran. Of course, the case of Israel is different. Israel has less capacity to attack and create a specific concern for its security after the JCPOA. However, Saudi Arabia, especially since it owns oil and the monopoly on oil production belongs to the Gulf Cooperation Council, is currently dissatisfied that Iran wants to return. This has nothing to do with whether we would have had less sensitivity if we had not implemented the JCPOA. Mr. Amir-Ahmadi, I ask you the same question. Have regional relations with Iran improved due to the JCPOA or not? The fundamental problem that arose during the JCPOA process was that the negotiations isolated both the Republican forces in the U.S. and the hardliners in Iran, as well as the countries in the region. Hoshang Amir-Ahmadi: In the short term, it has gotten worse. We can see that the situation between Iran and the Arab world or Israel and Turkey has worsened. That is, Iran's relations with these countries before the JCPOA, even if they were not very good, were not as bad as they became after the JCPOA. What is the reason? One discussion is the same points that Mr. Negahdar mentions, which is correct; these countries are worried that Iran will return and become a friend of the U.S. and the West, and therefore they will obstruct. But another problem, in my opinion, is the fundamental issue that arose during the JCPOA process. The JCPOA negotiations isolated the Republican forces in the U.S., the hardliners in Iran, and the countries in the region. You look at Iran negotiating with the 1+5, and in the 1+5, there is a country like Germany that has nothing to do with the issue. While I believe that from the beginning, I said that it would have been better if these five plus three included more countries. In these negotiations, I believe that Saudi Arabia should have been present. Turkey should have been present, and several other regional countries. What was relevant was not included. Therefore, unfortunately, this negotiation process isolated these countries in the region. It isolated the right-wingers in the U.S. and the hardliners in Iran. So a deal was made between Mr. Obama and Mr. Rouhani, and Mr. Khamenei was behind that curtain. Well, this cannot last. I have always said that you cannot normalize a small issue within a larger abnormal relationship. Even if you want to do that, the issues of that larger relationship interfere and do not allow this small thing you want to normalize, meaning the issue of enrichment, to remain in its place. Therefore, in my view, at least in the short term, it has worsened the situation, and in the long term, it depends on other developments. In general, whenever regional countries feel (I am talking about their feelings) that Iran has weakened, they have acted more aggressively against Iran. Whenever they have felt that Iran is a strong country, then they have positioned themselves better and worked more orderly. Unfortunately, after the JCPOA, regional countries concluded that Iran is weak. Because an Iran that had been saying for thirty-some years that it could do this and that to the U.S. and that it could not do anything, suddenly realized that this Iran is in ruins. It is all under sanctions. It is all trapped. It quickly wants this to happen and will do whatever the West, especially the U.S., wants. Mr. Negahdar, please consider this point that Mr. Amir-Ahmadi mentioned, that all those who should have been present at the negotiating table were not included, and this created problems. Secondly, in both countries, in Iran and the U.S., there are those who do not see themselves aligned with the JCPOA and therefore react to it. The late Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal actively worked with Mr. John Kerry and made quick trips, and even in one case, at the last moment, he sat for four hours on Mr. Saud al-Faisal's private plane and talked with him about under what conditions and how the sanctions would be lifted or not lifted, and he was practically involved in the process related to the sanctions. Farrokh Negahdar: The part that relates to Iran's nuclear program is under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It controlled it and that representative was a larger part of the international community than the 1+5. Of course, the 1+5 is the determining force there because they are the veto holders and the major European powers. In that way, Israel, which has not been a member of the NPT and has no obligations regarding international issues concerning nuclear weapons, has no meaning in this matter. Mr. Amir-Ahmadi did not say that it would have been good if Israel had come. In Saudi Arabia, the part that relates to the nuclear issue, Saudi Arabia is as much a stakeholder in this matter as others. The part of breaking sanctions and returning Iran to the international economy and the realm of international relations was of particular sensitivity to Saudi Arabia more than anyone else, and in this area, I believe that a deal or agreement that could have been made in exchange for the nuclear program could not have expanded this framework. Neither Iran could digest this issue, nor could the international community. Neither side saw it. Although alongside the negotiations to lift the sanctions, the late Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal actively worked with Mr. John Kerry, making quick trips, and even in one case, at the last moment, he sat for four hours on Mr. Saud al-Faisal's private plane and talked with him about under what conditions and how the sanctions would be lifted or not lifted, and he was practically involved in the process related to the sanctions. Mr. Negahdar, explain the internal opposition in both countries. Farrokh Negahdar: Regarding the second issue and the opposition, the JCPOA has created a large gap that still has repercussions and vibrations in the electoral competitions in the U.S. regarding whether Iran should return or not. This has become the most important international issue within American society regarding how we should deal with it. Iran's policies could not, for example, encourage Mr. Trump or Mr. Cruz to come forward. That is their issue. I cannot say whether Mr. Obama closed this gap well or poorly. In any case, the United States is prepared to conclude this agreement with Iran, and all the consequences of it rest with the Americans. I agree with Mr. Amir-Ahmadi's view that if the government changes, except for Bernie Sanders, the rest will probably show more strictness or concerns regarding Iran's return and the lifting of sanctions in the United States. Mr. Amir-Ahmadi, can you respond to Mr. Negahdar's remarks? But we have very little time. Please keep in mind that my next question is what impact the JCPOA has had on Iran's economy after the announcement of the end of sanctions? Even an attempt was not made to bring them into the field. In relation to the region of Afghanistan, we had a wide regional process involving the U.S., Europe, and Iran that worked on that issue. Now, the nuclear issue may have had more sensitivity, but I believe that if they had tried, a wider coalition of countries that were stakeholders could have been brought into the field that would have acted directly regarding Iran's nuclear program. Hoshang Amir-Ahmadi: I have nothing to say about Mr. Negahdar's remarks. I accept his words, with the difference that his point is that it seems that Iran and the U.S. had to isolate them. I do not believe that. Even an attempt was not made to bring them into the field. In relation to the region of Afghanistan, we had a wide regional process involving the U.S., Europe, and Iran that worked on that issue. Now, the nuclear issue may have had more sensitivity, but I believe that if they had tried, a wider coalition of countries that were stakeholders could have been brought into the field that would have acted directly regarding Iran's nuclear program. Another point I want to make is that the JCPOA, remember, is outside the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is not even within the NPT. The JCPOA itself states that this agreement is specifically written for Iran and does not apply to any other country. However, regarding Iran's economy, they say that a good year is known from its spring. The reality is that three months after the implementation of the JCPOA, the Iranian government is still trying to even get its money back. The last thing that the Americans said, Mr. Obama said last week, was that I will not allow and the Treasury Department has also said that it will not allow Iran to trade in dollars or use our financial systems. This means a very significant blow to the JCPOA and the economic opening that was supposed to happen. In this country, banks in England do not dare to work with Iran and do not work. The point I have is that the only thing that may happen in relation to Iran and the West will be trade. The investment sector is very weak.