Decoding the Black Boxes of the Prisons of the 1980s

With "everyday politics" and a short-term pragmatic approach, today we should not linger too long on the audio tape of Ayatollah Montazeri. It even seems that if it were not for the heavy weight of Ayatollah's renowned name and his agitated voice on this tape, some who today remain silent in dissatisfaction or have entered this arena for other reasons might have explicitly stated that now is not the time to raise these issues and it is an old harvest of wind. However, if our "politics" were a bit more time-bound and strategic, we would clearly see that the culture and politics that led to the atrocities of 1988 are still alive and taking victims, as the country's judicial-security system continues to view humans instrumentally as hostages for revenge or for collective intimidation and strengthening the foundations of power, and has recently executed a number of political prisoners en masse. Therefore, we will believe that we still need to address: "Preserving memory to prevent the repetition of the catastrophe." Besides, the quest for justice for this crime has its own independent authenticity and a step further, examining the file of the violence in the early days after the revolution (both the rulers and the condemned; of course with completely distinct degrees of legal and historical responsibility) will always be a light on our future path. Why has Ayatollah Montazeri's tape resonated so much? But why this time, after three decades, has this audio tape gained such resonance that even the usually silent Assembly of Experts, which speaks out once a year with repetitive and tedious statements, has entered the issue? It seems there are two main reasons for this: First, thanks to the extensive virtual networks and smartphones that many Iranian citizens now have, this tape has had an unexpected and undeniable reflection. Second, the rulers of the Islamic Republic (along with their accompanying body) are transferring generations, and the second generation, which did not directly participate in that bloody decade, today, even if they remain silent, have become questioning and demanding answers. As a side note, it can be said that a kind of security tolerance and leniency from the military-security forces connected to the power center has also been effective in this regard. Because this tape challenges the ruling Imam-line figures of that day and the subsequent reformists and moderates. Although if we look closely, this tape has deeper dimensions that point to the overall intellectual and political structure of the previous and current religious tyranny. This is why Mr. Khamenei, despite all his restraint, cannot hold himself back and in the beginning of his recent meeting with the government delegation, he harshly criticizes the recent release of Ayatollah Montazeri's audio tape. Three positions regarding the tape: Three groups have taken positions regarding this tape: First, those who themselves were involved in that era and in this crime (or have taken all their credibility and political rent from the perpetrators of this crime), are actually defending themselves. They hide behind Mr. Khomeini and some actions of the Mujahideen and try with noise and, as Ali Motahari says, with fallacies to cover up the crime. However, these deceptions have become tedious due to their repeated nature from the ruling security apparatus and have lost their impact even on the government’s supporters, and despite all the dust they create and the various efforts to cover up the main issue, the hand of the oppressed still remains out of the dust, reminding of the crime. Even if with complete audacity, Montazeri is still considered a victim, naive, and he and his children are still labeled as accomplices with the enemy and cooperating with Saudi Arabia and the Mujahideen and Israel and the USA, etc. Those who today show more heat than others have had their brutal actions (which at that time Ayatollah Montazeri directly called them criminals) exposed. The surprising point of history is that those who, in the middle of the historical tape, laugh in a disgusting manner at Ayatollah's repeated objections and efforts to prevent the continuation of the crime, today their drunken laughter has turned into a desperate cry for self-defense and justification of their wickedness. The second group consists of those who, despite all the pressures from the power center to take a position on this matter, have remained silent (it is said that Mohammad Khatami is also under pressure to declare a position). It seems that a significant part of this group has accepted that a crime has occurred. Now, they may have diverse opinions about its dimensions and roots, but they do not see entering this issue as politically beneficial or consider it detrimental due to some of their personal backgrounds. Not to mention those who, due to today’s political atmosphere and the influence of social media networks, do not dare to enter the matter and defend the ruling leader's decree or do not see this as politically beneficial for their personal interests. However, the third group consists of those who have taken a bolder and more humane position, questioning the official narrative or even somewhat condemning the crime, such as Mostafa Tajzadeh and Ali Motahari. In the case of these two, it seems that civil and political society, which is opposed to the crime, should have a positive and welcoming stance. It is true that Ali Motahari consciously and calculatedly does not question the "principle" of the fatwa of the crime but questions the "method of execution of the Imam's decree" (and of course emphasizes "compensation"), but let us not forget that he is now the deputy chairman of one of the three branches of the country and secondly, he is expressing his opinion within the power structure and the dominance of the ruling political-security discourse. This level of his positioning, where he mentions three people by name and questions them, indicates both his moral courage and honesty and his humane approach, and perhaps reflects that the next generation of powerful individuals in Iran, which we said is in transition and has not directly participated in the crime, is today questioning and demanding answers, and this is a positive step and a space-maker and should be welcomed. Regarding Mr. Tajzadeh, who has also had a respectable resistance during his imprisonment in the 1990s, we should also see the glass half full. It is true that he still calls the rulers' violence (of which his organization was also a significant part) "a reaction" against realities and repeatedly documented history, and does not narrate history from beginning to end but rather in reverse, and does not say that when the monopolistic ruling power closes the way for any kind of political activity and participation for "everyone" (and not just the organization he emphasizes), some may fall into what "reactions". However, again in this case, Mr. Tajzadeh's courageous position of "apologizing" to the survivors should be viewed positively and welcomed as a step forward in the path of seeking justice and uncovering the truth. It is better to emphasize the human, positive, forward-looking, and national aspects of the positions of people like Mr. Ali Motahari and Mr. Mostafa Tajzadeh rather than pointing out the weaknesses in their positions. We have not forgotten that in the past, some of the most positive and thoughtful reformist figures spoke of "collective repentance" and equated the executioner and the victim (and at most, the first-degree accused and subsequent accused). Welcoming these positive, courageous, and humane steps can open a better space for dialogue about this national and educational case that can be called "the Holocaust of political prisoners" in Iran, which is unprecedented in modern Iranian history. Today, some explicitly defend this crime and take pride in it. Some condemn it but rationalize it or have truly accepted the deceptive propaganda and the official deceitful narrative that this massacre was due to the Mujahideen's operations. However, in any case, this "entry" into dialogue can be considered a gain, and we can speak and discuss it patiently. Let them also not be afraid and be able to present their political and historical reasons in this regard without stuttering and fear in the public space. One can even expand the file of the 1988 executions (which does not contradict independent justice-seeking in this regard) and raise the issue of post-revolution "violence" to provide an opportunity for everyone to express their opinions and engage in a fair and comprehensive discussion so that perhaps a relatively common historical memory can be reached, and everyone can join this process by accepting their share and role, and this "memory" can prevent the repetition of the "catastrophe" or in this process, it can be determined who still wants to defend their past positions or actions at any cost. Ayatollah Montazeri in his book of self-criticism is a high example and a model in this regard, especially from someone who played an effective role in forming the established system and could have gained a very important position in the future by adopting "silence". We have previously observed this type of discussion and the gradual clarification of shares and roles in the context of revealing the various dimensions and aspects of the reality and truth of the matter in the file of the "war" in its final days and the reasons for its end and the opinions and positions and events, etc., and also in the file of "hostage-taking". In the nuclear file and the disastrous interventions of Iran in Syria, both of which are costly and national files, and also in the painful and hot file of the prisons of the 1980s and its climax, the genocide of political prisoners in the summer of 1988, we have not yet reached this stage. The noisy discussion of this issue in the current parliament, however, gives the positive promise that one day this file will also be opened. The black boxes decoding the prisons of the 1980s require the voices of those who were at the top of affairs or close to the centers of power, especially its important decision-making. They can provide many decodings in this regard. In the first stage, it is the right of the families of the victims of this crime to know why and how their loved ones were punished and exactly when and where they were buried. And in the second stage, more broadly, it is the right of all the people of Iran to have an accurate historical memory about this great tragedy, especially since this event coincided with other historic decisions such as the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the end of the war and the removal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the vice leadership and the amendment of the constitution to eliminate the condition of marja'iyyat, which paved the way for the leadership of other individuals. It is the right of all the people of Iran to know whether those at the top of the power pyramid and the main decision-making were aware of Mr. Khomeini's severe illness and whether they did not want to design and implement the last steps that only the then-leader could take, including the genocide (and in Ayatollah Montazeri's words, the uprooting of the political prisoners) whom they saw as intellectual, political, organizational cadres or motivated field forces for effective political interventions in the future, and thus, under the hypocritical cover of "mohareb" and "murtad", they engaged in genocide (of both religious and non-religious individuals)? Is this not a more accurate narrative than the deceptive and simplistic narrative of the Mujahideen's attack and the government's reaction? From this perspective, we can recall some political black boxes of the 1988 executions, which if they break their silence, many ambiguities will be decoded. Ayatollah Montazeri explicitly mentions Ahmad Khomeini and the Ministry of Intelligence as two factors that had been pursuing this action "for a long time". But could Ahmad Khomeini, who in the years before the 1980s referred to the third way (between the then President Mr. Banisadr and the Republican Party) or spoke of "the Imam is alone" and was against the party leaders, and they held a nationwide rally "the Imam is not alone" against his position, despite all his political shifts and closeness to the party leaders, could he have carried out all those fundamental actions alone, such as ending the war and removing Ayatollah Montazeri, without the participation and guidance of those party leaders who were the closest individuals to the leader? Would it not be more accurate to consider him "one of" the members at the top of the decision-making pyramid, who was an insider and trusted by the leader to carry out important collective decisions? In this case, who were the other members of this group? Everyone knows that Mr. Hashemi was the second person in the power system at that time and the trusted favorite of the then-leader. Is Mr. Hashemi, whose memoirs are timely and good, not an important black box that can decode this event and other similar events (such as the stories he told about the end of the war)? Also, as Ayatollah Montazeri explicitly stated in the mentioned tape, the Ministry of Intelligence is another decision-making side at least in this major file during those years. Thus, the mysterious figure of Mohammadi Reyshahri, the then Minister of Intelligence (and his accompanying team) and the management he had in important security files after the revolution is revealed here. Based on his previous and current positions, not much can be expected from him in this regard, but cannot a significant number of reformists who have a security background and membership in the ministry and intelligence institutions also be other black boxes in this regard, who, if they had the moral courage and religious and historical responsibility that weighed on Ayatollah Montazeri, could have opened many dimensions of this national file? These individuals can explicitly say when they were in the Ministry of Intelligence, when and why they distanced themselves, or perhaps regardless of their administrative role and position, due to relationships they had with their friends and colleagues in their organization (and sometimes even after leaving the ministry), what information they have in this regard? Especially since it is said that some of them were also present in negotiations with Kurdish leaders abroad...