Decoding the Leader's Keffiyeh: The Dawn of Post-Agreement Confrontations

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, delivered significant remarks regarding the cultural threats to the regime at a conference of scholars and elites from the seminaries of Mashhad and Qom. He indirectly attacked the Rouhani government, particularly the Ministry of Culture, for pursuing the policies of the Reformist and Construction eras and for being indifferent to the Leader's concerns about cultural NATO and cultural incursions. He explicitly considered some statements from government officials as a regression of religion, revolution, and Islam, claiming that neglecting the paradigm shift of foreign enemies' conspiracies from military and security to cultural and soft approaches has made the regime vulnerable. He accuses the Reformist government officials of creating serious threats to the regime through pressure tactics and the securitization of political and cultural issues, and he believes that the current moderation government is following a similar path. He further expresses concern about the moral and cultural state of society, reflecting the Leader's criticism that he believes has stagnated in the third decade of the revolution. The important points of his speech, which have strategic value in explaining the political and cultural confrontation landscape in the post-nuclear agreement era, can be categorized as follows: • Distinction between defending the Islamic Revolution and defending territorial integrity Jafari makes a fundamental distinction between these two. He sees the latter as solely the military's duty, while he considers the former a political, cultural, ideological, and doctrinal task. Within this framework, he identifies the main responsibility of the IRGC and Basij as preserving, developing, and deepening the Islamic Revolution. In other words, he defends the IRGC's political and cultural intervention within the framework of preserving the foundations of the revolution. • Moving towards the Islamization of society and the formation of a global Islamic revolution He describes the Islamization of society and the formation of a global Islamic revolution as the fourth and fifth stages of the Iranian Islamic Revolution that must be traversed based on the Leader's guidelines, with a long-term focus of revolutionary forces on this horizon. • The necessity of non-conservative guardianship The IRGC commander, distinguishing between conservative and non-conservative guardianship in defending the achievements of the Islamic Revolution and the regime, called for attention to non-conservative defense. According to him, based on the Leader's view, non-conservative guardianship is aimed at protecting the essence that has kept the Islamic Revolution alive and dynamic, facilitating movement towards relevant goals and preventing stagnation. This essence can be sought in maintaining a closed cultural space and political authoritarianism. • The importance of attention beyond borders He considers the view that the regime should focus solely on managing the people and country of Iran and not interfere in other countries as dangerous, advocating instead for intervention in the region and the world. He goes further, claiming that the Leader donned the keffiyeh to signal the continuation of the war against imperialism (the West). Based on the IRGC's performance and the Leader's views, it can be concluded that this intervention aims to strengthen Shiite Islamic fundamentalism. • The IRGC's need for clergy Jafari states that the Leader has assigned some confrontational cultural responsibilities to the IRGC. However, he notes that the IRGC cannot handle this alone and can only prepare the groundwork, while the clergy must provide the necessary products. Jafari's remarks lack coherence and display multiple contradictions, yet they are cohesive in that there has been no change in the IRGC's command strategy, and this force remains a tool for the leadership in political and cultural guardianship in society. It seeks to systematically maintain the existing political situation using military, security, and ideological tools alongside organizing forces under its command across all segments of society in the form of Basij forces and supporter cultivation, preventing fundamental changes. However, the contradictions in Jafari's remarks and the significant gap between his statements and societal realities indicate the fragile and eroded foundation of the IRGC's command structure and decision-making. He states in one instance that the Leader has said the revolution has stagnated in the third decade and in another emphasizes the necessity of Islamizing society and forming a global Islamic government in the fourth and fifth decades. As the Islamic Republic approaches the end of its fourth decade, the gap between society and the interpretation of Islam desired by Khamenei has widened significantly compared to the early days of the revolution. Security approaches and the organized presence of the Basij and interference in individuals' private lives have not only failed to halt this trend but have intensified it. Jafari himself describes the cultural and moral situation as very concerning. It is evident that this situation is not the result of actions by internal opposition forces or Western governments but rather reflects the failure of the regime's cultural and ideological apparatuses, which, despite controlling mass media and spending large budgets, have been unable to implement their programs. The mocking attitude of the new generation towards the identity foundations and myths of the conservatives and the deep gap between their values and official values indicate the roots of the regime's decaying and fragmented state in the majority of society, which is only based on an organized minority that is somewhat cohesive in terms of interests, beliefs, and shared goals. A simple look at the streets of the country shows how the identity symbols desired by the regime have increasingly fallen among the youth from generation to generation. However, contrary to Jafari's view, the Leader has superficially assessed the situation positively, claiming that the regime's growth among the new generations has been better and more fruitful. Yet, monitoring developments shows that these statements are more propagandistic and are made to reassure the regime's social base. Contrary to Jafari's claim, the reformists did not securitize the cultural and political arena; rather, conservatives and principlists, especially the IRGC leadership, have police-ified these areas to slow down the pace of changes and maintain the dominant position. However, the unaddressed demands are only accumulating in the lower layers of society. If the reform project had progressed, political and cultural development would have gradually created the ground for reducing the state-nation gap and changing the regime towards aligning with democratic functions. Of course, it is clear that in this case, there would be no room for authoritarian forces and those who consider themselves guardians and custodians of the people. However, the main importance of Jafari's remarks lies in the attacks he has made on government officials. As the government approaches the second half of its term and concludes the nuclear agreement, the time for increasing the repressive apparatus's activity to completely paralyze the government's plans for political and cultural reforms has been advanced. From this point onward, the likelihood increases that the IRGC and Basij will confront that part of Rouhani's government officials who seek openings in cultural and political arenas. Jafari warns that America's hostility towards Iran will not end after the nuclear agreement and that an ideological and identity war between them persists; on the other hand, he considers political and cultural developments and attention to demands as security threats. Decoding these remarks means that there should be no hope for a direct impact of the nuclear agreement on increasing freedoms and reducing restrictions, and the forces preserving the classic face of the regime are prepared and determined to block significant and meaningful changes in official cultural and political domains. The increasing disagreements between the Ministry of Culture and the Friday Prayer leaders also demonstrate another aspect of the readiness of authoritarian forces and defenders of the status quo to vaccinate the regime against the internal impacts of the nuclear agreement. The Rouhani government has so far taken limited actions to fulfill its political and cultural promises and has a generally weak record in domestic and cultural policy. However, even these limited activities have not been well-received by the authoritarian forces, who consider them a threat. What increases the scope and depth of these repressive and restraining activities is the end of the government's activities regarding the nuclear crisis and the widespread expectation for Rouhani to pay more attention to cultural, human rights, and political concerns. By revisiting the Reformist era, Jafari sends the signal that the IRGC and Basij will not remain passive observers and will stand against efforts beyond the Leader's desired boundaries in the domestic arena in the name of defending Islam, the revolution, and the regime. The Rouhani government has also taken limited actions to fulfill its political and cultural promises and has a generally weak record in domestic and cultural policy. However, even these limited activities have not been well-received by the authoritarian forces, who consider them a threat. It seems that the IRGC has plans for the upcoming parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. Brigadier General Gholam Asgar Karimi, commander of the Ashura IRGC, has announced the IRGC's election policy under the following points: • Ensuring election security and conducting fair elections • Maximum public participation as a basis for demonstrating the power of the Iranian nation and the deterrent power against the enemy • Outlining the principles of the Islamic Revolution and clarifying the ideals of the Imam and the Leader • Exposing anti-revolutionary movements aligned with the West and strengthening anti-imperialist movements aligned with the Islamic Revolution. The type of reaction from dissenting and reform-seeking forces will show whether the IRGC will be able to suppress the will for change in society or whether public opinion will insist on this demand through resistance and critical and protest activities, refusing to succumb to the plan for an eternal monolithic rule desired by the absolute power structure.