Democracy in the Shadow of 'Normalization'

Mowlavi Abdolhamid, the leading Sunni figure in Iran, has criticized the government of Rouhani in an interview regarding its approach to Sunni citizens, stating: "The discussions with Mr. Rouhani's team promised that they would try as much as possible to solve the problems of Sunnis, and wanting is being able. Now, Sunnis are saying that if Mr. Rouhani and his team are serious, the problems are solvable, especially with this letter from the Supreme Leader. However, our people are somewhat dissatisfied now, as reformists forget the people when they win elections and do not maintain the interactions of the election period after the elections. If they do not pay attention to the demands, there is a risk that the entire nation will turn towards another direction." The recent comments from the Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan are just one of the critical reactions to Rouhani's second government; after Rouhani did not appoint any women to his second cabinet, women's rights activists criticized him for the noticeable gap between his election promises and what transpired. In addition, the Sunni composition of the new cabinet, the selection of some questionable candidates for collaboration (such as the ministers of culture and education), and the continued presence of some ministers who are not aligned with democratization (including Rahmani Fazli, the Minister of Interior, and Ali Rabiei, the Minister of Labor) led to protests from many civil society activists and young supporters who stood behind him in the recent elections against the camp of Ebrahim Raisi. Clearly, Rouhani has adopted a behavior in recent months that does not provoke the central power structure. It is difficult to overlook the fact that Rouhani seems to be attentive to the illness of the first person in the system. From this perspective (active presence in the political power structure as an effective and trusted player for the moment of the absence of the Supreme Leader), Rouhani seeks not to disturb the top of the political system, nor to cause concern for the security forces governing the IRGC, nor to make traditional clerics aligned or misaligned with the government in Qom dissatisfied with him. All of this emphasizes Rouhani's focus on the continuation of a non-controversial government with an emphasis on improving the country's economic situation and continuing engagement with the West and deepening international relations, while avoiding entering into marginal and challenging areas for himself and his government; areas that are mainly linked to democratization, political development, and cultural development. Rouhani's noticeable retreat on the UNESCO 2030 educational document was one of the significant manifestations of his post-election approach. Despite all his fierce claims and agitation regarding the opponents' focus on this document during the electoral competition, he retreated in the face of pressure from the core of power—especially the insistence of the first person in the political system—and officially accepted the halt of its implementation. To advance his promises and slogans in the political and cultural sphere, Rouhani has shown no sign of relying on social forces; it seems he is attentive to interacting with the central power structure in the Islamic Republic. Unrealistic expectations lead to inevitable disappointment for those voters who supported Rouhani in the 2017 presidential election and have quickly (in recent weeks) become disillusioned with the success of Rouhani's government or its adherence to its promises and electoral propaganda. Rouhani's government was not supposed—and is not—to prioritize the project of transition to democracy. In the recent elections, faced with the supporters of Raisi, Rouhani had to sharpen his rhetoric and propose exciting slogans; however, it was not hidden from the eyes of informed and realistic observers what fundamental biases he and his associates have in the political power structure and what weight and power they hold. A realistic expectation from Rouhani's government was the continuation of the path of his first government for gradual improvement of the country's economic situation and also the enhancement of global relations in the post-JCPOA era. Of course, for those concerned with democratization, it was important that the consequences and overflow of such a process in civil society could lead to the revival of the cultural middle class and social movements. From this perspective, the persistent forces for democratization are compelled to continue their efforts in civil society and pursue their demands; although the continuation of Rouhani's government provides a better opportunity and possibility compared to the establishment of Raisi's government. An analytical mistake occurs when Rouhani's government is evaluated as a government for democratization; in this case, frustration and increasing disappointment will be assumed. A government for 'normalization' not 'democratization.' Two years ago (September 2015), Saeed Hajarian, a prominent analyst in the reformist camp, emphasized the distinction between the two concepts of 'normalization' and 'democratization,' stating that the discourse of moderation seeks to normalize the public space of the country—after eight years of Ahmadinejad's exceptional government and also heavy sanctions. He clarified that Rouhani's project is to normalize the country's conditions, not democratization. It remains that Rouhani has limited potential even for this normalization, as he does not possess the capability to normalize in the realm of political disputes, because 'normalization in the political sphere requires political will for democratization.' Moreover, even in the economic sphere, according to Hajarian, Rouhani is unable to easily and completely normalize the situation; because 'structural corruption has also affected Rouhani's government, and corruptions from the previous government have been transferred to the government of moderation.' If Rouhani's continuation is evaluated from the perspective of the importance of continuing normalization, expanding rationality in the political power structure, strengthening prudent and rational bureaucracy, and violence-free governance, and also expanding industrial capitalism, the approach to the current situation will differ. In other words, although Rouhani is obliged to fulfill his electoral promises, and although civil society actors should demand the realization of their demands from him—as the head of the executive branch—they will not place all their eggs in Rouhani's basket. The problem is that active and demand-oriented engagement in civil society and the pursuit of democratization and fundamental rights will be overshadowed by the establishment of Rouhani's government and will be equated with normalization. As long as public pressure for increasing the position of women in the country's management structure, allowing women into stadiums, holding concerts with security, free and safe media activities, and political, professional, and civil associations, and other related issues are not present, tangible, and powerful, even Rouhani's government will have little will to pursue and realize these issues. From this perspective, the criticism and demands of Mowlavi Abdolhamid, or women's rights activists and other civil society actors, become meaningful and significant and are evaluated as an important element for the revival of social forces supporting democratization—in the era of normalization, and despite the threats and obstacles posed by authoritarianism.