Dennis Ross: Not Implementing the Nuclear Agreement Benefits No One for Iran

Dennis Ross, who previously served as the special coordinator for the Middle East at the U.S. State Department, was among the first American diplomats to receive Oman’s message regarding Iran’s readiness to negotiate on nuclear issues. Mr. Ross answered questions from Radio Farda about the background of the nuclear negotiations and the implications of the JCPOA during the period when Iran expressed its willingness to negotiate. Dennis Ross is an American diplomat who previously served as the special coordinator for the Middle East during Bill Clinton's presidency and as a special advisor to Hillary Clinton on Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian affairs. He is currently a senior analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and was among the first American diplomats to receive Oman’s message about Iran’s readiness for nuclear negotiations. Mr. Ross noted that the negotiations that ultimately led to the agreement last year had been ongoing for over a decade. However, at one point, as a special advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State in 2009, you received a message from Iran through Oman, marking the beginning of the final six-year period. Was receiving that message the catalyst for the process that led to the JCPOA? This period was certainly a starting point for an era that could potentially initiate this process. However, secret talks did not begin until 2012 and did not take real shape until after Hassan Rouhani was elected in Iran. Therefore, I think the real turning point was Rouhani's election. The signal received in the secret talks was that the Iranians were ready to engage in serious negotiations. Before that, we were not receiving such messages from Iran. Of course, we were receiving these messages from the Omanis, who believed that serious talks might be possible, but we did not see any real signs in this regard. You mentioned a point that has been widely discussed these days. Ben Rhodes, a senior White House official, has been accused in recent weeks of attempting to mislead public opinion about the agreement, suggesting that it was Rouhani’s election that made the agreement possible and implying that the U.S. negotiated with a so-called moderate government or at least a pragmatic one. Yes, it seems you share this view. But how do you respond to these critics? I think the answer is the same. A government that sought to lift sanctions had to come to power to negotiate so that the U.S. government could be convinced that dialogue could lead to a real outcome. Prior to this time, there were serious doubts about achieving anything in negotiations with the Iranians. The Obama administration made it clear from the beginning that it was ready to talk to Iran. The initial reactions from the Iranians contained signs that they were not interested in this issue at all, they were hesitating, and they were not even ready to engage in the P5+1 framework, and if a bilateral dialogue were to take place, the Iranian approach was that nothing was possible until all sanctions were lifted. However, later they entered serious negotiations when sanctions were being fully enforced. Mr. Ross, the JCPOA was reached a year ago after all these ups and downs. Do you think this agreement will be sustainable, and are you hopeful about its future? I believe this agreement will be implemented because I think the Iranians have no benefit in not implementing it. I do not think it is in Iran's interest for the question of what their goal is in having this program to be raised again; it is also not in their interest for sanctions to be reimposed, and they have put their initial commitments into action, and we must carefully examine how they adhere to their commitments. I still believe the JCPOA has not changed Iran's intentions. I think they have delayed their goals regarding nuclear weapons, and I do not think they have abandoned this option because if they implement the agreement as they should, in 10 or 15 years, they will again be in a position where they can consider this option. However, since they can retain and develop a large part of their program, it means they still have this option available. Do you think it would be in Iran's strategic interests to pursue building a nuclear weapon in 10 or 15 years? I do not think so, and the next U.S. administration will emphasize that Iran must adhere to its commitments. When I say that Iran has not abandoned this option, I mean the capability regarding weapons. What Iran has committed to in the JCPOA is that it will never seek to acquire or produce weapons, and if it violates this, it faces a significant threat, and the next administration will be much clearer about what the consequences of such a violation would be. The JCPOA may have a specific timeframe regarding some of its limitations, but the commitments regarding the prohibition of weapon production do not have a timeframe and are permanent. Therefore, if violated, it will face a very strong reaction. I am interested in this administration and specifically the next U.S. administration clearly stating that if the Iranians violate that commitment, the consequence will be the use of force (military action) to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. This is not our option, but it will be the consequence of Iran violating its promise not to pursue nuclear weapons. You mentioned the next U.S. administration. Analysts I have spoken with see one of the doubts about the future of the nuclear agreement as related to the presidential elections in the U.S. What is your view on this? Especially if Hillary Clinton wins the Democratic nomination, do you think she will continue the current administration's policy regarding Iran? I believe that if Hillary Clinton becomes president, she will adhere to the commitments made under the JCPOA, but if you even listen to her speech on this matter, she emphasizes the importance of strict implementation of the agreement. She is hesitant that if the Iranians are not truly aware of the consequences of not adhering to their commitments, they will not do it correctly. Therefore, I think the policy regarding the implementation and commitment of the U.S. will be similar to this administration, but in formal rhetoric, there will be less sensitivity about interpreting these harsher statements in Iran. The Obama administration seems very cautious about not giving hardliners in Iran an opportunity to exploit harsher statements. I think the Clinton administration will have less sensitivity in this regard; the Iranians have no sensitivity about their provocative statements against us, and I do not understand why we should be sensitive in this regard. Both sides have interests in implementing the agreement, and the Iranians must understand that when we say they must adhere to their commitments, we are serious. Mr. Ross, you have been an observer of Middle Eastern developments for years. My last question to you in this regard is whether you think the nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers has changed the balance of power, hegemony, and dynamics in this region in any way? Certainly, those in the region are concerned; the nuclear agreement has presented an image of Iran as a country that is advancing in the region and has greater potential to gain superiority. My sense is that many of America's traditional friends have not come to terms with the fact that this agreement has made the Iranians a more prominent player in the region. The JCPOA has given the Iranians more confidence in terms of future achievements; that they can increase their maneuverability or even take regional hegemony. Again, I believe this can have a response, which is to clearly tell the Iranians that more hostile policies in the region will have consequences. In my opinion, the situation for the Iranians in Syria is not good, and the cost they are paying there is very high, and I do not understand how this aligns with Iran's interests. However, I agree with those who say that if Iran acts aggressively, it must pay a price for such policies. If Iran wants to have a role in the region that is recognized, that is a legitimate demand, but it is unacceptable for Iran to feel that it can dominate the region. Both Iran and America's friends must understand that we will raise the cost for Iran for such behavior. Do you see a time when Iran could become a strategic partner instead of such a position? I mean not friendship and closeness but rather partnership in common interests. You see, being able to talk to the Iranians is valuable. One of the successes of the Obama administration was establishing a communication channel and being able to have diplomatic dialogue is valuable because we can talk about the consequences of bad behavior as well as good behavior. Those who in Iran advocate normalizing relations in the region and not threatening neighbors should know that this will not go unanswered. But it must also be clear that those who advocate Iran's dominance over the region will pay a price. The logic of what we did in the nuclear negotiations was that Iran should know that continuing its nuclear program, which violated international laws and Security Council resolutions, would have consequences. I think it is still the case that as long as Iran engages in actions that destabilize the region or supports Hezbollah in Lebanon or other Shiite militias that threaten central governments, they must know that we will work with others to raise the cost of these actions. If we apply this logic, there is a possibility that it will lead to a change in Iran's behavior. But regarding the nuclear agreement, Iran's motivation to continue negotiations and reach an agreement was the lifting of sanctions. In terms of the region, what could be the motivation for cooperation? The motivation is that if Iran wants to be part of the new security structure in the region and wants to be a country that plays a positive role in the region, there is a possibility that the doors of the region will open to this country, but only if it does not threaten its neighbors.