Difficult Choice; What Options Does the Iranian Government Have in Response to the Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh?

The deterrent capability of the Iranian government is increasingly undermined. When the Islamic Republic's consulate in Damascus was hit by Israeli missiles in April this year, many analysts spoke of the damage to Iran's deterrent capability and the exit of the 'shadow war' between them from the gray area. At that time, the officials of the Islamic Republic faced a critical crossroads: to remain silent in the face of Israel's unprecedented action to prevent the escalation of conflicts or to respond to that attack to revive their deterrent capability; especially since Ali Khamenei and his supporters have introduced keeping the fire of war away from Iranian skies as one of the government's major achievements over the past decades. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic chose the second path and targeted Israeli territory with unprecedented drone and missile attacks; although by prolonging the attack process and informing Israel's allies of the attacks a few hours before they began, they created conditions to prevent the tension from escalating beyond a controllable level. The United States, alongside Britain and Israel, shot down nearly all Iranian missiles and drones. After that, some analysts spoke of the revival of the Islamic Republic's deterrent capability and considered the 'shadow war' between Iran and Israel to be likely. Now, four months later, the Iranian government finds itself in a situation similar to those days, but on a larger scale. Just hours after Massoud Pezeshkian officially began his work as the new president, Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas's political bureau (a group that the U.S. and the European Union consider terrorist), was killed in an attack attributed to Israel in Tehran. Although official news regarding the details of this attack has not been released, however it was carried out, including missile fire or bomb explosion, it was a complex operation that was successfully executed. This action could signify Israel's willingness to remove Iran from the gray area and engage the Islamic Republic more directly in the fire of regional conflicts. As Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly stated in his speech to the U.S. Congress about the unity of the enemies and friends of the United States and Israel, he is encouraged by U.S. support in a potential direct conflict with Iran; under such circumstances, Netanyahu's government policy is likely to provoke the Islamic Republic further to enter more directly into conflict with Israel. Now, the leaders of the Islamic Republic once again face a difficult choice; the assassination of a leader of a militia group allied with the Islamic Republic in the capital of Iran is so humiliating that ignoring it seems almost impossible. Regardless of the security and intelligence failures of the responsible agencies in the Islamic Republic to secure Ismail Haniyeh, the question now is what options the Iranian government has and what it will do. The first choice, a balanced response, if the Iranian government officials want to respond to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh at a similar level, they must resort to an action at least comparable to what they did in April with the launch of nearly 300 drones and missiles at Israel. Targeting a senior Israeli official on the soil of another country is also another option that could be evaluated as a balanced response from the Islamic Republic. Ali Khamenei, hours after Ismail Haniyeh's assassination, spoke of the certainty of 'avenging the dear guest' of the Islamic Republic. Although there are different interpretations of this message, a balanced response to this attack cannot be anything less than Iran's missile and drone attacks on Israel in April. However, such an action significantly increases the risk of broadening the conflict for the officials of the Islamic Republic. Policymakers in Tehran have tried over the decades to create a network of militia groups loyal to them in the region, pursuing a path to strike Israel indirectly and within the gray area; a policy that Israel is determined to change. A direct Iranian attack on Israel again within about four months could significantly increase the risk of ending the 'shadow war' between the two countries and turning it into a direct conflict. The second choice of the Iranian government could be even more difficult than the first. Ignoring or downplaying what happened in Tehran on Wednesday morning is almost impossible; Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, who had come to Tehran for the inauguration of the new Iranian president and had met with the Supreme Leader just a day before, in the heart of the Iranian capital. Iranian officials could argue that in this attack, unlike the attack on the Islamic Republic's consulate in Damascus, no Iranian citizens were killed, and thus they could respond to Israel in a more limited and controlled manner than before. However, choosing such an approach would have three fundamental problems. First, it does not revive Iran's deteriorating deterrent capability and inflicts irreparable damage to it. Second, it misleads Israel into believing that it can easily conduct any operation in the heart of Iran and target any official it deems necessary without worrying about the consequences. Third, the silence and inaction of the leaders of the Islamic Republic would lead to deep disappointment among their loyal forces and supporters, both domestically and regionally. Right now, the Islamic Republic is already being questioned by its domestic supporters and regional loyal forces about how it failed to prevent such an attack and how its security and intelligence agencies were unaware of such an obvious and significant threat. In such circumstances, it seems that the officials of the Islamic Republic have no choice but to respond to this action attributed to Israel. The costs of ignoring or downplaying such an action will be very high for Tehran. At the same time, Ali Khamenei and his supporters have introduced keeping the fire of war away from Iranian skies as one of the major achievements of the government, and given the severe limitations in software, financial, hardware, political, and social aspects, it seems unlikely that they currently have the capacity, motivation, or desire to move towards full-scale war. As a result, in the current complex situation, the officials of the Islamic Republic may conclude that the response to this attack, in which the leader of one of the militia groups supported by Iran was killed, should be given by the same network of proxy groups in Tehran; an action that could somewhat mitigate the failure to ignore Israel's action and also temporarily remove the risk of entering a broader regional conflict from Iran. However, even if this happens, there is no guarantee that with changes in Israel's strategies towards Iran, this gray area will remain for a long time. It seems that Benjamin Netanyahu's government is determined to directly involve the Iranian government in the fire of war, and even if the Islamic Republic escapes such a crisis, similar events can be expected to recur in the near future in line with this policy by Tel Aviv.