Diplomacy in the Shadow of Zarif and Kerry, and the Fate of the Half-Alive JCPOA

Multiple meetings between Javad Zarif and John Kerry have become a controversial topic in U.S. politics. However, beyond the dispute between Donald Trump and Mike Pompeo with the former U.S. Secretary of State, the significance of these discussions lies in the future of the Iran nuclear deal known as the JCPOA, which has been struggling for survival since the U.S. withdrawal. Based on the positions of Islamic Republic officials and monitoring the actions of European companies active in Iran, it can be concluded that the European Union's efforts to maintain the JCPOA with the 1+4 group have not been successful and can only preserve a shadow of it. Zarif's recent threat to increase uranium enrichment, which raised doubts about moving beyond mere words, has also increased the likelihood of the premature death of the JCPOA. In this context, the question arises whether the visible and hidden meetings and communications between Kerry and Zarif can help preserve the JCPOA and what its potential is. Naturally, one can expect that John Kerry, who considers himself one of the architects of the JCPOA, has provided recommendations and strategies for its preservation during these meetings. The Islamic Republic also views these meetings as an opportunity to assess working on the rift within the U.S. political arena to preserve the JCPOA. Meanwhile, the good personal relationship between Zarif and Kerry has created a situation for evaluating the capacities for preserving the JCPOA in the U.S. However, since Kerry has no influence in the current U.S. administration, potential capacities can be sought in two areas: the possible impeachment of Trump and the victory of the Democratic Party in the upcoming midterm elections. However, it should be noted that the relationship between Zarif and Kerry is not without tension and significant points of disagreement. As Kerry has stated, he has warned Zarif about the negative consequences of missile programs. With the policy that the Islamic Republic adopted after the JCPOA and its unwillingness to extend détente with the U.S. to other areas while maintaining hostile relations, even if Hillary Clinton had won the 2016 election, preserving the JCPOA would not have been without challenges. Although it was unlikely that the U.S. would withdraw from the JCPOA, significant disagreements in missile and regional policy would not allow the JCPOA to be utilized at the levels desired by the Islamic Republic. As was the case in the early months, the existing reality differed significantly from the configurations and expectations created by Rouhani's government. Towards the end of Obama's presidency, the U.S. government had its sensitivities towards the Islamic Republic and imposed punishments outside the scope of the JCPOA. It can be predicted that with the intensification of the rift in missile programs and regional disputes, the likelihood of new sanctions being approved in a parallel and coordinated manner with Europe existed, which would overshadow the survival of the JCPOA and at least make it fragile. Now, assuming that Trump is impeached in the coming months, which has a notable likelihood and is on an upward trajectory, but still lacks certainty, Mike Pence will replace him. Pence's views and those of the current U.S. cabinet regarding the JCPOA, which have the support of the majority of the Republican Party, do not differ significantly from Trump's views on the JCPOA. They also consider the JCPOA to be finished and seek to reach a new agreement with the Islamic Republic that would make nuclear restrictions permanent and add missile issues and regional disputes to it. In their view, the cost of leaving the JCPOA has been paid, and there is no reason to back down from their positions. Decision-making in this regard has not depended on Trump himself, although he has insisted on achieving it based on his campaign slogans. Therefore, Trump's removal would mainly affect reducing tensions with Europe and particularly moderating the trade war with China, and it does not have a significant capacity to preserve the JCPOA. Another scenario is the victory of the Democrats in this year's elections, which can be predicted to gain the majority in the House of Representatives, but it is unlikely that the composition of the Senate will undergo significant changes. At the same time, the dominant faction of the Democrats does not have major disagreements with the Republicans regarding the Islamic Republic. John Kerry and Obama are exceptions among the Democrats. In the best-case scenario, the Democrats may move towards returning the U.S. to the JCPOA due to rebuilding Obama's legacy and reducing differences with the European Union as a strategic ally. However, the balance of power in the Senate poses a significant obstacle to achieving this action. On the other hand, the dominant section of the Democrats may be more inclined to defend against the U.S. government's withdrawal from the JCPOA and adjust the current conditions of the U.S. government. In fact, the idea of preserving the JCPOA while continuing a hostile policy towards the U.S. and expansionism in the Middle East by the Islamic Republic is not acceptable in the U.S. political arena, and structural contradictions will not be resolved. Therefore, considering the aforementioned considerations, the meetings between Zarif and Kerry are only effective in the realm of consultation and psychological warfare in the U.S. and will not have a significant capacity to preserve the JCPOA, especially if Trump is not impeached and the Democrats do not win the elections, which will not only have no positive effect but will also make the situation in the U.S. more difficult for the Islamic Republic and add a layer of factional competition to the aggressive approach of the U.S. government.