Dirty Election Money and the Repeated Series of Upside-Down Events

Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, the Minister of Interior, on Sunday, April 25, in an open session of the Parliament, clearly retreated and reduced the issue of using dirty money in elections to a warning about the future. The Minister of Interior backed down sooner than expected and, citing flawed reasons and accusing the media of misrepresentation, claimed that his statements had been distorted! He referred to huge illicit incomes and the growth of smuggling, attributing the meaning of his controversial remarks to them, but did not explain that raising this issue did not require highlighting the elections, and he could have pointed to the staggering growth of money laundering in Iran and the failure of government institutions to control it. Thus, the case of dirty money in elections was formed and then closed! Fazli's statements in Parliament contradicted his previous claims and those of Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the Minister of Justice, and supporting representatives in Parliament who claimed to have evidence and documents! The logical outcome of Rahmani's remarks regarding the staggering increase in smuggling figures and dirty money in the country's economy is the growth of mafia gangs' influence at high levels of governance. In the absence of such influence, the possibility of expanding smuggling and earning illicit incomes at current levels does not exist. They have attracted supporters within political and economic institutions. Rahmani's claim that they may approach Parliament representatives in the future for support and to create legal and political backing for illicit profit-seeking purposes does not seem correct. The occurrence of this phenomenon in the past and present is likely, and attributing it to the future is a kind of evasion of potential consequences and costs. Fazli's repeated apologies to Parliament representatives strengthen this hypothesis; he preferred to avoid challenging the Ninth Parliament and conservatives due to the consequences of his actions. Conservatives, especially the hardline faction, felt concerned about the discussion of dirty money in elections and accused the government and reformists of poisoning the upcoming electoral atmosphere. At the same time, in another arena, reformists and supporters of the moderate government introduced themselves as those who had used dirty money in past elections. Their strong reaction was such that some Parliament representatives did not accept Fazli's repeated apologies. However, now after Fazli's early retreat from a demanding position, they have launched a new psychological war against independent media and reformists. It is still unclear what the main goal of Rouhani's government was in raising the danger of dirty money being deposited in elections. However, the Minister of Interior's statements in Parliament and his apologies contradicted his initial positions and those of Pourmohammadi, the Minister of Justice. They initially showed that they had come prepared and had documents to demonstrate the pathways through which dirty money had flowed. But now they accuse the media, political forces, and the opposition of distorting the discussion and creating a political atmosphere. It seems that raising this issue was a political project to create psychological warfare against conservatives in the tenth parliamentary elections, which was framed in a way that both created an atmosphere and, at the same time, the issue did not advance beyond words and did not turn into action to create costs for the government. This topic may continue until the elections in a controlled and sanitized manner without introducing specific instances and evidence. However, the phenomenon of inversion is repeating itself so that media and movements that do not have access to the main power sources are placed under suspicion. An examination of the unsuccessful cases of major governance violations reveals that after the issue is raised and the initial retreat occurs, governance institutions gradually dominate the atmosphere, and ultimately the roles of the accused and the accuser are reversed. Now, Fazli has accused the media of distorting his statements and has confirmed the cleanliness of the Ninth Parliament. A similar incident occurred in the case of illegal scholarships at universities. Ultimately, just as the Article 90 Commission of Parliament seeks to close the issue of illegal scholarships in an unconventional manner, the issue of dirty money was also abruptly closed so that the media and reformists would be accused of spreading lies and poison. Therefore, it can be predicted that in the tenth parliamentary elections, the discussion of controlling election expenses will practically be detrimental to those protesting the current situation. The risk of financial assistance to reformists and supporters of the moderate political program is likely to increase. Since the judiciary and the Guardian Council are responsible for legal prosecution regarding the use of illicit assets in electoral competitions, individuals intending to provide assistance may become targets of accusations. Thus, the psychological cost of financially supporting candidates advocating change will increase. Of course, if the judiciary were independent, this issue would not be problematic, but given the political approach dominating this branch, the proceedings are not natural, and supporters will pay a heavy price for their backing. The premature failure of the dirty money case reflects the negative impact of inadequately addressing important issues, indicating that merely wounding a problem does not lead to its elimination but may strengthen it.