Discontent with the JCPOA; Will Khamenei Condemn Himself or America?

Ayatollah Khamenei described Iran's 2-1 victory over the United States in the 1998 World Cup as "tasting the bitter flavor of defeat against a strong and arrogant opponent." Such a message suggested he was pleased with the outcome of a game. However, he has left no doubt that he is not satisfied with the most important issue for the Islamic Republic, namely the nuclear agreement (JCPOA). He has referred to the nuclear agreement as a "heavy cost" and "pure loss" and described the United States as "untrustworthy" and a violator of agreements. In his assessment, the Islamic Republic has made significant commitments, but the American side is evading its obligations. According to him, "the Americans today... promise, do not act, violate. They take cash concessions but do not give deferred concessions." On the other hand, Barack Obama considers the nuclear agreement with Iran one of the remarkable successes of his foreign policy. This note does not aim to evaluate the JCPOA but assumes that Ayatollah Khamenei's dissatisfaction with it is valid. This means that the JCPOA is a pure loss, the U.S. is malicious, and it has not fulfilled its commitments. In such an assumption, does he not think that the more he criticizes the JCPOA, the more he confronts public opinion with the question of whether the JCPOA is the product of anyone other than him, who oversaw and directed the negotiations? Are Ayatollah Khamenei's statements about the United States' untrustworthiness more of a condemnation of himself for negotiating with a treacherous devil? To answer this question, one must inevitably review the process of the nuclear negotiations from inception to approval and examine Ayatollah Khamenei's role in this process. The claim of this note is that Ayatollah Khamenei played a "central role" in three stages: before the negotiations, during the negotiations, and in the approval of the negotiations. Whether the JCPOA is good or bad, it is the result of the guidance and oversight of Ayatollah Khamenei himself. The JCPOA, whatever it is, is the product of Ayatollah Khamenei. He is the undisputed leader of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, years earlier, he had described those who believed in negotiating with the U.S. as people who "either do not know the alphabet of politics or the alphabet of honor." Despite this, he issued a permit for negotiations with the U.S. and did not step back from the negotiations until the moment the JCPOA was approved in parliament. A review of the beginning to the end of the JCPOA proves this claim. This claim is based on four facts: First; according to Ali Akbar Salehi, Ahmadinejad's foreign minister, it was Barack Obama who proposed the initiative for nuclear negotiations with Iran in late 2012 through the Omani government in correspondence with Ayatollah Khamenei. It is a misconception that Rouhani initiated the negotiations. Salehi stated that when he met with Hassan Rouhani after his presidential election victory and informed him of the secret negotiations between Iran and the U.S. in Oman, the level of progress in the negotiations was "incredible" for Rouhani. In response to Obama's request, it was Ayatollah Khamenei who secretly issued a permit for secret negotiations with the U.S. at the end of Ahmadinejad's presidency. Did Ayatollah Khamenei consider the U.S. untrustworthy at the time of that decision or not? If yes, why all this criticism of the U.S.'s untrustworthiness now? Is such criticism not a condemnation of himself? Second; after Hassan Rouhani's election, it was Ayatollah Khamenei who openly revealed his change of approach to negotiating with the U.S. on the nuclear issue. He named this new approach "heroic flexibility" and likened it to the flexibility of a wrestler to "bring the opponent to the ground at the right time." With such a change in approach toward negotiating with the U.S., if there is any criticism of the outcome of the negotiations, is it not primarily directed at Ayatollah Khamenei himself? Can he now claim that his flexibility was "heroic"? Third; all evidence indicates that the nuclear negotiations were conducted under Ayatollah Khamenei's supervision. He did not express any opposition to transferring the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry, nor did he ever utter a word of distrust toward the negotiating team; on the contrary, he always endorsed them, describing them as "our revolutionary children." Therefore, there is no evidence to claim that he was deceived by the negotiating team. Not only is there no such evidence, but Abbas Araqchi, the second-highest-ranking nuclear negotiator, has publicly stated that some red lines were shifted with Ayatollah Khamenei's approval. For example, Araqchi said: one of the red lines was the lifting of all sanctions against Iran, but U.S. officials stated that their government could not lift congressionally mandated sanctions, and if the Iranian negotiating team insisted, "it would mean no agreement." He clarified that Ayatollah Khamenei's directive was that it was acceptable to lift EU sanctions, executive orders of the president, and UN Security Council resolutions, but congressional sanctions should be halted, and the U.S. president should commit to continuing that halt. If the concession from the regime's red lines was not made with Ayatollah Khamenei's will, then his dissatisfaction with the JCPOA and the U.S.'s untrustworthiness is directed at no one but himself. Fourth; despite the significant protests within the country and from those associated with Ayatollah Khamenei regarding the JCPOA document, to the extent that they compared it to the Treaty of Turkmenchay, he not only never prevented the continuation of negotiations but expedited the approval process of the JCPOA in parliament so that such an important document, even in a parliament with numerous opponents, passed in just 20 minutes. The story of the JCPOA's approval in the Islamic Consultative Assembly became so disgraceful that Ali Asghar Zarei, a representative from Tehran, cried out with tearful eyes: "At least you could have preserved appearances. You have brought shame." Such a ridiculous rush in the approval of the JCPOA in just 20 minutes was due to the presence of Asghar Hajazi from the Leader's Office in a meeting with Ali Larijani (the Speaker of Parliament) and Ali Shamkhani (Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council). Larijani responded to the protesting representatives in parliament by saying: "We all must adhere to the frameworks [of the Leader's directives]." With these considerations and the need that Ayatollah Khamenei saw in expediting the approval of the JCPOA, is all this opposition to the JCPOA and the U.S.'s untrustworthiness more a condemnation of the U.S. or a condemnation of himself? Conclusion: It was stated that the Iran and 1+5 nuclear agreement began when Ayatollah Khamenei adopted a new approach to the nuclear issue. He explicitly stated that to "ward off evil" from the enemy, he would negotiate with the "Great Satan" over what he considered the "legitimate right" of the regime. He named this new approach "heroic flexibility" to instill the concept of "powerful flexibility" against the U.S. in his followers. Now, one must recall Ayatollah Khamenei's cheerful message regarding the football match and compare it with his passive flexibility in the nuclear issue to realize that if there is blame and reproach in the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, this blame is directed at no one but Ayatollah Khamenei himself.