Disintegration in the Shiite Camp of Iraq

With the resurgence of disputes between Nouri al-Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr in early 2014, and the deepening of these conflicts following harsh words exchanged by both sides against each other, a series of subsequent events in Iraq progressed towards an all-encompassing crisis that remains unresolved to this day. It seems that whatever the outcome, the political coalition of Shiites, which had dominated the political scene in Iraq for over a decade, will not be able to maintain its past unity and will fall into a period of weakness and dissolution. Although the severe criticism from Muqtada al-Sadr regarding Nouri al-Maliki's trip to the United States and the former Prime Minister's reaction, in which he referred to al-Sadr as a "newcomer to the political scene of Iraq," cannot be considered the sole root of the crisis between these two Shiite political groups, it did publicize the internal Shiite disputes. With Nouri al-Maliki being blamed for the fall of Mosul and the subsequent exposure of corruption cases within his government, there was no longer any room for his third term as Prime Minister. At that time, al-Sadr's supporters believed they had finally prevented al-Maliki from becoming Prime Minister again. However, the crisis of falling oil prices on one hand, and the extensive network of al-Maliki's allies within the government on the other, hindered the new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, from making progress in governing the country. In such circumstances, Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters attempted to portray the reasons for this chaos as the incompetence of the new Prime Minister, seeking to exploit this situation to regain control of the government. However, Haider al-Abadi emphasized a point that was not only the desire of most political groups in Iraq but also aligned with public opinion: the need for administrative and political reforms. These reforms were supported by religious authorities and often targeted al-Maliki's associates within the government. In the recent protests, al-Sadr's supporters clearly expressed their desire for revenge against al-Maliki and his associates in parliament and the government. Meanwhile, al-Maliki and his supporters were not idle; they primarily attempted to oust the current Speaker of Parliament and take over the parliament themselves, and secondly, to seize control of the military and security affairs of the country through their affiliated militias. This plan was thwarted by pressure from demonstrators outside parliament and political movements within parliament and the government. So far, Haider al-Abadi's reform program has neither been implemented nor has a clear outlook on its results been outlined. However, what has occurred is undoubtedly a form of disintegration within the Shiite political camp that has not been seen since 2003. This disintegration has presented a new composition and situation for these groups and the Islamic Republic as an influential country with effective power over them. What is the current situation of the Shiite political parties and groups in Iraq, and can they maintain their past unity? What role does the Islamic Republic play in this context, and how close or distant are these Shiite political formations from the government of the Supreme Leader under the new conditions? 1- Al-Dawa Party: This party is now divided into two factions, and the disagreements between the two sides are deepening daily. One faction supports Nouri al-Maliki, the former Prime Minister, who is more distributed among the military wing of the party and the leaders of the "Hashd al-Shaabi" militias. The second faction supports Haider al-Abadi, which includes the leadership and political cadre of the party, with figures such as Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi, Tariq Najm, Sadiq Raqabi, Walid Hilli, and Ali Alaq at the forefront. This group believes that: a- Nouri al-Maliki is a notorious figure among Iraqi public opinion, and his destructive actions should not tarnish their reputation, thus they aim to distance the Al-Dawa Party from any accusations of corruption and negligence by identifying the source of this corruption. In recent months, this group, led by Haider al-Abadi, has publicly criticized al-Maliki and published the report of the investigative committee regarding the fall of Mosul and the spread of corruption within the former Prime Minister's government. b- This group desires that the Iraqi government considers the warnings and frameworks of the United States in its overall policies and adopts a positive interaction with both sides in the conflict between Iran and the Saudi Kingdom. c- This group enjoys support from Sunni and Kurdish formations, the Supreme Islamic Council, the Virtue Party, the Sadrist movement, religious authorities, Arab countries in the region except Qatar, the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations for implementing reforms. Iyad Allawi's group has not accepted Haider al-Abadi's reforms and has raised concerns about them. d- This group may form a new party to free itself from Nouri al-Maliki's legacy within the party, thus creating another split within the Al-Dawa Party. This group will not agree to any reconciliation with Nouri al-Maliki if requested by Iran and has strongly criticized interventions outside the official channels of the two governments conducted by Qassem Soleimani. The Al-Dawa Party, in its two factions, currently has 92 representatives in parliament. 2- The Sadrist Movement: The Sadrist group demonstrated its higher mobilization power through recent widespread protests and can effectively exert pressure on the government. Muqtada al-Sadr's tools include 34 parliamentary representatives out of a total of 328, a strong popular base, especially in impoverished urban areas and southern cities, and having militias known as "Saraya al-Salam," which number in the thousands and were established after the dissolution of the Mahdi Army in 2014. These militias now, under Muqtada al-Sadr's command, are tasked with protecting mosques, husseiniyahs, shrines, and religious authorities and are considered part of the Hashd al-Shaabi forces. The Sadrist movement is currently strongly opposed to Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters. The Sadrists believe that Nouri al-Maliki, by empowering the "Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq" militias during his premiership, attempted to limit their power and established another militia group called "Kata'ib al-Mukhtar," led by an individual affiliated with the Islamic Republic named "Wathiq al-Batat," to diminish their military strength. Currently, Muqtada al-Sadr's group does not accept any reconciliation with Nouri al-Maliki but is willing to reach an understanding with Iran as long as its demands are met. 3- The Supreme Islamic Council: This group has supported Haider al-Abadi's reforms but is very obedient to the Islamic Republic and operates within the framework of the Iranian government's policies. However, it also keeps an eye on U.S. policy in Iraq and the region and previously, during George Bush's era, attempted to distance itself from the Islamic Republic's policies under pressure from the White House, even changing the name of its party, which was established in Iran. The Supreme Council currently has 29 representatives in the Iraqi parliament. 4- The Virtue Party: This party, under the religious authority of Muhammad Yaqubi and the secretariat of Hashem Hashemi, currently has only 6 representatives in the Iraqi parliament and strongly supports Haider al-Abadi's reforms. To exit the current crisis in Iraq, this party has proposed early elections on the condition that the current composition of the election monitoring body is changed. This party seeks to maintain good relations with Iran, but its religious authority does not consider either Najaf or Qom to be above itself and wishes to gain advantages in political games. This party cannot be considered completely subordinate to the Islamic Republic and may stand against Iran if it deems it necessary. 5- The Reform Party: The leader of this party is Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the current Foreign Minister of Iraq, whose position in this ministry has been heavily criticized, and serious calls for his replacement have been made. The Reform Party currently has 6 representatives in parliament, and its secretary-general, in the position of Foreign Minister, has closely followed the policies of the Islamic Republic. Shiite Militias: 1- Badr Organization: This militia group has a long history of cooperation with the Islamic Republic in military and security matters and was formed during the early years of the Iran-Iraq War. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, thousands of its fighters entered the police and security forces in Iraq, especially in the capital. Currently, most police stations in Baghdad are run by forces from this organization. This group has extensive political influence in Iraq and supports Nouri al-Maliki. Hadi al-Amiri, the commander of these militias, considers himself subordinate to the Supreme Leader and is regarded as a close associate of Qassem Soleimani. In the past year, Nouri al-Maliki has attempted behind the scenes to make him the Minister of Interior but has been unsuccessful. Many members of the Badr Organization have become leaders of newly established militias in Iraq, such as Jamal Ibrahim, commander of Hezbollah brigades, Ali Yasiri, commander of the Khorasan unit (this militia group is currently present in Syria), and Wathiq al-Batat, who led Kata'ib al-Mukhtar. Some former members of the Badr Organization, such as Adnan al-Shahmani and Mustafa Khazali, have also become members of the Iraqi parliament. According to some reports, Khazali, along with Mustafa Shibani, from the Quds Force and commanders of the Badr Organization, formed the Sayyid al-Shuhada brigades to fight in Syria. 2- Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: This militia group gained strength during Nouri al-Maliki's eight-year premiership and was provided with extensive state resources. Its leader, Qais Khazali, was previously loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr but later stood against him. Qais Khazali considers himself a cleric of comprehensive sciences who issues fatwas not only regarding the takfir of foreigners and Sunnis but also on separating men and women and prohibiting women from being in the presence of men and vice versa. This group kidnapped several British oil engineers and an American soldier in 2008 and claims in its official statements to have conducted over six thousand operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. This group possesses very advanced military equipment and operates under the command of Qassem Soleimani. 3- Saraya al-Salam: These militias belong to Muqtada al-Sadr and are remnants of the Mahdi Army. At the beginning of the formation of this group, Muqtada al-Sadr claimed its purpose was defensive, but after a while, it participated in attacks, especially playing a leading role in the cities of Samarra and Diyala. In June 2015, the Saraya al-Salam group held military parades in cities such as Baghdad, Basra, and Najaf, showcasing its strength. These parades revealed that the militia affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr has over 40,000 fighters, and given that the current Iraqi government does not provide much military assistance to them, financing such a large militia, which receives at least twenty million dollars in salaries monthly, has become one of Iraq's secrets. 4- Abu al-Fadl Abbas Brigade: This brigade was formed by a religious authority named Qasim Tai and is made up of volunteers who fought in Syria. The forces of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Iraq, and some supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr participate in it. This group is considered one of the first Shiite militias to participate in the Syrian war in 2012 but returned to Iraq after the fall of Mosul to ISIS and fought against ISIS. This brigade also operates under the command of Qassem Soleimani. 5- Hezbollah Iraq: The leadership of this group is held by an individual named Wathiq al-Batat, who considers himself a follower of Khamenei. This militia was formed during Nouri al-Maliki's time in 2010. At that time, they defined their mission as killing members of the Ba'ath Party, Sunnis, and Wahhabis. Later, Wathiq al-Batat changed the name of his militia to Kata'ib al-Mukhtar. This group has attacked the Liberty Camp, the disarmed base of the Mujahideen Khalq members, with rockets twice, killing and injuring many of them. This group is on the U.S. terrorism list, and during the last months of Nouri al-Maliki's premiership, its leader, Wathiq al-Batat, was imprisoned for a month but was released through the mediation of the Islamic Republic. All these Shiite militia groups in Iraq have close ties with the commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and operate under their orders, thus they can be used as a strong pressure lever against Iraqi politicians. As long as Iraq does not have a truly national army and its police and security forces fall short of national and global standards, the fate of the country will be determined by these militias. Especially since they now claim to be fighting ISIS, they can pressure any politician, even if that person is Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. However, the divisions in the political front can spill over into conflicts among the militias, complicating the situation in Iraq even further. For the first time in a hundred years, Shiites have taken control in Iraq, a period that has been accompanied by the "development of militias." This phenomenon is undoubtedly a reflection of the military's rule in Iran, and as long as the IRGC governs Iran, not only will Haider al-Abadi be unable to advance his reforms, but for many years to come, the issue of militias will overshadow all affairs in Iraq.