Does America See the Iranian Government as an Enemy After the Nuclear Agreement?

In the equations of national security and strategic defense calculations of the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran is considered a security threat. A question that may occupy the minds of defense and strategic security planners for some time is how to depict a pragmatic image of Iran after the potential finalization and signing of a comprehensive nuclear agreement. In the view of the United States, and in line with the not entirely uniform security considerations of its powerful and strategic allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, as well as smaller countries like Azerbaijan and the UAE, the Islamic Republic of Iran is perceived as a threat to regional peace. Factors that place the Islamic Republic in a threatening position against regional security are not limited to the pursuit of nuclear activities over the past twenty years in Iran; the open and declared opposition to Arab-Israeli peace, allegations of support for international terrorism, and the Islamic Republic's military interventions abroad in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are other grounds on which the security threat posed by Iran is established. The expected exit of the Iranian nuclear file from its stalemate, as a result of a potential nuclear agreement, and the continued cooperation of the Islamic Republic to suspend the controversial aspects of its nuclear activities, only diminishes or neutralizes one of the threatening grounds of the Iranian government. Accepting a change in Iran's threatening status in other areas requires behavioral changes, while the Islamic Republic, in line with the nuclear rollback of the past two years, has strengthened its efforts in other challenging areas of its foreign policy despite financial constraints. The mobilization of 20,000 to 30,000 Shiite fighters in Iraq and their concentration in Salah al-Din province to confront ISIS forces in Tikrit, which ultimately provoked a reaction from the United States and also prompted a response from the Iraqi Prime Minister, as well as the alignment with the Houthis in Yemen, which has led to extensive military reactions from Saudi Arabia and seven allied countries in the past month, are the latest examples of intensified interventions and increased extraterritorial actions by the Islamic Republic, rather than their moderation. Domestic and Middle Eastern opponents of Obama's foreign policy claim that his efforts to reach a nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic strengthen the position of a regime that has yet to moderate its threatening foreign behaviors. In such reactions, another aspect that may be less discussed is the unchanged image of the Islamic Republic as a potential security threat in the eyes of the U.S. government and lawmakers. If this reality is accepted, the U.S. government's efforts to reach a nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic should be seen as a way to reduce its destructive power and slow down its threatening edges (depriving a hostile political system of having military nuclear capabilities) and, on the other hand, gradually weaken the 'enemy' through continued exhausting sanctions. In any realistic and non-partisan view of the Islamic Republic's situation after finalizing the nuclear agreement, it is evident that Iran, after the government relinquishes its questionable nuclear capacities and sanctions are reduced, will not necessarily move towards increasing power; rather, the process of weakening its economic foundation will only slow down. Undoubtedly, Iran's neighboring countries and the strategic partners of the U.S. in the region are also aware of this situation, and their critical perspective on the U.S. government's nuclear compromise with the Islamic Republic is influenced by the effort to present maximalist demands to secure as much as possible from the requests, rather than a principled opposition to it; a policy that the Republicans controlling the U.S. Congress are also pursuing in this regard. Having a tacit satisfaction with the finalization of the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic is a core that aligns Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey with Republican representatives in the Senate and House of Representatives in the U.S., while all members of this axis appear to be critics of the U.S. government's policy in this regard. On April 14, a representative of the Obama administration accompanied Senator Corker's proposal, which was presented in the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee, and the bill was approved by an absolute majority of 19 representatives. According to this bill, which is expected to become law in May and June after being presented in both legislative chambers, members of Congress will have 30 days to review the repeal of any proposed sanctions by the government. On April 22, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee passed a proposal that revises the U.S. defense strategy against 'growing threats.' According to this proposal, Iran is asked not to support terrorism, to respond to the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding past nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions, and to suspend the use of the S-300 missile defense system until the time of sanctions removal. The subcommittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives states: 'Any effort to empower insurgent forces and resistance movements to overthrow (friendly) regimes constitutes asymmetric warfare against the U.S.' The committee's statement also emphasizes: 'Committee members believe that supporters of asymmetric warfare, such as Russia and Iran, employ conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, and intelligence activities in a continuous effort to counter U.S. national security goals and considerations.' Thus, it is seen that regardless of the U.S. government's movement towards reaching a compromise with the Islamic Republic on a specific axis (nuclear), Washington's assessment (the government and lawmakers) of the Islamic Republic's situation and its definition as a 'national security threat' has not fundamentally changed, and before the Iranian government's behavioral changes in the region, this assessment remains unchanged in its current strength.