Does the Nuclear Agreement with Iran Arm Saudi Arabia?

Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, expressed concern about the possibility of Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons if a nuclear agreement is signed with Iran. This is the latest credible reaction to the influential dimensions of an event that could structurally alter the balance of power in the Middle East. As the deadline for reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic approaches at the end of March this year, the usual sensitivities related to the potential nuclear agreement have intensified in all affected directions. Kissinger's fundamental argument, known for his conservatism and non-interference in the decisions of U.S. administrations, is that if Iran's demand for several thousand centrifuges is accepted, it would be impossible to deny other countries this right. If this concession is granted to the Islamic Republic, rival countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The current and official U.S. policy towards the Islamic Republic is framed within Washington's principled opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for UN Security Council resolutions against Iran that have been in place since 2006, opposing any form of enrichment to any degree. The differences between diplomacy and coercion suggest that if diplomacy and negotiation are pursued to reach an agreement, the negotiating parties will have to moderate their maximalist demands. Otherwise, instead of resorting to diplomacy and engagement, the claiming party must resort to force (military capacity). The U.S.'s maximalist demand regarding Iran is the complete neutralization of Iran's nuclear capabilities and the irreversible blockage of current capacities to neutralize capabilities that are referred to as a danger of becoming a nuclear military force. The Islamic Republic's maximalist demand is the legal preservation of all current nuclear capacities and their suspension (temporary shutdown) with a return to these capacities under mutually agreed conditions. The minimum demand from the U.S. regarding the Islamic Republic apparently aims to create a one-year gap between Iran and the potential capacity to acquire a nuclear bomb, referred to as 'breakout time.' In the short term, according to Kissinger's argument, Barack Obama is attempting to neutralize the potential risk of a country acquiring a nuclear bomb (reducing costs), while in practice and over a longer period, it places other countries in line to acquire nuclear weapons (increasing costs). Saudi Arabia is the most immediate option for nuclear armament. A significant portion of the costs of Pakistan's nuclearization was funded by Saudi Arabia. If Abdul Qadeer Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - provided centrifuge models for uranium enrichment and bomb designs to the Islamic Republic and Libya, his home country is prepared to deploy the constructed nuclear bomb at a base in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has purchased intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs from China for the past 20 years. The acquisition of these missiles, due to their low accuracy in targeting, is only justifiable if equipped with weapons of mass destruction. With Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in power, having spent his years of exile in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan's readiness to take such action - at Riyadh's request - is greater than ever. In addition to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt will also be interested in approaching nuclear bomb-making capacity. Egyptian President Sisi signed a contract for the construction of a nuclear reactor with Putin in Moscow last week, and Turkey signed a contract with the Russian Atomic Energy Agency in 2010 for the construction of two nuclear power plants, which are set to become operational in 2018 and 2023, respectively. If a nuclear agreement is signed with the Islamic Republic and limited enrichment rights are accepted, non-regional countries will also again be interested in acquiring this capacity. Brazil, for example, has previously been on this path and has turned back. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also prevented Argentina and South Korea from continuing uranium enrichment in the past. The argument for legitimizing uranium enrichment for the Islamic Republic, claiming that 'Iran has achieved the nuclear fuel cycle and technical knowledge cannot be eradicated,' is seen by some observers as baseless, as over 40 countries possess the necessary technology for uranium enrichment and over 90 countries have the technical knowledge necessary for producing chemical and biological weapons but are not allowed to possess the means to produce weapons of mass destruction. If this right is granted to one country, it is impossible to deny other countries similar rights. In the remaining days before the deadline for reaching a nuclear agreement, in addition to increasing anticipations regarding the possibility of reaching or not reaching a lasting agreement within the remaining time, the issue of the real benefits and harms of such an agreement for regional security will spark heated discussions, leading to the expectation that the world will agree on a well-known formula with the U.S. and the Islamic Republic: not reaching an agreement is better than reaching a bad agreement.