Domestic Politics and 'Confusion After the JCPOA'

On July 14, 2015, everything that unfolded after the JCPOA was no longer solely related to the nuclear issue and its technical details. The crisis that took 13 years to resolve was alleviated a year ago when Iran and six world powers reached the JCPOA. Although the post-JCPOA era has its own complexities and negotiations regarding various aspects, especially in lifting sanctions, are ongoing, Iran's nuclear file transformed from one that could have led to a full-scale war into a different shape through diplomatic means. The JCPOA turned the domestic political scene in Iran into a battlefield where, on one hand, praise and commendation reached new heights, and many tried to emphasize or even exaggerate their roles in this multi-year negotiation process, while on the other hand, a group resorted to the harshest forms of criticism against this agreement. These two approaches stem from a duality that in Iran, former parliament representative Ghasem Sholeh Saadi interprets as follows: 'Two contradictory positions were taken by Mr. Khamenei and Mr. Rouhani, which were exceptionally both correct. Mr. Khamenei said the JCPOA is a mere loss, while Mr. Rouhani claimed we have won. The irony of the situation is that both were right. Mr. Khamenei, who says it is a mere loss, is correct because many concessions were given to the negotiating parties, and in practice, nothing significant was received. Mr. Rouhani, who says we have won, is also correct because if this agreement had not been made, Iran's situation would have been much worse than it is now, thus preventing a deterioration in the situation.' This duality has emerged while the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has repeatedly praised Iranian diplomats and their actions in negotiations, and the government has often cited Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's support as a reason for its success in negotiations. However, especially in recent months, the contradictory statements of the Leader and the President of Iran regarding diplomatic issues, domestic politics, or culture and society have highlighted the differences in approaches within the Islamic Republic, where the Leader has the final say. Although analysts like Farrokh Negahdar in Britain believe that such changes in the discourse of these two will not lead to a comprehensive confrontation: 'There have been differences between Mr. Rouhani's and Mr. Khamenei's views on existing issues in our world and how to deal with them, a perspective that perhaps can be said to have existed in a different way in the views of Mr. Rafsanjani and Mr. Khamenei, who worked together for years and still do. I do not predict that this difference in perspective will lead to conflict and elimination in the political space, but I think the tone of both sides will become somewhat clearer and sharper to attract the support of their supporters.' However, everything related to the domestic political scene in Iran is not summarized in the views and discourse of the two senior officials, namely the Leader and the President. In this scene, various players and groups play roles that have been divided into two sections, principlists and reformists, over the past two decades; groups that were heavily influenced by the protests of 2009 following that year's controversial presidential election until the rise of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, creating a bipolar atmosphere in the domestic political scene. This political arrangement, as Mehdi Mahdavi Azad, a political analyst in Germany, states, fundamentally changed with the resumption of negotiations and the leap towards a nuclear agreement, transforming into two groups of supporters and opponents of the negotiations and agreement: 'In the opposing camp of the JCPOA, this time the radical and sectarian principlists, along with part of the opposition, were present, while in the pro-JCPOA camp, all political potentials of the country, along with a large part of the principlists, were involved. From that time until July 2015 when the JCPOA was signed, and until October 2015 when the parliament approved this agreement, and until now, we are witnessing a post-JCPOA era where the factions and boundaries of political groups have nearly collapsed, and the classical structure of political activity that we knew in Iran, dividing it into reformists, principlists, opposition, and civil activists, has disintegrated, and groups are adjusting their relationships not based on their motivations or economic interests but based on their views on foreign policy and the country's outlook.' Mr. Mahdavi Azad calls this situation 'the era of confusion after the JCPOA'; a period where, according to him, a diplomatic opening has caused the approach of a moderate principlist like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to become closer to the moderate opposition, while the approach of the overthrow-seeking opposition, in opposition to the JCPOA, has become closer to radical principlists. However, despite the evident changes in the arrangement of political forces around diplomatic issues, and the support of a group of traditional principlists for the process that led to the JCPOA, there are still analysts who believe that these movements occur on the surface, but the composition of political groups in Iran remains based on principlists (conservatives) and reformists. Reza Alijani, a political activist and analyst currently residing in Paris, is among these analysts who say that an invisible schism has occurred among the groups, but that classical structure remains intact. 'On the surface, a technocratic moderate current that is more tolerated in the current security conditions has become more prominent. Just as Mr. Rouhani remained while Mr. Hashemi or Mr. Khatami were sidelined. However, I do not think that fundamentally, the issue, meaning the main arrangement of political forces in Iran, has changed, because in discourse, they are still in conflict. A discourse that wants to interact with the world, seeks peace in the region, and within, to some extent, the constitution is implemented, and another current that thinks the opposite. We see this conflict from the reformist era, it peaks during the Green Movement, with the suppression of that street formation, the Green Movement becomes somewhat latent, it rises again in the 2013 elections, and I think part of the forces from the opposing current is moving towards this side. Just as in the Green Movement, it was eroded by Mr. Mousavi, in this period, it is also eroded by the diplomacy and discourse of the Rouhani government in the world and region. On the surface, the moderate current has become stronger than before, but fundamentally, I do not think the arrangement of political forces in Iran has moved beyond those two discourses of principlists (conservatives) and reformists.' After eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency and the principlist faction's power in Iran, in the spring of 2013, Hassan Rouhani replaced him, coming to power with a faction that had moderate approaches and, throughout the nuclear negotiations and thereafter, garnered more groups with him, so much so that in the parliamentary elections in February 2016, a list named 'Hope' secured most of the seats in several cities, including Tehran. However, whether during the negotiations or when Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement, many, some of whom were supporters of the agreement, warned that this process could lead to further repression of civil society in Iran. Although some openings have occurred in certain areas, observers of Iran's social space continue to express concern about this. Tara Sepehri Far, a researcher at Human Rights Watch in America, believes that although there was hope for improvement, the nuclear agreement's subject matter, Iran's responsibilities regarding its nuclear program, should not necessarily lead to an improvement in the status of civil and political freedoms. 'What we have observed in the past year is that the issue of human rights in Iran continues to face serious challenges. Efforts have been made by officials inside to address some of the challenges, including attempts to teach native languages in areas where Iran's ethnic minorities are located, but overall, when we look at this issue, human rights still face many challenges, and we cannot say that, in general, the status of civil and political freedoms has improved to a noticeable extent.' In the approximately three years since Hassan Rouhani's government came to power, political activists have still been arrested and faced heavy sentences. Religious and ethnic minorities continue to face multiple challenges. Numerous journalists and media activists have been imprisoned, leaders of the 2009 protests remain under house arrest, and in the recent parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, many, including the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, were unable to participate in the competition. Mehdi Mahdavi Azad in Germany sees these movements as part of the power struggle in Iran and explains their background in previous governments: 'During Mr. Ahmadinejad's era, as the most radical and extreme government in the past four decades, we witnessed more tolerance and leniency in the social aspect. There was still the morality police, there were actions against women, there were strict measures in the parliament, new laws were passed, but what was felt in society was clearly less. As soon as Hassan Rouhani's government came to power, one of the first demands and plans of the principlist faction was that the situation of hijab in Iran had worsened. Another example of this issue is Mr. Khatami's government, which after 1999 and the victory of the reformist parliament saw a clear increase in social confrontations. The shrouded protesters who were in their homes during Mr. Ahmadinejad's era returned to the streets after Mr. Rouhani's victory. These types of strict measures, although rooted in ideological issues, stem from the rulers' fear of losing their power.' The Islamic Republic is based on the leadership or the Supreme Leader and the independence of the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial). This independence has recently turned into confrontation, especially between the executive and judicial branches; to the extent that in a recent judiciary conference, Hassan Rouhani criticized the performance of this branch, stating that the judiciary should act transparently regarding events such as the attack on the Saudi embassy and inform the public of the results of its investigations and rulings. Analysts evaluate one of the reasons why no significant change has been observed in the status of civil society in recent years, especially after the JCPOA, as this situation of the judiciary, whose head is appointed by the Leader of Iran. Among these analysts is Farrokh Negahdar, who believes that fundamentally, the pro-change approach in this regard still has no place in the thinking of the Leader of Iran and his supporters: 'Since no change has occurred in the composition of the forces governing the security and judicial apparatus in Iran, I do not see serious signs that a change has occurred in their behavior towards citizens, and there is no evidence for it. The balance of power, meaning the supporters of the JCPOA within the government and their social base, did not have the power and ability to exert pressure that military, security, and judicial institutions felt the need to implement reforms to govern. I do not see such a perspective in the ruling apparatus and Mr. Khamenei that a necessity for change in the relationship between citizens and these institutions has arisen.' Alongside the judiciary, another security apparatus in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This body has not only rooted itself in the military sphere but has also penetrated the Iranian economy and, on the other hand, has established a parallel intelligence-security network independently. Following the achievement of the JCPOA, a group of its critics in the international community described this agreement as beneficial to this section of power players in Iran, including missile tests with provocative slogans against Israel and arrests and security actions in Iran as signs of this power increase. However, Reza Alijani in Paris believes that such actions, which overshadow the activities of Hassan Rouhani's government, especially in foreign policy, are not necessarily due to increased power but can indicate the IRGC's fear of the current conditions. 'The IRGC, during Ahmadinejad's eight-year government, actually tried to seize Iran's economy and seized a large part of it, entered the parliament, and many governors and board members of companies were all IRGC members. I think the JCPOA has not overall benefited the IRGC, but it has brought the behind-the-scenes challenge to the forefront, that the IRGC is declaring its positions more than before and even standing against the JCPOA, undermining it alongside Mr. Khamenei, which stems from that feeling of weakness and the fear of their interests being threatened. If we only look at the discourse, their approaches are that the government is moving towards reconciliation, and we must prevent it, just as during Mr. Hashemi's time when it was felt that he wanted to reconcile with Europe, they created obstacles in Europe that were somewhat more severe and engaged in terrorist activities. We now see that they are climbing the walls of the British embassy, Mr. Soleimani's statement is astonishingly published, and Hassan Nasrallah's speeches are brought up. I do not see these challenges as a sign of the IRGC's advance but rather as the IRGC's concern that its interests may be jeopardized. Additionally, there are also behind-the-scenes challenges regarding the division of Iran's released funds, which reportedly the IRGC wants a large share of for war in Syria and support for Hezbollah, and the government, with all its shortcomings, is resisting in this regard.' These power struggles and rivalries in the domestic political scene of Iran continue as the country will witness presidential elections in a year, and movements in this regard are already taking shape.