Domestic Politics and Political Landscape After the JCPOA

Farrokh Negahdar, in analyzing the political situation after the JCPOA, believes it is still uncertain whether the nuclear agreement will serve as an asset for Hassan Rouhani in the upcoming elections or turn against him and his government. He also asserts that no changes have occurred in the relationship between military-judicial-security institutions and citizens since the JCPOA. Farrokh Negahdar is a political activist and analyst who began his political career during the Pahlavi era and was elected as the Secretary-General of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Majority) after the 1979 revolution. He currently resides in London. He questions whether there has been any change in the internal political mechanisms or the arrangement of political forces in Iran since the JCPOA. He notes that a significant change in the balance of power has occurred within the country and in domestic politics. Despite the JCPOA not fulfilling all the promises made by both parties, he suggests that about 90% of the unmet issues stem from external factors, while 10% might relate to questions Iran has regarding the JCPOA and its nuclear program. He compares the current political climate to that of the 9th Islamic Consultative Assembly, where a considerable number of representatives opposed the government and the JCPOA, noting that their numbers have decreased in the 10th Assembly. The relationship between the Rouhani administration and the people is markedly different from previous administrations that opposed the JCPOA. He also discusses the leadership's stance before and after the JCPOA, indicating that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has consistently been pessimistic about the negotiation outcomes. He observes that Khamenei's recent positions reflect increasing skepticism, suggesting that if the West and the U.S. do not fulfill their promises, Iran should not feel obligated to maintain its commitments. Negahdar believes that while differences exist between Rouhani's and Khamenei's views, he does not foresee a significant confrontation or conflict arising from these differences. He emphasizes that the JCPOA's impact on Iranian society will largely depend on developments in the U.S. If sanctions are lifted and tangible improvements in people's lives are observed, he hopes this will strengthen the government's position. However, he acknowledges that many are working against such developments. He expresses skepticism about the Boeing deal and its potential to transform Iran into an economic hub. Finally, he reflects on the state of civil society in Iran, noting that while the JCPOA may have prompted some civic engagement, there has been no significant change in civil liberties or the treatment of political prisoners, as the power dynamics within the security and judicial apparatus remain unchanged.