Donald Trump and the Future of the JCPOA

Since the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, dozens of large economic delegations from various countries, many of them European, have traveled to Tehran. Both the European Union and Iran were confident that following the closure of the Islamic Republic's nuclear file and the beginning of the sanctions relief process, the path for expanding economic relations between the two sides would be paved, and Iran would become a future paradise for international investors. The signing of preliminary contracts in various fields between Iranian and European companies, including during President Hassan Rouhani's visit to France and Italy in January of this year, further fueled this optimism. However, this optimism did not last long. Although the deadlock before the JCPOA was broken and the presence of foreign investors in Iran became more tangible in some areas (tourism infrastructure, automotive, gas, etc.), the expected dynamism was not achieved, and foreign investment in Iran, after years of stagnation, did not have the momentum and outlook that could bring about a significant change in the country's economic situation. In fact, in addition to internal obstacles (stifling bureaucracy, corruption, the presence of numerous actors known as 'quasi-governmental'), European companies faced other challenges created by the U.S. judiciary regarding the implementation of the JCPOA. We know that the JCPOA only pertains to the lifting of 'secondary' sanctions related to the Islamic Republic's nuclear file. In contrast, the so-called 'primary' sanctions, which are related to issues such as 'human rights' and 'terrorism' imposed by the U.S. against the Islamic Republic, remain in place. These types of sanctions, which have extraterritorial dimensions (their enforcement goes beyond the territory of the United States), put European companies and banks intending to cooperate with Iran in a very difficult position, which we will discuss in detail on another occasion. Here, it is worth noting that European investors, traders, and banks, fearing involvement with the U.S. judiciary and facing hefty fines, often refrain from doing business with Iran and, by extension, investing in the country. Meanwhile, Donald Trump's victory in the presidential election on November 8 has significantly raised the level of concern among European investors regarding cooperation with Iran. Given the sharply critical positions of the elected President of the United States regarding the JCPOA, which were repeated numerous times during the electoral campaign, Europeans who have invested in Iran are understandably very worried, and those who intend to invest in this country will be more inclined to wait and see. Mr. Trump has described the JCPOA as 'the dumbest deal in history' and has stated that if elected president, he would bring the parties involved in the Iranian nuclear issue back to the negotiating table to reach a better agreement. In an interview with France 2 television on Thursday evening, November 20, Walid Phares, one of Donald Trump's advisors on international issues, reiterated the elected President's dissatisfaction with the signing of the nuclear agreement on July 15, 2015, between Iran and the 'P5+1' group and added that some provisions of this agreement might be renegotiated. One of the factors that, according to Walid Phares, will compel the United States to reconsider the JCPOA is Iran's involvement in various crises in the Middle East. Speculation regarding the future of the JCPOA has intensified in light of the new conditions following the recent U.S. presidential election, and the fate of this agreement will increasingly attract the attention and scrutiny of political, economic, and legal circles both in Iran and in the capitals of other signatory parties. In this regard, it seems essential to emphasize several points: 1) There is no doubt that both in Iran and the U.S., the most extremist factions opposing the JCPOA will once again try to either completely dismantle this agreement or change its provisions to alter its nature, taking advantage of the political conditions following the U.S. elections. In this context, the activities of lobbies affiliated with Saudi Arabia and Israel will also intensify. Mr. Walid Phares, Donald Trump's foreign affairs advisor, is a Lebanese-American known for his staunch opposition to Iran. He was close to the Maronite Phalangists during the Lebanese civil war and later in the U.S. served as a political analyst on the right-wing Fox News channel and as an advisor to Mitt Romney, the unsuccessful Republican candidate. 2) The statements of people like Walid Phares do not necessarily reflect Donald Trump's future positions regarding the JCPOA. During an electoral campaign, many statements are made that do not necessarily become official policy once the candidate takes office. The JCPOA is an international treaty that was unanimously approved by the members of the United Nations Security Council with Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. After that, both the U.S. Congress and the Iranian legislature ratified the JCPOA. Questioning the JCPOA by the United States, even if it is possible concerning general international law (which it is not), would add a very dangerous new crisis to the current crises in the Middle East and would also create serious tensions between the U.S. and other signatory powers of this agreement (China, Russia, France, the UK, and Germany). 3) Within Iran, hardline factions opposed to the JCPOA will not sit idly by and will use the statements of figures like Walid Phares to try to revert the situation to the pre-agreement era. They are confident that with the dissolution of the JCPOA, the balance of power within the Islamic Republic will shift against Hassan Rouhani's positions, and the possibility of his achieving a second presidential term, if not impossible, will be significantly reduced. 4) Once again, we remind that Donald Trump's strategy for achieving the presidency will not necessarily become the foundation of his policy in the White House. There is a risk that the next president of the world's most powerful nation, even if he does not question the JCPOA, will impose even more obstacles to its implementation; however, there is also hope that the elected president of the United States will revert to the traditional 'pragmatism' of this country and continue efforts to reduce tensions in relations with Iran. Who can confidently predict the main lines of foreign policy of the 45th President of the United States? 5) International politics is an arena of surprising twists and turns. The difficult conditions prevailing in Iran and especially the explosive situation in the Middle East could create the grounds for adopting a 'pragmatic' policy by the key decision-making centers within the Islamic Republic. The advance of this 'pragmatism' to accepting direct bilateral talks with Donald Trump's America is not impossible. The most pessimistic scenario in this regard would be the victory of the most hardline anti-JCPOA tendencies in Tehran and Washington; however, the worst scenarios do not always come to fruition.