Economic Tragedy and the Reversal of Bashar al-Assad's Political Victory

The pace of developments in the Syrian civil war has slowed down following the agreement between the Russian and Turkish governments to establish a buffer zone in Idlib. Although Stefan de Mistura, the UN envoy for Syria, has stated that if the process of drafting a new Syrian constitution does not proceed appropriately in the next three months, the flames of civil war may flare up again. The Syrian government, under the strong military, logistical, financial, security, and political support of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, alongside the rise of extremist and jihadist Islamists and unparalleled cruelty, has managed to shift the narrative of the civil war from fighting tyranny to combating terrorism, thus eliminating threats. Now, Bashar al-Assad, having regained most of Syria's territory, positions himself as a ruler whose dominant position, from the perspective of global and regional actors, seems unchallengeable for at least the next few years. Currently, apart from the northeastern and northwestern regions of Syria controlled by Syrian Kurds, armed opponents, and Turkey-aligned forces, and a small area near Deir ez-Zor where ISIS still has a tangible presence, the rest of Syria falls under the influence of the government and its regional and global allies. Due to Turkey's high sensitivity and the considerations that Russia and Iran have in not souring relations with this country, the plan to retake Idlib has currently been removed from the Syrian government's agenda, but it seems unlikely that Bashar al-Assad and his supporters will be satisfied with this region and the Kurdish areas remaining outside the territory under the Syrian government's control. Therefore, negotiations to find a middle ground continue. The United States and Turkey also no longer have plans to remove Bashar al-Assad from power and are looking to use the presence of their allied Syrian forces in northern Syria to gain leverage in the future of Syria and change the country's constitution so that the Ba'ath Party does not hold a dominant position. However, given factors such as the heavy costs that Bashar al-Assad and his supporters have incurred, Erdogan's retreat, the despair of the Syrian people, the inaction of the opposition, and the lack of a coherent plan from Western governments, it seems unlikely that the political, military, and diplomatic maneuvers of these governments can halt or reverse the advances of Assad and his allies. In a situation where the Assad-Khamenei-Putin-Nasrallah coalition has paid the price of nearly 470,000 deaths, over a million injuries, and more than 12 million displaced persons, and the international community has passively watched the largest humanitarian disaster of the 21st century, it is unreasonable to think that Bashar al-Assad would settle for anything less than exercising power over all of Syria. Thus, it appears that the Assad family continues to be the main player in the power equations in Syria while dismissing the crisis. However, a deeper examination of various aspects of Syria shows that Bashar al-Assad's political victory and the end of the civil war, while beneficial for the Ba'ath Party coalition, Hezbollah, and the governments of Russia and Iran, may not only not be an end but could also mark the beginning of the end of Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian rule. The complete recapture of Syrian territory may just be the beginning of hard days for Bashar al-Assad. Based on various expert assessments, the cost of rebuilding the scorched and devastated Syria is estimated to require between $250 billion to $1 trillion. The Syrian government has very limited financial and banking resources. Syria's GDP has decreased to less than a quarter of its pre-civil war level. According to World Bank estimates, it will take at least four years for GDP to return to pre-war figures. Conferences and meetings held for the reconstruction of Syria with the participation of international delegations and government representatives have accepted commitments amounting to a maximum of 20% of Syria's needs, primarily concerning the costs of the return and resumption of life for refugees and displaced persons, and most have shown little willingness to participate in the commercial, construction, and infrastructural projects desired by the Syrian government. In this context, Bashar al-Assad's government is primarily counting on cooperation with the Chinese government. The Russian and Iranian governments, due to their extensive supportive roles and the heavy costs they have incurred for Bashar al-Assad's survival, expect to be involved in post-civil war economic and reconstruction projects. Regarding the Islamic Republic, although Bashar al-Assad is inclined to utilize the facilities of Iranian companies, the presence of multiple problems is unlikely to allow the Islamic Republic to sit at the table for the reconstruction of Syria. Factors such as a lack of financial resources, unnecessary bureaucracy, high corruption, heavy foreign sanctions, structural economic problems, and low-quality services and some goods prevent Iran from having a significant presence in Syria's economic reconstruction and force it to withdraw in competition with other countries. However, Russia and China are unlikely to provide significant grants to the Syrian government. They prefer to invest in specific projects with high profitability. Additionally, the insecurity and uncertain conditions in Syria are factors that cause Chinese companies to act cautiously. The Chinese government has even classified the Iranian market as one of the high-risk economies, and Chinese companies and banks conduct transactions with Iran under specific restrictions. Wealthy Arab countries and Western governments also show no interest in participating in the reconstruction of Syria until conditions for political changes in Syria become favorable. Turkey also follows a similar approach. Therefore, after the end of the war, Bashar al-Assad cannot ignore expectations for improving living and security conditions, and the continuation of destruction, poverty, and unemployment makes him extremely vulnerable. In terms of receiving grants, only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, the United States, and some European countries have such potential. Thus, unlike during the war, Bashar al-Assad's fate is in the hands of opposing foreign countries, and his current supporters have little ability to solve the problems of the peace era. Without an agreement between the two foreign poles of the Syrian conflict, the reconstruction of Syria has a bleak outlook, and any agreement would at least require the end of the Ba'ath Party's permanent dominance over the political and governance landscape of Syria. Therefore, it is not incorrect to conclude that the era of peace heralds even harder days for the survival of Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian rule and the Ba'ath Party in Syria.