Eight Points About the Protest Marches

The third day of protest demonstrations in Iran has taken place. The number of cities witnessing opposition marches has reached 20. The protests began with a seemingly simple gathering in Mashhad, where loud anti-government slogans were shouted near the shrine of the eighth Shia Imam. Even some principlists opposed to Rouhani's government initially acknowledged their involvement in the protests. However, the slogans quickly became more intense as the protesters rapidly included different social layers. The cries of protest shifted from Rouhani to Sadegh Larijani and then to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Economic discontent quickly took on a political hue, and now it apparently encompasses the entire country from east to west and north to south. Data about the protests in various cities is limited; available information is restricted to images and videos shared by citizens from the protests on social media, especially Telegram. The following points can be noted based on the aforementioned assumptions: 1. A new wave of protest in Iran's 'movement society' has shown signs of having a 'movement society' for years. On one hand, there is a sequence of crises; on the other hand, every social and economic issue has the potential to become political; and there is a significant distrust between society and the existing government. Economic inequality, corruption, dissatisfaction with the political and cultural behavior of the government, combined with Iran's young demographic and the criticism from women—especially the educated segment—about their situation, as well as the depreciation of currency and unemployment, and the widespread presence of citizens on social media, have significantly increased the likelihood of protests, as we have witnessed in recent days. Although the government has ostensibly suppressed the Green Movement and confined its leaders, the people have been taking to the streets since 2009. Stopping this 'foot' is not only difficult but seems unlikely. The protest movement exists beneath the surface of society and has now manifested again, with a new pretext and a new configuration, despite the recent presidential elections. 2. The hidden dissatisfaction of the majority is assumed. It is hard to doubt the claim that most citizens of Iran are dissatisfied with the current situation for various reasons. The dissatisfaction present in different social layers has different themes. The army of unemployed individuals, most of whom are graduates of higher education institutions, the multitude of workers dissatisfied with rising prices and delayed wages, the mass of young people protesting against social-cultural strictures, the angry underprivileged classes due to economic stagnation and widespread inflation and corruption, women and girls demanding freedom of dress, and religious and ethnic groups feeling inequality and oppression—all of these exist independently of citizens concerned about political freedom and democracy and similar concepts. This dissatisfaction does not necessarily mean that the protests will take on a large scale; although the possibility of their expansion is not ruled out. 3. Not all dissatisfied individuals have taken to the streets. The urban middle class and underprivileged layers are present among the protesters, but for various reasons, not all dissatisfied individuals from these two major groups (the cultural middle class and the underprivileged) are participating in the marches. Some of them participated in the recent presidential elections and are considered supporters of Rouhani's government, still connected to the political forces supporting the government (especially reformists and their strategy), and hopeful for gradual reforms relying on the established government. However, it can be confidently said that among the protesters, there are citizens regretting their participation in the elections or disappointed with Rouhani's government. Yet, it seems that a significant portion of citizens who supported Rouhani in the last elections have not reached disappointment with the moderate government; let alone that they would take to the streets out of anger towards the government's record. A significant portion of citizens are also likely evaluating the 'cost-benefit' of participating in the protest marches and calculating the potential gains and losses. The coming days will clarify whether the weight of the protesters will increase or whether they will diminish due to suppression and threats. Alongside these slogans, one cannot overlook the references to 'Reza Shah' and the Pahlavi dynasty in some marches; slogans like 'We revolted, what a mistake we made' and 'Reza Shah! May your soul rest in peace.' This significant occurrence comes at a time when about four decades have passed since the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the change of the political regime in Iran. However, the political authority has failed to establish the goals of the revolution and the necessity of achieving them in public opinion, despite all the resources and propaganda, educational, and ideological institutions at its disposal. 4. The ping-pong of online social networks and the streets. It is the era of communication and information technology; in a context where technology has facilitated the exchange and transfer of data, and at a time when the manager of 'Telegram' has announced that this messaging service has about 40 million users in Iran, there is a significant exchange between visible protests and citizens' hidden discontent. The viral sharing of videos in millions has, on one hand, encouraged more citizens in various parts of the country to express their protests, and on the other hand, has pushed the element of fear to the margins under the shadow of established repression and the ruling religious dictatorship. Although the not-so-distant experience of a significant portion of citizens with the bloody suppression of the Green Movement (in 2009 and 2010) and the concerns of others about changes or threats to their livelihood have reduced their participation to that of 'discontented observers' present in online social networks. The increase of several hundred thousand members in a Telegram channel (Amadnews) in a few days forced Rouhani's Minister of Communications to request the suspension of its activities from Telegram's management, which is a significant indication. Regardless of the judgment about the output and approach of this channel, the mere increase in its popularity is sufficiently thought-provoking and a significant sign of growing discontent and the expansion of protest waves. 5. Slogans that transcended economics. The cries of protest and slogans raised in the recent protests in various cities have a very important theme. The slogans began with economic demands in Mashhad and continued here and there, but quickly fell under the shadow of explicit and radical political slogans. 'Death to the dictator' and 'Independence, freedom, Iranian republic,' in both negative and positive aspects, may be the most important slogans of the recent protests. Although slogans like 'You have made Islam a staircase, you have made the people miserable' or 'Leave Syria, think about us' also reflect the visible opposition of protesters to the established ideological government and its regional policies; an opposition that clarifies the lack of legitimacy and democratic authority of the core power in the Islamic Republic. Alongside these slogans, one cannot overlook the references to 'Reza Shah' and the Pahlavi dynasty in some marches; slogans like 'We revolted, what a mistake we made' and 'Reza Shah! May your soul rest in peace.' This significant occurrence comes at a time when about four decades have passed since the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the change of the political regime in Iran. However, the political authority has failed to establish the goals of the revolution and the necessity of achieving them in public opinion, despite all the resources and propaganda, educational, and ideological institutions at its disposal. A very important occurrence is this unprecedented rupture; there is no reference to the manifestations or signs of the Islamic Revolution, and the protesters have delineated their boundaries with the entirety of the political power structure. 6. The gap between social forces and political forces. The recent protests in Iran are an almost unprecedented event in the history of the Islamic Republic. Perhaps for the first time, such extensive marches are taking place in the country; of course, after the Green Movement. In the early 1990s, some cities witnessed protests and unrest with economic themes; however, this time the scale of the marches and especially the theme of the slogans raised are different. A noteworthy point is that the emergence of recent protests is independent of the presence and position of effective political forces in the political power structure. In other words, in the recent protests, no reformist party or principlist group has stood alongside the protesters. Targeting the top of the political system and raising slogans that transcend the established government has not been acceptable for the reformists supporting Rouhani's government and committed to the constitution, nor for the principlists claiming allegiance to the Supreme Leader. Thus, a noticeable gap has emerged between some social forces demanding structural change and meaningful transformation and the political forces connected to the power bloc in the Islamic Republic; a gap that will not only affect the position of political forces and their influence but also the future of political developments in Iran. From this perspective, it is now the reformists who must clarify their position regarding the protests; whether to stand with the protesters and show solidarity with their fundamental demands, or to remain silent and insist on their strategy of gradual reforms relying on Rouhani's government and election-oriented processes. 7. Unprecedented damage to the credibility and legitimacy of leadership. The stance of Mousavi and Karroubi against the judgment of the Supreme Leader after the presidential elections, coinciding with the protests of millions of citizens against the results of those elections, was an unprecedented event in the Islamic Republic. Eight years after the 2009 elections, and at a time when Ayatollah Khamenei had managed to significantly repair his legitimacy crisis and that of the government through the holding of two presidential elections in 2013 and 2017 and the parliamentary elections in 2016, the recent protests have dealt a new shock and significant blow to the credibility and legitimacy of the ailing leader. It is very unlikely that the head of the political system is unaware of the level of dissatisfaction among social layers and his position in the eyes of the majority of Iranians; however, the shouting of 'Death to the dictator' and the respectful, sarcastic, or insulting demands of protesters for the leadership to step down from power tells another story. This time, Ayatollah Khamenei has been targeted by ridicule and opposition in front of tens of millions of Iranians and many international observers. This is an unprecedented and new blow to the regime based on the absolute rule of the jurist and to the person of the leader of the system. A very important occurrence that indicates that the legitimacy crisis in the Islamic Republic has not been resolved. 8. The outcome of the protest demonstrations. On paper, and in the current conditions, one might argue that due to the imbalance of the government's hard power and the disintegration of the protesters and the lack of organization and purposefulness of the marches, the protests may fail, leading to a new round of repression and increased political closure and censorship, as well as despair and isolation for dissatisfied citizens. However, if the protests continue and the population of angry and dissatisfied individuals with the current situation increases, the occurrence of unforeseen events and the emergence of severe challenges for the central power in the Islamic Republic will not be far-fetched. Challenges that could simultaneously extend to the economic sphere alongside the political-security arena. However, independent of what will happen in the future, the undeniable reality is the serious damage to Rouhani's government and the political authority in Iran. At a time when economic stagnation and crisis have gripped the moderate government and beyond, the entry of many citizens into the streets can be concerning for the prevailing authoritarianism in Iran. Unless rational prudence and realistic instrumental rationality devise a strategy for national reconciliation and rely on significant changes. There are no hopeful signs indicating that such a possibility exists within the government. The root of the crisis in Iran relates to the prevailing authoritarianism and the lack of the components and elements of 'good governance.' As long as the central power does not provide a principled and convincing response and a correct and comprehensive reaction to the root of the crisis, protests will continue within the 'movement society' of Iran; even if the recent marches are contained.