Elections 94; Hassan Rouhani the 'Most Likely Candidate' for the Next Leader

More than a quarter of a century has passed since Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership, yet there has never been any talk within domestic circles about appointing a successor for him. This is while, during the life of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Assembly of Experts had at least once appointed someone as 'Deputy Leader.' The reason why a successor has not yet been appointed for Ayatollah Khamenei, while one was determined for Ayatollah Khomeini, may well be due to the age of the founder of the Islamic Republic, who was 76 at the time of the Islamic Revolution. It is well-known that upon his return to Iran, he had to visit his doctor due to the pressure of the crowd. In such circumstances, appointing a deputy leader was a precautionary and prudent measure. Ayatollah Khomeini passed away at the age of 87 while the Islamic Republic was in a deadlock regarding the appointment of the next leader due to the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri from his deputy position. Ayatollah Khamenei's hospitalization in September 2014, which was unusually publicized and covered extensively by the media, posed a significant question to everyone: Who is the next leader of the Islamic Republic? Elections 94 and speculation about the next leader According to statistics, the participation rate in the Assembly of Experts elections is usually lower than that in parliamentary and presidential elections. However, in addition to the merging of the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in 2015, the atmosphere of this election indicated that public opinion was giving importance to the Assembly of Experts elections parallel to the parliamentary elections. Coincidentally, the behavior of the Guardian Council in heightening public sensitivity to the Assembly of Experts elections was one of the effective factors in the people's attention to the Assembly of Experts elections. The Guardian Council approved only 166 out of 801 candidates for the Assembly (21%), including disqualifying Hassan Khomeini despite all the costs he had for the Guardian Council. In addition to all these disqualifications, it was ridiculous that 5 out of the 6 clerics on the Guardian Council themselves became candidates for the Assembly. Now, according to the results of the Assembly of Experts elections, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rouhani are the top two candidates elected to the Assembly, while Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Yazdi, and many of the leader's appointees have failed to enter the Assembly. Although by law, the next leader of the Islamic Republic does not necessarily have to be chosen from among the members of the Assembly and can be someone outside the Assembly, it is strongly believed that such an event will not occur. If the next leader is to be appointed, it is highly likely that one of the newly elected members of the Assembly will be chosen for this position. In this assumption, who is the most likely candidate? The reason that brought Khamenei to leadership Hashemi Rafsanjani's account of the deadlock that Ayatollah Montazeri's dismissal brought to the system is well-known to all. In the meeting to appoint the new leader in June 1989, he recounted a story that went as follows: 'In a meeting attended by the heads of the three branches, the Prime Minister, and Haj Ahmad Agha in the presence of the Imam, we discussed with the Imam that we would later have problems with the Constitution because there might be a leadership vacuum. He said: 'There will be no leadership vacuum; you have a person.' It was asked: 'Who?' He pointed to Ayatollah Khamenei in the presence of others and said: 'This Mr. Khamenei.' Later, in a meeting where I was alone with the Imam, I expressed my concerns more clearly and said: 'What should we do about leadership given the current situation (the dismissal of Montazeri)? We have no one.' The Imam replied: 'With Mr. Khamenei, why are you so doubtful?' If this account is accurate (as there is no sound, image, or written record of it), Hashemi played a significant role in preventing a council-led leadership and, at the same time, in choosing Khamenei. Among all the options that could have been in Ayatollah Khomeini's mind at that time, he established three traditions by pointing to Ali Khamenei to find a way out of the leadership deadlock: First: He removed the condition of marja'iyyat (religious authority) from the conditions for the leadership candidate. Second: He transferred the selection of the leader from outside the Assembly to within the Assembly. Third: He suddenly elevated the then-President Ali Khamenei, who was referred to as 'Hojjat al-Islam' in terms of religious rank, to Ayatollah. The fifth Assembly of Experts is now being formed under conditions where among its 88 members, only two have held the presidency: Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rouhani. Coincidentally, these two are the top elected members of the Assembly of Experts with the highest votes. Of these two, Hashemi Rafsanjani is currently 81 years old. His qualification for the 2013 presidential election was rejected by the Guardian Council solely on the grounds of his advanced age. It is unclear how old he will be when the next leader is determined. He is 5 years older than the current leader, and moreover, the factions that could not tolerate his presidency over the Assembly are unlikely to tolerate his leadership. However, the other presidential member of the Assembly, Hassan Rouhani, is currently 67 years old. While he had the support of Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami for victory in the 2013 presidential election, it is important that he has always been one of Khamenei's trusted individuals. From 1989 to 2013, he represented Khamenei as a member of the Supreme National Security Council. His record includes five terms as a representative of the people in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and vice-presidency in the fourth and fifth terms. He has also been a representative of the people of Tehran in the Assembly of Experts since 1999 and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council since 1991. Rouhani served as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran from 1989 to 2004 and was appointed by Mohammad Khatami as the head of the nuclear negotiating team and senior negotiator regarding Iran's nuclear program. In addition to his religious studies at the level of ijtihad, he holds a doctorate in constitutional law from Glasgow Caledonian University. He is also a licensed attorney. However, in the author's opinion, the most significant intellectual transformations of Hassan Rouhani from a 'revolutionary' to a 'jurist' occurred when he served as the head of the Strategic Research Center of the Expediency Discernment Council from 1992 to 2013 and invited intellectuals such as Dr. Mahmoud Sariolghalam, which fostered the growth of pragmatism and a distancing from revolutionary fervor in him. Now, with the resolution of the nuclear issue, Rouhani has become a prominent figure in Iran's political system. Although the resolution of the nuclear crisis was only conceivable with Khamenei's approval, the people who poured into the streets during the nuclear celebration expressed their gratitude to him with the slogan 'Thank you, Rouhani,' not to Khamenei. Perhaps a survey will show whether public opinion attributes the resolution of the nuclear crisis to Khamenei or to Rouhani. In terms of his political approach, although he has not introduced himself as a reformist, he is also not among the hardline conservatives. His slogan of moderation and the cabinet he has formed are evidence that he has tried to stand in the middle of the two main currents of the system. If necessary for the appointment of the next leader, it can be strongly assumed that he will have the votes of Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Karroubi, and Mir Hossein Mousavi. In addition to the public support he currently enjoys, he has a significant executive record, including important positions during the war, in the parliament, in nuclear negotiations, and now as president. Calculations on paper What has been outlined is merely a calculation that can be referred to on paper, meaning if the next leadership is to be chosen from within the Assembly and not in a council-like manner, and if no power struggle occurs, it is likely for various reasons, including suitable age, education, work record, etc., that Hassan Rouhani is the best candidate for the next leader, who coincidentally also carries the second vote from Tehran with him. In this equation, the influence of powerful institutions such as the current leader, religious authorities, the Revolutionary Guards, and the market institutions has not been factored in, nor has the positive or negative influence of institutions such as universities or the impact of Rouhani's presidency if it fails been considered. What this writing claims is nothing more than that the results of the Assembly of Experts elections of 2015 have significantly helped to solidify the positions of Rafsanjani and Rouhani, who are, coincidentally, the only members of the Assembly who have also held the presidency. The claim of this writing is that if Ayatollah Khomeini transferred leadership to the Assembly and pointed to the then-president among the members of that time, the most likely candidate to repeat this scenario now is Hassan Rouhani, provided that we do not witness a power struggle (for example, support from the Revolutionary Guards for Mojtaba Khamenei).