Elections and the Balance of Power in Iran

The elections on March 7 are the first test of holding elections under Hassan Rouhani's government. Two sensitive elections are taking place: on one hand, the fate of the seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) for another four years will be determined, a parliament that has had intense conflicts with the executive branch during the two years of Rouhani's presidency. On the other hand, the Assembly of Experts is also set to hold elections. Although this assembly has had a more ceremonial role in recent years, the growing questions about the future of leadership in Iran have led to increased scrutiny of the election process for its members. This program addresses the question of how the alignment and configuration that these elections will create will impact the balance of power in Iran and the relationship between the institutions of power. What we see today in the political arena of countries regarding the separation of powers into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches has its roots in the thoughts of philosophers from centuries ago, including Montesquieu. In 1748, in 'The Spirit of the Laws,' he wrote about the tripartite separation of powers: 'Political freedom is the tranquility of mind that comes from the opinion each person has of his security. To obtain this freedom, it is necessary that the government be organized in such a way that no one fears another.' This thought laid the groundwork for what is somewhat reflected today in Article 57 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to this article, the governing powers in the Islamic Republic of Iran consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which operate independently of one another. Although a significant part of Article 57 contradicts the thinking that many political science philosophers wanted to use to make the separation of powers a tool against dictatorship, in Iran's Constitution, the three branches operate under the absolute guardianship of the leader and the leadership of the community. Ehsan Mehrabi states that elections for the Majlis have, in some cases, led to changes in the political configuration, citing the fifth Majlis elections as an example. Although the Supreme Leader ultimately determines macro policies in today's Iran, the three branches operate somewhat separately in daily political affairs while influencing each other's performance. In the months we have passed, the performance of the Majlis, especially some of its representatives regarding the nuclear agreement, has been an example of the conflict between the executive and legislative branches. Arrests or pressures on social activists, journalists, dual nationals, and other cases are evaluated by many analysts as the competition between Iran's judiciary and the executive branch under Hassan Rouhani. Therefore, the upcoming elections may play a role in establishing or disrupting the balance of power among the three branches and other power institutions. Ehsan Mehrabi, who has been a parliamentary reporter in Iran for years and now resides in Germany, shares his experience with Radio Farda: 'Elections for the Majlis have, in some cases, led to changes in the political configuration and balance of power independently. For example, in the fifth Majlis elections, it changed the existing political alignments or at least made them public in the public space. Sometimes, the Majlis elections alone cannot change the balance of power and the political configuration, and the existing political configuration continues.' In recent days and weeks, speculation about the configuration of the future Majlis has emerged in political circles. This configuration will determine the relationship between the legislative body and other power institutions. One of the more frequently heard estimates is that the upcoming Majlis configuration will not change fundamentally but will align more closely with the executive branch with a center-right approach. Reza Alijani, a political analyst residing in Paris, believes: 'My guess is that the composition of the Majlis will not change significantly overall. That is, traditional right-wing forces and conservative factions close to the leader will still hold the upper hand. However, some extremist factions may give way to more moderate or reformist forces. Thus, the influence of the extreme right will decrease somewhat, and the Majlis may cooperate more with the government. Also, the Majlis does not have much power against the judiciary's dominance.' Farrokh Negahdar believes that the composition of the tenth Majlis will differ from that of the ninth Majlis, and the Guardian Council's strategy to make it resemble the ninth Majlis will face a negative response from the people. However, another group of analysts sees the current government's experience as a precursor to change in the future Islamic Consultative Assembly and believes that the moderate slogans of Hassan Rouhani's government can transform the future Majlis configuration. Farrokh Negahdar, a political analyst residing in Britain, is among those who tell Radio Farda: 'The most important issue is that the extreme right, which showcased itself by opposing the JCPOA last year, has almost lost all its ground in society. Unlike 2011, when it was dominant and managed to secure a considerable number of Majlis seats in the vacuum created after the events of 2009, now, with the people's emergence and the change in spirit among the reformist and moderate spectrum of the country and their interest in participating in elections and the positive response of the people to the actions taken, including the JCPOA, it seems that in the upcoming elections, the extreme right will not find a place for itself. Regarding the moderate spectrum in the principlist camp, they have managed to somewhat establish an independent position by separating themselves from the extremist faction, including Mr. Larijani's decision to run independently in the elections. My assessment is that the composition of the tenth Majlis will differ from that of the ninth Majlis, and the Guardian Council's strategy to make the tenth Majlis resemble the ninth will face a negative response from the people.' Nevertheless, the institution referred to as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, one of the three branches in Iran, although its members are elected by the people, is not considered one of the powerful institutions in the Islamic Republic due to the oversight of higher institutions such as the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Discernment Council over its decisions. However, Reza Alijani in Paris, recalling that the configuration of the parliament will not be very fruitful in terms of the national balance of power, believes this impact is significant at local levels, stating: 'More than half of the Majlis representatives come from cities that have a single representative. In these cities, the Friday prayer leader, the IRGC, and the government are the three pillars of power. If the representative aligns with the IRGC and the Friday prayer leader, the atmosphere of the city is more closed, and it affects the configuration of forces there at the local level. But if they think differently and align somewhat with the current government, they can create a balance. Younger forces, the student movement, women, and others in the region can use the representative and their relative power to present their agenda.' Alongside this function, Mr. Alijani also mentions another important function of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stating: 'The important impact that the Majlis has is creating an atmosphere in the country. It can facilitate the government's work through political atmospherics. For example, if the JCPOA had a Majlis more aligned with the government, it would have progressed better. Or in some cases, figures like Mr. Motahari could increase and have more influence.' Ali Motahari is one of the representatives who has made headlines in recent years, especially during the 2009 presidential election, with his statements in the Majlis. He is one of the principlist representatives who has repeatedly spoken about issues such as the house arrest of the leaders of the election protesters. The social feedback of the actions of the Majlis representatives and the balance of social power is a topic that Farrokh Negahdar in Britain also emphasizes, stating: 'In the social aspect, regardless of how much the Guardian Council eliminates candidates, a new balance of power will emerge in terms of the number of votes... that is, how many of us there are and how many of you there are. That is, how much support there is for the reformist and moderate spectrum, how much support there is for the government's policies, and how much support there is for the opponents of the government's policies. In the worst case, I think the social balance of power, meaning the counting of votes, will show a significant transformation after March 7. This will change the spirit of the people, give them courage, and allow them to take further steps.' Reza Alijani states that the Islamic Republic has so far experienced reformism at the level of president, minister, and representative but has not experienced it at the level of leader. Alongside the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly on March 7, Iranian voters must also make another important choice. Voters must send clerics to the Assembly of Experts to carry out its duties of determining and overseeing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic for eight years, according to Article 107 of the Constitution. This function, which has not been particularly evident in recent years, could be decisive for the balance of power in the coming years of the Islamic Republic. Reza Alijani believes in this regard: 'When it comes to the selection of the leader, due to the concentration of powers that legally and factually exist in the Islamic Republic concerning the leader, a change in leadership can drastically alter the balance of power. It can also transfer power from one faction to another. In the transition of leadership from Mr. Khomeini to Mr. Khamenei, a political current that was in the upper hand was sidelined, and another current came to the center of power, although both leaders were extremist leaders. If we assume that the Assembly of Experts can bring a more moderate leadership to power, because the head of the judiciary is under the leader, and the Guardian Council is similarly positioned, the IRGC, and the state media, this could significantly change the political atmosphere and perhaps be the greatest opportunity for the largest reform in the power structure of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic has so far experienced reformism at the level of president, minister, and representative but has not experienced it at the level of leader. What happened in the Eastern Bloc, for example, the former Soviet Union with Khrushchev and later with Gorbachev.' All these predictions depend on how the final list of candidates for the elections of the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly is formed. Although the political arena, like other arenas, is always subject to change.