Elections and the Claim of the Representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC

Ali Saidi, the representative of the Supreme Leader in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), recently stated: "The IRGC has not interfered in any elections, does not, and will not." At first glance, this statement from the representative of the Islamic Republic's leader in the IRGC seems commendable; however, what relation does this claim have with the current realities in Iran today? The claim by the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC comes at a time when Hassan Rouhani, in the last debate among presidential candidates, posed a thought-provoking question to Ebrahim Raisi; the President asked Raisi: "Ask those who bring crowds to you by bus from cities; where do these revolutionary and security institutions get their money from? They are doing this with public funds." Regardless of Rouhani's important observation — made in front of tens of millions of viewers — a glance at the outputs of two news agencies affiliated with the IRGC makes the matter clearer. "Tasnim" and "Fars," two news agencies linked to the security apparatus governing the IRGC, have not only campaigned against Rouhani in recent weeks, particularly in the past few days, but have also actively promoted Raisi. In other words, the outputs of these two news agencies and other propaganda arms affiliated with the IRGC (including the publication Sobhe Sadegh) provide sufficient evidence against the claim of the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC. However, independent of what is happening, the history of the IRGC contradicts this claim. Two significant pieces of evidence of the IRGC's interference in elections are presented below. First; the protest letter from Karroubi in 2005. After the ninth presidential election, Mehdi Karroubi wrote an unprecedented open letter to the Supreme Leader, stating: "If some friends in the IRGC and Basij are to access centers of power, the best course of action is to assign these responsibilities directly to them rather than using the IRGC's credibility to bring some to power and committing illegal acts in this process." Karroubi emphasized to the Supreme Leader that "the crisis resulting from inappropriate interference in elections is the most dangerous crisis threatening the country today and in the future." This (the IRGC's interference in elections and in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) was not only Karroubi's claim; Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the then President, also prepared a report on military interference in the 2005 elections. Khatami complained about some IRGC commanders for their interference in the elections; however, legal follow-up on the matter, as expected, did not reach a conclusion. The lack of an independent and impartial judiciary and the close ties of the security apparatus governing the IRGC with the top of the political system explain a significant part of the story. Another; the IRGC's interference in the 2009 electoral coup. Another significant evidence is the interference of the security forces governing the IRGC in the process and outcome of the 2009 presidential election and the subsequent bloody crackdown and events. The IRGC's commander-in-chief, in an important speech to the commanders of this force, documented significant evidence of this matter for observers. Mohammad Ali Jafari, in this speech — the film of which was published — referred to the "sensitivity" of the 2009 election, mentioning the "concern and anxiety" and "red line" that was significant for him and other security officials governing the IRGC; he spoke of this "threat" that "the forces opposing the revolution and the values of the revolution, who had found an opportunity during the second Khordad and infiltrated the government, would come back to power." Jafari emphasized in this important speech that the process and "slope" of the ninth presidential election was such that "it would definitely have been a two-round election, and in the second round, it was unclear what the result would be." Interestingly, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC brazenly states the prohibition of military interference in elections, asserting: "In this election and the events that followed, it became clear why they insist so much that the IRGC and Basij, under the title of military forces, should not interfere in elections at all. We should not interfere so that they can do their work and the IRGC and Basij do not pose any obstacles for them." He explicitly mentions the result and impact of the IRGC and Basij's interference in the 2005 elections and the violent suppression of the civil protests of the "Green Movement." The illegal interference of the security forces governing the IRGC and Basij in elections occurs in various ways and with different tools at different times; interference that happens on two levels: affirmative (proactive) and negative (denying). The IRGC's intelligence organization is involved in preparing reports about candidates from the very stage of approving candidates for elections (especially for the parliament and presidency, and even for the Assembly of Experts and councils). Furthermore, the special relationship of the Supreme Leader with this security institution has made it one of the power sources in the Islamic Republic; because it leaves a significant impact on decisions, judgments, and political actions at the top of the political system during elections. In addition to these, supporting their own candidates in elections using organized human resources in military and paramilitary networks, and attempting to threaten rival campaign headquarters or disrupt and limit the field activities of non-affiliated candidates; promotional activities in favor of aligned candidates in IRGC-affiliated media and also media actions against rivals and non-aligned candidates by these propaganda arms; and also providing material support to like-minded candidates using major economic enterprises (such as Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters and the Foundation of Cooperation) and affiliated companies and seemingly retired and wealthy forces related to the IRGC; are some other methods of direct and indirect security interference of the IRGC in elections. On another level, it should be noted the summons and detention of human resources from rival campaign headquarters by the IRGC's intelligence organization; an encounter that has also occurred in recent elections (as only two examples: the summons of Mostafa Tajzadeh and Abdollah Ramazanzadeh). The security forces governing the IRGC's misuse of the barracks at their disposal and mobile ballot boxes related to military locations is another significant ambiguity and flaw in elections in the Islamic Republic. In addition to all this, the candidacy of military-security forces after formal retirement should also be mentioned; an occurrence that especially in council and parliamentary elections has undeniable political consequences for the institutions related to elections. All of this creates a situation that raised the voice of Rouhani's criticism three years ago: "If guns, money, newspapers, websites, and advertisements are gathered in one place, corruption will definitely arise." Rouhani also made a significant remark last December at the beginning of electoral activities, stating: "We must all be careful that during the elections, public and governmental resources are not used in favor of a specific individual, group, or faction; this is forbidden and prohibited. Just as if a military, armed, and security force violates this, we must stand against it and protest." However, this protest, of course, will not have a desirable outcome without relying on social power. To change this situation — which is one of the factors distancing elections in Iran from the standards of "free, fair, and just elections" — there is no way but to rely on civil society. Without the presence of critical and protesting social forces, the security-military personnel will have a greater thirst for interference in elections.