Elections and the Dilemma of Government Supporters and Reformists

"The Moderation and Development Party" did not attend the Sunday meeting of the "Supreme Council for Election Policy of Reformists." The party has supported Mohammad Khatami, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Hassan Rouhani in the presidential elections of 2001, 2005, and 2013, respectively, and included several reformists in its electoral lists during the sixth and eighth terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Gholamali Dehghan, a representative of this party, told the state-run Iran newspaper after last week's meeting of the Reformists' Policy Council that today moderation faces a rival he describes as "extremism like the Front of Steadfastness" (a group close to Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi). He added that "the Moderation and Development Party" is trying to include both reformists and moderate conservatives in its list. From Gholamali Dehghan's remarks, it appears he opposes competition between the "Moderation and Development Party" and the conservative supporters of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament. Additionally, the readiness of the United Front, which includes ministers from the ninth and tenth governments or former allies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for participation in the upcoming elections in Esfand should be noted. Given these developments, will the upcoming elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts be bipolar, tripolar, or take another form? In other words, will the moderate and government-supporting faction unite with the reformists against the conservative faction, or will there be three separate lists of candidates facing the voters, or is another scenario taking shape? We discussed these questions with four guests on this week's Perspectives program: Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, a member of the Central Council of the National Trust Party in Mashhad; Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, Secretary-General of the Democratic Front of Iran in Tehran; Taghi Rahmani, a political activist and analyst from the National-Religious faction in Paris; and Fariba Adelkhah, a researcher at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and a lecturer in Iranian Studies at the New Sorbonne University. Mr. Javadi Hesari, considering that there are nearly three months left until the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, and there has been no news of a joint meeting of reformists and moderates, under what circumstances will the elections be bipolar between conservatives and a coalition of moderates and reformists, and under what circumstances will it be tripolar, with separate electoral lists from each of the three factions of the government? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: If we look at the issue realistically, meaning both moderates and reformists should realistically assess their capacity, which shaped Mr. Rouhani's victory, they will realize that this capacity is very fragile. Given the past conditions, reproducing that capacity and increasing it without careful consideration can be provocative and fragile. If reformists and moderates act separately and try to mobilize parts of society, the likelihood of failure for reformists will increase. However, if they look at the issue realistically, the votes split from extremist conservatives, namely moderates and reformists inclined toward Mr. Hashemi, can be a good capacity alongside other reformists to shape the general transformation seekers of society and create a bipolarity against the right-wing current, essentially creating two arrows: one side being conservatives and the other side being moderates and reformists together. Now we need to define mechanisms in between to measure the capacity of each side proportionately. One of the concerns currently is that reformists might think that if they merge with moderates, their capacity will remain ambiguous and unmeasured, and moderates might think that joining the reformists could leave them behind, saying they have no capacity. If a parameter can be defined to measure capacity within a collective, I believe it would be the best situation to place moderates and reformists in one front and conservatives in another. Mr. Tabarzadi, you heard what Mr. Javadi Hesari said. I know that you and your political allies have not yet reached all the necessary conclusions about the appropriate electoral behavior of your dissenting current. However, you have experienced the political intricacies over the past 37 years, both inside and outside the government, in prison and outside of it, and you are capable of answering the question of what factors influence the bipolarity and tripolarity of the elections? Heshmatollah Tabarzadi: Well, if we say elections... according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we do not consider this as an election... but what is happening in the name of elections will, in my opinion, become extremely bipolar in the future. One side will be the current of Mr. Rafsanjani, Mr. Rouhani, and so-called moderates, and the other side will be the forces that are labeled as "concerned" which, with the interventions of the IRGC, will be revealed as a military political party and the clampdowns that have begun will show that this current is set to interfere more in the elections. I think the main competition will be between these two currents, namely the reformists, the truly free reformists who will be completely disqualified, and the factions close to the fighting clerics who will try to ally with the moderates. I even believe that in this serious and polarized competition, Mr. Larijani's current and more moderate conservatives will come closer to Mr. Rouhani's current and will likely even win the elections. Because the repression and clampdowns against or from the moderates will also be significant. Let's move from Tehran to the besieged city of Paris. First, let's turn to Mr. Taghi Rahmani. Mr. Rahmani, you represent a strand of the National-Religious faction that voted for Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 presidential elections, but recently we have seen some criticisms from you regarding the performance of the government and the moderate faction. How do you see it? What factors are influential this time in the bipolarity or tripolarity of the elections? Taghi Rahmani: You do not have elections in the sense of elections in Iran. Let's move past that. We have said many times that to prevent the situation from worsening and for us not to become Iraq or Afghanistan, we currently have bureaucrats who are from Mr. Hashemi's and Mr. Rouhani's factions, against the military. This key-playing of influence is a dangerous game that I fear will also affect the elections. The Iranian right wants to have traditional right within itself. It also has the implicit support of Mr. Khamenei. This can polarize the elections. As Mr. Tabarzadi said, between bureaucrats, there is a Rouhani and Hashemi government and the right and extreme right. The Guardian Council can assist in this polarization. I do not see much room for moderate reformists either. Unless radical reformists inherently have a lot of positions, unless the Guardian Council plays a complex game and increases the approvals. But right now, the elections are likely bipolar, and in this way, they are bipolar. The reformists' capacity is more than logistical support. We must also be careful that the elections, unlike the sixth parliamentary elections, are not about personalities and parties. Unfortunately, it is just a game of personalities. Our society has regressed in these eight years and has not advanced politically or in the alignment of forces. However, one factor can polarize the elections and create a favorable situation for the bureaucratic faction. The people's vote will be between bad and worse, meaning their choice will be between the political scene. Bureaucrats will vote. This is a probable state. A complex scenario could also emerge where the extreme right retreats, and Mr. Khamenei gives a green light to Mr. Larijani to bring the extreme right and traditional right closer, which I believe will create a dangerous parliament. That is, a parliament of the traditional right and Mr. Rouhani. This possibility also exists. We cannot overlook this. Because Mr. Khamenei makes tactical softening moves and buys time in these tactical softening moves. In my opinion, this could happen to the benefit of bureaucrats and reformists. A third scenario could emerge in the elections, which is a civil parliament of reformists, not in the sense of being pro-reformists. A parliament that has more civil figures in it, meaning they are a step ahead of the government. This could be somewhat desirable for the current Iranian society. However, the likelihood of polarization in the elections is higher; however, in polarization, civil figures can also win votes. Because part of Iranian civil society votes in a complex, cautious, and aware manner, depending on their situation. This is a perspective that can be had about the upcoming elections. In Paris, we turn to Ms. Fariba Adelkhah, a cultural, social, and political sociologist who closely follows the movements and behaviors of factions, especially on the eve of elections. Ms. Adelkhah, what is your response to the question? What factors influence the bipolarity or tripolarity of the elections? Fariba Adelkhah: The remarks of Mr. Tabarzadi and Mr. Rahmani regarding the essence of elections and the nature of elections, which are not elections, can be said to be like many countries, elections without choice. This means that the choice is made in advance. It is done within specific networks, and people give their opinions. This is not unique to Iran. Alongside this, it should be added that the broad presence of people in any condition, this election without elections guarantees this main issue of elections, and that is why it is addressed. Another issue regarding your question about bipolarity or tripolarity is that I think we should say that elections are an opportunity for other groups... I mean, the review of the electoral process occurs during election opportunities. New circles join power, in fact. After the war, as soon as the possibility of elections was provided, it moved out of bipolar states. During Mr. Rafsanjani's time, the issue of the Executives was raised. During Mr. Khatami's time, the same. You have different circles of reformism. Participation, the two Khordadis, etc., enter and break the bipolarity of the two factions. During Mr. Ahmadinejad's time, the steadfastness faction did this more precisely. And today, during Mr. Rouhani's time, with moderation and these issues being raised. I think what we should point out is that firstly, elections have never been bipolar because there is an opportunity for the presence of other groups... Secondly, elections depend on the same reasons that Mr. Rahmani and Mr. Tabarzadi pointed out. One is the approval of candidates by the Guardian Council, and the other is a new factor added today, the issue of financial resources that candidates can have for participation in elections, and this is not an easy task. Not everyone has access to this. In a way, it throws you into a polarizing current because you need, firstly, to be approved, and secondly, you need huge financial resources to be able to enter the election round. As a result, more than being a political game, it depends on other factors. This has caused intra-factional conflicts, something we have had less of. This intra-factional conflict now cannot place more than thirty people on a list in Tehran. Who do you place to create more chances and opportunities? Let's address the implications of bipolarity for the political composition of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts and the implications of tripolarity for this issue? Mr. Javadi Hesari? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: If it becomes bipolar from the aggregation of Mr. Rouhani's government forces or the bureaucrats that friends have named, whom I call transformed moderate right-wingers who are also pursuing a kind of transformation, and their commonality with reformists is this transformation-seeking. If we name the assembly of transformation-seeking traditional right or those cut off from that current, which is now recognized under the supporters of the government or moderates... from the assembly of moderates and reformists, a powerful front will emerge that can control the extremist current and their backers, namely military parties and extralegal forces that have always been effective in Iranian society. Because if we do not do this, the parliament will lose the necessary efficiency. The electoral mechanism of the parliament in Iran is such that a strong faction, no matter how strong, if it does not have a majority vote and cannot pass in the parliament, a theoretical proposal and program, external facilities are sufficient to diminish or silence the critics' voice or faction. Therefore, if we cannot form a maximum parliament composed of a majority of reformists and moderates and a minority of conservatives, whether extremists or moderates, we will not make significant progress in implementing Mr. Rouhani's government's programs, and it is possible that the next parliament, provided that its majority is not in the hands of reformists and moderates, will create serious obstacles to the JCPOA and motivate opponents of the JCPOA to move toward voting for extremists. Therefore, the bipolarity of the parliament significantly helps the implementation of government programs and the continuation of the trend that the nation began by voting for Mr. Rouhani, and tripolarizing it, meaning a pole of reformists, a pole of moderates, and a pole of right-wing extremists, creates a situation that facilitates external influences within the parliament. That is, even if an alliance occurs between reformists and moderates within the parliament, it will be so fragile that external pressures will break that alliance apart.