Elections in Simple Terms: Party Alignments

Five months remain until the parliamentary elections in Iran, but the alignment of the principlist faction against the moderate and reformist faction is already clearly visible. Evidence suggests that this alignment will be enduring, even if it undergoes some changes. Both factions consist of parties with distinct backgrounds and varying degrees of influence on the electoral process. The cohesion among parties in the principlist camp is less than that in the moderate and reformist camp. There are also other entities that influence the elections but do not have a party nature, including the political office of the Revolutionary Guards. A - The Moderate and Reformist Camp The moderate and reformist camp (and supporters of the government) has a relative cohesion. The leadership of this organization is in the hands of the "Election Policy Council," which includes the most important parties of this camp. The Executives (Moderate) - The Executives are the strongest centrist organization and are considered supporters of Rafsanjani. After the unrest of 2009, several members of this party were arrested and their activities were hampered. However, after the 2013 election, the Executives rebuilt themselves and nearly 400 people participated in their recent "pre-congress." The party's charter is expected to be published soon. The Executives party was established during Rafsanjani's presidency by his ministers and views him as its spiritual father. The Secretary-General of the party is Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and prominent members include Mohammad Atrianfar and Mohammad Ali Najafi. The Moderation and Development Party (Moderate) - The importance of this party lies in its proximity to Hassan Rouhani and Hashemi Rafsanjani. This organization was established under Rouhani's leadership, and its secretary-general is currently Mohammad Baqer Nobakht (government spokesman). This party is known for its "right-wing tendency" among Rafsanjani's supporters and has a history dating back 15 years. They emphasize economic development and the bureaucratic and private sectors in their intellectual domain. In domestic politics, they recommend a "moderate strategy" and promote loyal parties, leaning towards gradual political development. Their organizational and media reach is unclear, but about 200 people attended their recent meeting with Rafsanjani. Fatemeh Hashemi, Akbar Turkan, and Mahmoud Vaezi are members of their central council. The Democracy Party (Moderate) - The ability of this small party was to keep itself alive as a spokesperson and standard-bearer for reformists during the years of reformist stagnation (after the 2009 unrest). Although it does not have a wide organization, its secretary-general, Mostafa Kavakebian, has managed to advance the party's position around his political initiatives. The party was established about 18 years ago after Mohammad Khatami came to power, and its impact is more due to its survival in changing political conditions. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, it collaborated with the National Trust Party (led by Mehdi Karroubi). The Union of Iranian Nation (Reformist) - The Union is introduced, rightly or wrongly, as the successor to the Participation Party and the Mojahedin of the Revolution and, in a sense, fills the void left by the dissolution of those parties. For this reason, it is considered a potentially strong force in the camp of government supporters. The party's program is titled "Promotion of Compassionate Islam, Advancement of Democracy, and Realization of Justice" and proposes "creating a space for dialogue" to achieve this. The first congress of the party was held in 2015 with over three hundred participants. Ali Shakouri Rad is the secretary-general of the Union, and many prominent political activists are members. The organizational scope of the party is unclear. The National Trust Party (Reformist) - Mehdi Karroubi is the secretary-general of the National Trust Party. After the events of 2009, the party's offices were sealed, and several of its members were arrested, leading to a suspension of their organizational activities for several years. However, with the situation calming down, especially since the beginning of this year, their organizational activities have resumed, and the National Trust Party is now engaged in the parliamentary elections. The deputy of the party is Rasoul Montajabnia, who has expressed hope that the National Trust will "gradually" advance its activities and have a significant presence in the elections. The party has a ten-year history. Neda (Reformist) - This new party's establishment has caused concern among some reformists as they have doubts about its "reformist" positions and goals. To alleviate these doubts, Neda's leaders have made efforts, including visiting Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani. The doubts apparently stem from Neda's seemingly more conservative stance while presenting itself as reformist. The party's elder statesman is Sadegh Khrazi (a former representative at the UN). Neda claims to have opened offices in most provinces and has several thousand volunteers. Other Parties - Smaller groups are also active, including the Labor Party, the Solidarity Party, and the Will of the Nation Party. B - The Principlist Camp The internal cohesion of this camp is less than that of its rival, and there is a notable ongoing tension between its hardline and moderate factions. It appears that the principlists aim to achieve a form of convergence - rather than unity or even coalition - and to advance their electoral program through division of labor, organizational flexibility, and fluid and variable convergence. Such an approach has been effective in past elections, but its effectiveness in the current conditions, given the strength of the rival, is questionable. The Society of Teachers (Traditional) - This group (including the Society of Teachers and the Society of Combatant Clergy) ranks at the leadership of the principlists and is an effective channel for the conservative clergy's influence on the elections. It has relative dominance over almost all principlist groups and determines their broader strategic framework. It seems that in the upcoming elections, it will collaborate with Mesbah Yazdi (the spiritual father of hardline principlists). The Stability Front (Hardline) - This group's behavior is very influential in determining the principlists' electoral strategy, and it could be said that the rise or decline of this group will be the most significant outcome of the 2015 elections. The Stability Front consists of former supporters of Ahmadinejad who have taken on a new identity since 2011 but have maintained their connections with his network, including Mesbah Yazdi, and despite their small numbers, they are influential in the power structure. During the elections, they collaborate with traditional principlists, but their relations with moderate principlists are tense. Their identity is based on resistance against reformism, and they reject any form of compromise. Motalefeh (Traditional) - The important role of this group in the 2015 elections is to mediate between hardline and moderate principlists. Members of this group believe in a scenario of cooperation with hardliners (as during Ahmadinejad's era) but are also aware that moderate principlists are a growing force that cannot be ignored. The social position of traditional principlists is declining, but they have influence in the government and can mobilize their organizational forces. About 400 people participated in Motalefeh's annual congress. This party claims to have 2000 members. The Front of Followers of the Line of Imam (which includes sixteen groups under the secretary-generalship of the deputy speaker of parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar) effectively operates within the framework of Motalefeh. Ahmadinejad's supporters and the Yekta group (Hardline) - Ahmadinejad's absence from the 2015 elections destabilizes the position of hardline principlists. Ahmadinejad has stated that he will neither introduce a candidate nor engage in party activities. However, his scattered speeches have led to the inference that his supporters are not disinterested in some form of presence. None of the principlist forces, except for some elements of the Stability Front, have welcomed Ahmadinejad's presence. Meanwhile, some of his supporters have gathered in the Yekta group and apparently intend to play a more active role. However, this group has also kept its distance from Ahmadinejad and has not yet shown any significant activity in the electoral scene. The forces of Ali Larijani and the Followers group (Moderate Principlists) - Ali Larijani's position as an effective element of "moderate principlism" is significant, and his role will be a determining factor in the principlists' electoral campaign. Larijani represents the city of Qom and has good relations with religious authorities. The main ideological aspect of his supporters is moderation and pragmatism within the framework of principlism. Their relations with Rouhani's government are pragmatic, and with traditional principlists, they are friendly, but with hardline principlists, they are considered bitter and tense. The capacity of Larijani's faction - known as the Followers group - is not sufficient to emerge as a party and take leadership of the principlist front. The forces of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (Moderate Principlist) - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf's position as someone who received the second-highest votes after Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 elections is noteworthy. His supporting networks are unofficial but have political and media influence. Qalibaf's personal relations with hardline principlists have been tense, and Ahmadinejad's supporting publications have referred to him as an "enemy." The relations of Qalibaf's affiliated groups with traditional principlists are generally positive, and with moderates and reformists, they have a working and pragmatic relationship. In the upcoming elections, Qalibaf's forces are likely to seek to attract traditional government supporters as well as sections of the middle class. The Martyrs and Pathfinders (Hardline) - The role of these smaller groups as supporters of the hardline tendency in the electoral scene is worth examining. Ahmadinejad was a member of the Martyrs group but was removed after his conflict with Ayatollah Khamenei. It is expected that these groups will follow the path of the Stability Front. Other Parties - Smaller groups are also active, including the Resistance Front associated with Mohsen Rezaei, which is close to the moderate principlists.