End of Vienna Nuclear Negotiations; Beginning of Marketing for Sale

Despite the multiple red lines drawn by the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the threats and media resistance from military and conservative factions, the Vienna nuclear agreement has finally been formalized and announced. From this stage until the implementation of the agreement's provisions, the two main negotiating governments face difficulties in marketing the deal domestically and internationally and executing the terms of the agreement. The agreement reached, based on the published outlines, although not comprehensive and postponing the resolution of some disputed points to later months (such as the implementation of the Additional Protocol and managed inspections of suspicious military sites in Iran including Parchin, the continuation of military sanctions, and maintaining restrictions on Iran's missile capacity for 15 years), is significantly better than what a failure of two years of negotiations could have brought. By placing extraordinary importance on negotiations that had recently been somewhat forgotten by global public opinion (except for the Iranian people), a failure of the talks could have led to the onset of a serious crisis in the region. According to the agreement reached, the Islamic Republic has finally agreed to limit its suspicious nuclear program, which is believed to pursue military objectives, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions (against the oil and gas industries, the Central Bank, and the release of billions of dollars of Iran's blocked foreign reserves), maintaining at least an annual distance of 8 to 15 years from a nuclear bomb. The joy of the Iranian people is solely related to the expected results of the lifting of sanctions and the prospect of a better life as a result of exiting the economic crisis and the relative normalization of foreign trade relations. The dissatisfaction of foreign opponents of the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement (including Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding the recognition of the one-year distance of the Islamic Republic from a nuclear bomb) is evident. The Israeli Prime Minister did not miss any opportunity to express strong opposition to the Vienna agreement. Based on the agreement reached in Vienna, the Security Council will begin reviewing the lifting of sanctions against Iran before presenting the agreement to the U.S. Congress (within 7 to 13 days). Previously, the Security Council had stated that the issue of lifting sanctions would be postponed until after a 30-day decision period in the U.S. Senate resolution of April 14. According to the Senate decision, if the text of the nuclear agreement with Iran is sent to Congress before July 10, the matter must be reviewed by U.S. lawmakers for 30 days. If the submission of the agreement to Congress is delayed until September 7, the review period would increase to sixty days. According to the agreement reached in Vienna, the Security Council will not wait for the U.S. Congress's decision and will put the agreement to a vote within two weeks, expecting it to be approved by the Security Council. Thus, Iran's demand for the immediate lifting of sanctions will be partially met, although this part of the lifting of sanctions will only pertain to the Security Council sanctions that were imposed from 2006 to 2011. The unilateral sanctions of the U.S. and Europe, which were enacted on January 1, 2012, will still await a decision from the U.S. Congress. Part of the unmet demands of the Security Council regarding the dimensions of suspicious nuclear activities believed to have military aspects is postponed until Iran cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the future. According to the agreement reached, Iran will inevitably have to open its military center to IAEA inspectors, while Iran will maintain specific provisions to preserve appearances, with inspections to be arranged in advance. Yukiya Amano, the Secretary-General of the IAEA, stated in a separate announcement, coinciding with the meeting of foreign ministers of the six member countries of the 1+5 group, that an agreement with Iran for these collaborations would be discussed within the next five months. Considering the internal political landscape in the U.S., it can be expected that the Vienna nuclear agreement of July 14 will be put to a vote by U.S. lawmakers after review and will face opposition in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Republicans in the Senate need 12 votes from Democratic senators to reject the agreement with Iran and place it outside the veto power of President Obama. The Obama administration, which has described the nuclear agreement with Iran as 'historic' and one of its major foreign policy successes, is somewhat confident that it can veto and neutralize a negative vote from the Senate in this regard. Nevertheless, Republican pressure on the administration will continue during the election campaign and over the next 18 months, impacting the Obama administration's dealings with Iran, the lifting of sanctions, and Washington-Tehran cooperation regarding regional crises. If a Republican were to enter the White House, the Vienna agreement, as Republican leaders have threatened, would be at risk. Opponents of the nuclear agreement and some of Iran's neighbors, after failing to prevent the agreement, will change their stance and focus on future cooperation with the next U.S. administration. Undoubtedly, the Vienna agreement was communicated in detail to Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, before its signing and was approved by him. However, the red lines that the leader of the Islamic Republic may have drawn to strengthen the hands of his negotiators during the negotiations were largely overlooked in the text of the agreement. The military and conservatives within the ruling establishment, who have never reconciled with the initiation of nuclear negotiations, will undoubtedly raise the shortcomings of the agreement in terms of expectations and in contrast to the red lines, especially during the implementation of the agreement, and will use this as a pretext to criticize the government. The expectation that the translation of the nuclear agreement will lead to immediate economic growth and rapid changes in living conditions in Iran is far from rational pragmatism and idealistic behavior. Aside from having a psychological impact on the currency market and ending the state of anticipation that has faced the Iranian domestic market with a deeper recession in recent years, the lifting of sanctions will require many months to have a direct impact on the Iranian economy. Moreover, the very critical state of the Iranian economy, especially in comparison to neighboring oil-rich countries, has never been a direct result of the imposition of sanctions, and as a result, the sanctions have only intensified the situation. The lifting of sanctions will not have an impact on the privatization of the Iranian economy, distancing from a state-controlled economy, changing trade regulations and currency transfers overnight, standardizing exchange rates, or reducing the depth of administrative and governmental corruption. In this regard, the Rouhani administration, which has tied many hopes to the results of reaching a nuclear agreement and lifting sanctions, will face a difficult path in marketing and selling the nuclear agreement domestically and will inevitably confront the results of internal frustrations in the coming months. Reaching a nuclear agreement, despite 20 months of exhausting negotiations and breaking the record for the longest duration of U.S. Secretary of State involvement in a single diplomatic conversation, is the easiest part of the efforts to neutralize Iran's capacity to become a nuclear military power and correspondingly lift punitive sanctions against Iran. The most difficult part will be implementing the terms of the agreement in the coming months.