Everything You Need to Know About the Snapback Mechanism in the JCPOA

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization stated that a potential recourse by European countries involved in the JCPOA to the "snapback mechanism" would mean a "complete violation of the agreement made with Iran." Mohammad Eslami said on February 3 last year on Islamic Republic television that such an action by the Europeans would provoke an appropriate response from the Islamic Republic. What is the snapback mechanism, which is not directly mentioned in the JCPOA, that has become so controversial and now threatens Tehran with its potential use? The snapback mechanism was first mentioned during a hot summer in 2015, just minutes after the nuclear agreement or JCPOA was reached, when foreign ministers smiled for photographers and took commemorative photos. In the middle of this speech, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry first used the term "snapback" to refer to the process of reinstating sanctions if Tehran fails to comply with its commitments. Since that speech and the subsequent publication of the American fact sheet, the discussion about "snapback" has always been a contentious issue in the JCPOA, especially in Tehran where critics of the nuclear agreement claimed that Iranian negotiators had agreed to terms that were detrimental to Tehran. The term "snapback" means the immediate return of a phenomenon to its previous state. But which phenomenon? According to the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" or JCPOA, this mechanism relates to seven UN Security Council sanctions resolutions. According to Annex 5 of the JCPOA, which deals with the implementation of the agreement, resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, and 2224 are considered terminated, but if Iran shows serious and blatant non-compliance with its commitments, including in the area of "limitations on the transfer of sensitive items related to proliferation," these resolutions can be reinstated. All of this was also included in a supportive Security Council resolution numbered 2231 to ensure it could be pursued within a framework based on international law. When the JCPOA was reached, it was assumed that within an eight-year timeframe, all actions would yield results, Iran's peaceful program would be confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Additional Protocol would be ratified by Iran, leading to a completely normalized status for this program. A two-year period was also set to ensure all aspects were considered, and then a final day for Resolution 2231 was determined. The end date considered is the expiration of Resolution 2231, which is ten years after the implementation date of the agreement, coinciding with October 18, 2025. However, this process will only be completed if the parties involved in the JCPOA do not use the "snapback" mechanism. Provisions 36 and 37 of the JCPOA, which address "dispute resolution," explain how this mechanism operates: if one member of the JCPOA accuses another of blatant violation of the agreement and this matter is reviewed in the JCPOA Joint Commission and the Advisory Council without reaching a conclusion, it goes to the UN Security Council. In this case, the Security Council has 30 days to vote on a resolution to continue the implementation of the JCPOA. If this resolution is not passed, the previous seven Security Council sanctions will be reinstated. This process gives Western countries the opportunity to prevent a veto from Russia and China (which currently have closer relations with Iran) while also allowing them to veto a potential resolution to continue the implementation of the JCPOA. The United States once attempted to use this mechanism during Donald Trump's first term, two years after Washington announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated at the time of announcing the use of this mechanism: "One right thing that the previous administration did was create a mechanism based on Resolution 2231, where any country that believes sanctions should be reinstated can use the snapback, and that is what we will do." However, when the U.S. went to the Security Council for this purpose, 13 council members, including Washington's closest allies, opposed it; the main reason being that the United States had exited the agreement and could not act like a JCPOA member to invoke its provisions.